



# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

## THESIS

**PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS FOR SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS FORCES IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS:  
MODELING SUCCESSFUL OVERT AND  
CLANDESTINE METHODS OF RECOVERY**

by

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June 2004

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**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**
*Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188*

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<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>	<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> June 2004	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Master's Thesis		
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:</b> Personnel Recovery Operations for Special Operations Forces in Urban Environments: Modeling Successful Overt and Clandestine Methods of Recovery		<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>		
<b>6. AUTHORS:</b> Marshall V. Ecklund and Michael A. McNerney				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A		<b>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:</b> The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy, position, or endorsement of the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Special Operations Command, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government. The original document contains color images.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b>		
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b>				
This thesis presents two prescriptive models for approaching challenges to special operations forces with regard to personnel recovery in an urban environment. It begins by developing a model for overt recovery methods, using McRaven's model of Special Operations as the foundation. This model is then tested against three different case studies from operations in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. The original six principles proposed by McRaven are complimented with four newly-prescribed principles that account for the interactions of the isolated personnel. Following this analysis, a nonconventional assisted recovery model is presented for clandestine personnel recovery methods. This model borrows the relative superiority concept from McRaven's theory, but proposes six different principles. This model is evaluated using three case studies from the World War II era through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. These cases support the idea that while the urban operational environment may vary across time and space, the principles supporting successful personnel recovery operations endure.				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS:</b> Task Force Ranger, TF Ranger, nonconventional assisted recovery, NAR, unconventional assisted recovery, UAR, McRaven, Special Operations, personnel recovery, PR, Mogadishu, Somalia, UNOSOM II, O'Leary, Korean War, IRAQI FREEDOM, GOTHIC SERPENT, CONTINUE HOPE, SOF, Urban, TF 2-14, Falcon Brigade, QRF, Super 61, Super 64, Courage 53, CSAR, JPR, JCSAR, evasion, evade, JPRA, Lynch, JSSA, SERE, QRC		<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 217		
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified		<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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FORCES IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS: MODELING SUCCESSFUL OVERT  
AND CLANDESTINE METHODS OF RECOVERY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS**

from the

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis presents two prescriptive models for approaching challenges to special operations forces with regard to personnel recovery in an urban environment. It begins by developing a model for overt recovery methods, using McRaven's model of Special Operations as the foundation. This model is then tested against three different case studies from operations in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. The original six principles proposed by McRaven are complimented with four newly-prescribed principles that account for the interactions of the isolated personnel. Following this analysis, a nonconventional assisted recovery model is presented for clandestine personnel recovery methods. This model borrows the relative superiority concept from McRaven's theory, but proposes six different principles. This model is evaluated using three case studies from the World War II era through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. These cases support the idea that while the urban operational environment may vary across time and space, the principles supporting successful personnel recovery operations endure.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In addition to the many hours of tutelage provided by our primary advisors, we would like to thank the following scholars and warriors who critiqued early drafts of this work: George Lober, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS); Kalev "Gunner" Sepp, Assistant Professor at NPS; COL Mark Bracich, Director of Policy, Doctrine, and Training (J7) for the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA); LTC Michael Whetstone, currently serving at Fort Carson, Colorado; CW4 Dale Shrader, currently serving in Stuttgart, Germany; and Thomas Durell-Young, European Program Manager at the Center for Civil-Military Relations at NPS. However, the opinions, analysis, and conclusions stated herein are ours alone, as are any mistakes or misrepresentations.

Additionally, this work would not have been possible without the support, cooperation, and clarifications provided by many of the participants of the case studies that follow: LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery; MG (Ret.) William Garrison; BG (Ret.) Larry Casper; BG (Ret.) Bill David; COL (Ret.) James Faust; LTC Michael "Tigerkhan" Whetstone; MAJ Curtis Crum; MAJ Mark A. B. Hollis; MAJ Eric Patterson; MAJ Lee Rysewyk; CW4 Dale Shrader; and others who wished to remain anonymous.

We have also benefited greatly from the support of several members of the rescue community while conducting both related and specific research (alphabetically): MG (Ret.) David Baratto; Lawrence "RB" Barnes; Dan Baumgartner; COL Mark Bracich; Ms. Julia Coco; Mike Dozier; Al Erickson; Bob Falise; Fred Kleibacker; Ron McNeal; Bob Mohan; Dave Pitts; Ms. Mona Scott; COL (Ret.) Dave Plummer; and Darrel "Nail 25" Whitcomb.

Finally, we would like to acknowledge the fine men and women of our Armed Forces who have selflessly answered the call of duty in dangerous places around the globe while we worked to capture lessons learned for future generations. Without their sacrifices to protect our way of life, we would not have been able to shamelessly enjoy the secure environment of the Monterey Peninsula—but, we would have gladly traded places with anyone deployed in harm's way, and welcome getting back to reality.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. MODELING HOW SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUCCEED IN PERSONNEL RECOVERY

According to *Joint Military Doctrine for Urban Operations* (JP 3-06), the U.S. will conduct many military operations in urban areas in the future. These operations will occur in both high and low intensity environments across the full spectrum of military operations. This will present unique challenges for U.S. military forces, especially when conducting personnel recovery (PR) operations in support of isolated personnel (IP). The first draft revision of *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery* (JP 3-50) states that, “preserving the lives of those participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense” (2003, p. I-1). This thesis will address this priority by developing two models of PR for Special Operations Forces (SOF) operating in urban environments.

It is necessary to develop Special Operations Forces (SOF) PR models because no doctrine currently exists which specifically addresses PR missions in urban environments. Current U.S. doctrine bases the principles for the conduct of both conventional and special operations missions on two active participants—friendly and enemy forces. Carl von Clauzeewitz’s principles of war, commonly accepted in both conventional and special operations doctrinal manuals, do not adequately account for operations where the desired effect is other than the destruction of opposing forces. Likewise, William H. McRaven’s principles of special operations do not take into account the friendly, participative, third party dimension of the mission.

In the destruction or capture of an enemy target, the relationship is two-dimensional—friendly forces attempt to achieve a goal, while enemy forces endeavor to avert it. In the case of the overt rescue of friendly forces captured by the enemy, such as in a hostage rescue scenario, friendly forces again attempt to accomplish their goal, while the enemy tries to disrupt the successful rescue. Under enemy control, a hostage has minimal ability to participate or assist in his or her recovery. An IP, however, presents an active third dimension to the recovery scenario. Adversaries will likely challenge

friendly forces attempting an overt recovery, but there is also an IP actively participating in the events of the mission, whose actions directly affect the probability of mission success.

Additionally, in the case of clandestine, covert, or unconventional warfare (UW) operations conducted by SOF-trained surrogate forces, Clauzewitz's and McRaven's principles have little applicability. The military does not adequately address these missions in any of its doctrinal manuals, thus there is little available for planners or mission executors to use in the conduct of similar operations. Even the five principles for success in the conduct of UW combat operations, as stated in *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations* (FM 3-05.201), focus on unconcealed military operations conducted with guerrilla forces (2003, p. 3-43). There are no published principles, theories, models, or paradigms for establishing and maintaining a surrogate network, specifically trained to support PR operations in threat environments deemed too risky for typical and observable recovery methods.

Existing theories discuss mission success in terms of a direct action force's "superiority" relative to the enemy, but do not consider the third variable of the IP. This thesis proposes that *relative superiority*, and the broader concept of *situational superiority* (discussed in detail in section D below), are both required in order to ensure successful PR operations.<sup>1</sup> Situational superiority (SS) is nothing more than capabilities of commanders and their staff, the recovery force, and the IP all coming together at the right place in time and space in order to bring about the desired effect in the targeted area. Friendly forces can only achieve SS when the recovery assets and the IP have sufficiently exploited their operational environment and reduced the enemy's capacity to respond to the recovery attempt. While SS is a necessary precondition for successful PR operations, this does not imply that it is a sufficient condition for success. Several uncontrollable variables, such as luck, weather conditions, and things generally associated with the frictions of war, could also have an impact on the success or failure of a PR mission.

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<sup>1</sup> The term situational superiority in this paper is derived directly from the first draft revision of *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery*, (JP 3-50). While the term was directly adopted, the concept and means to attain situational superiority differs greatly from the joint publication's application of Clausewitz's principles of warfare.

## B. THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS

In order to develop succinct and precise models for SOF PR, the authors chose to limit the scope of study to the urban environment. Because it is a uniquely difficult and extraordinarily demanding environment, that the U.S. military has had little experience and even less success in exploiting, it would arguably suffice for less demanding environments. Therefore, a detailed study of this particular environment is important. For the purposes of this thesis, urban environments will include any built-up populated area. The urban setting offers a unique environment, and presents significant challenges to SOF in the conduct of PR operations. Additionally, special operations for the purposes of this study will be limited to those missions that meet the definition of a special operation as proposed by McRaven.<sup>2</sup> However, unlike McRaven's research, this study focuses primarily on two special operations PR missions involving IP—those conducted as high-risk overt or direct action (DA) missions, and those conducted as clandestine nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) missions.<sup>3</sup> JP 3-50 (2003) describes these operations as follows:

DA operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF or [special operations]-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. One of the activities that fall within the DA mission area is SOF recovery operations (p. G-2).

NAR operations are performed by special operations forces or other government agencies [OGAs] that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to recover isolated personnel using uniquely developed recovery mechanisms (2003, p. GL-19).

Since friendly forces do not typically conceal DA PR operations, from this point on, all discussion of DA PR missions will refer to overt recovery operations to emphasize the diametrical opposition of DA and clandestine PR operations.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> McRaven (1996) asserts that “a special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative” (p. 2).

<sup>3</sup> Doctrine also defines unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) as NAR operations carried out exclusively by SOF. Although this thesis is written specifically to apply to SOF, UAR is a subset of NAR, therefore the thesis will only refer to the term NAR to alleviate confusion.

<sup>4</sup> By doctrine, “NAR operations may be covert or clandestine” (FM 3-05.231, 2003, p. 1-16). In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities (JP 1-02, 2003, p. 89).

Within the context of NAR, there are both planned and unplanned assisted recoveries. Unplanned assisted recoveries can occur when members of the general population in an enemy-held area assist an evader in returning to friendly control (McCann, 1999, pp. 2-11). Opportunists, accidental contacts, or good Samaritans illustrate these types of people. Since there is no deliberate planning involved with regard to unplanned recoveries, this thesis will not consider them; this study is limited to planned assisted recoveries.

### C. WHY IS SOF PR UNIQUE?

The term *special* operations itself implies that these operations are unique and offer distinctive capabilities in support of PR operations. These unique capabilities allow SOF to conduct high-risk DA operations in denied areas with a higher probability of success than conventional forces against an enemy force that is usually stronger numerically and in firepower. Therefore, when personnel are isolated in extremely high-risk areas, SOF may provide the best opportunities for successful personnel recovery. The most distinctive capability that SOF brings to the entire PR spectrum is that they are the only military force capable of conducting NAR operations. NAR is a subset of UW operations—a capability resting exclusively with SOF. In short, SOF is unique because it can provide capabilities that are distinctive, forces that are uniquely proficient, or both (for further analysis of the role of SOF in PR, see Appendix A).

### D. SITUATIONAL SUPERIORITY

As is depicted in Figure 1, a successful PR architecture rests upon a foundation capable of supporting the mission. Effective policy, sound doctrine, timely PR support products, superior equipment, adequate education, and realistic targeted training establish this foundation. Built upon the infrastructure is preparation of commanders and their staffs, the recovery force (RF), and those individuals at risk of becoming isolated before a crisis. Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), the area overlapped by these three groups, ties it all together, and holistically gives U.S. forces the capability to accomplish the two unifying enabling objectives that all commanders and their staffs, RF, and IP attempt to accomplish in the conduct of PR. First, they desire to gain and maintain situational awareness (SA), or battlespace awareness, in an area of

interest. Second, they desire to gain and maintain SS. An important consideration is that military and operational forces attain these enabling objectives differently during PR missions.

To achieve SS is to gain and maintain the desired effect in an area of influence for a specific period. As it pertains to PR, SS is nothing more than the combined battlespace exploitation of the three groups involved in PR. SS is the cumulative and combined product of commanders and their staffs, the RF, and IP gaining relative superiority (RS) within their own spheres of influence. The authors will thoroughly discuss RS in Chapters II and VI, but it is an advantage that a smaller attacking force can gain over a numerically superior adversary for a limited amount of time. Obtaining SS allows for the



Figure 1. Relationship Between the Essential Elements of Success for Personnel Recovery.  
(From PR Doctrine Briefing, personal communication, COL Mark Bracich,  
Director of Policy, Doctrine, and Training for the Joint Personnel Recovery  
Agency, July 25, 2003).

successful accomplishment of the five PR tasks of report, locate, support, recover, and return, while simultaneously allowing an IP to survive and evade long enough to be recovered prior to capture. Written as an equation, the formula for SS is:

$$SS = RS_{\text{Commanders \& Staffs}} + RS_{\text{Recovery Force}} + RS_{\text{Isolated Personnel}}$$

The recovery forces used in the conduct of overt missions typically have no bearing or impact on NAR operations. Simply changing the name of the recovery force variable gives the formula for SS in a NAR operation, and is similarly represented as:

$$SS = RS_{\text{Commanders \& Staffs}} + RS_{\text{Recovery Mechanism}} + RS_{\text{Isolated Personnel}}$$

This thesis will not address RS<sub>Commanders and Staffs</sub>, thus it will not address all facets of SS. As the initial research into this model of SS, this thesis will address RS for both types of RF—overt (DA) and clandestine (NAR). As represented in Figure 1, the relationship between overt recovery forces and NAR mechanisms is limited to the fact that they are interchangeable methods of recovering an IP; they both perform the same function, albeit through very different means. Since there is already an applicable model for DA operations for SOF, the research in this area will focus on integrating RS for both the IP and the RF into a more specific PR model. There currently exists no model applicable to NAR operations, so research in that area will focus on developing and testing a RS model for the IP and the NAR RF or recovery mechanism (RM).

RS is different for each of the three key actors in personnel recovery. The authors argue that it is achievable only by applying specific principles thoroughly discussed in Chapters II and VI. The absence of any of the interdependent principles needed to achieve RS, through ignorance, neglect, or necessity, will result in some degree of failure for that actor which could affect the overall success of the recovery operation. This thesis claims that with RS it is possible to overcome overwhelming numerical odds for a specific period. These different sets of principles are only effective for the RF or IP when all of the principles are properly integrated; it is this interdependence of these variables that reinforces the notion that each of the principles is equally important and

mutually supportive. Detailed discussion of the principles that govern successful recovery operations are at the beginning of each case study section.

These principles should not be considered a holistic solution to the pursuit of PR.. James Schneider states that, “the principles of war are heuristic devices: rules of thumb that offer a quick entry into the solution of a problem” (as cited in Leonhard, 2000, p. ix). PR planners and executors should apply the principles proposed in this thesis in a fashion similar to the principles of war; since PR, as the authors argue, is the conduct of warfare. The application of principles and subsequent measures of RS are not quantitative measurements of how to conduct successful PR missions. The authors do not intend the thesis to mirror British mathematician Fredrick Lanchester’s highly debated, yet widely applied, mathematical theory of warfare. Rather, the authors designed the thesis to provide military PR planners with a starting point for considering factors that could significantly affect the success or failure of their operations.

#### **E. CASE STUDIES**

To further explain how RS affects the outcome of PR operations, this thesis presents seven historical case studies with follow-on analyses. Due to the limited number of both clandestine and overt personnel recoveries conducted in urban terrain, the pool of available cases was extremely limited. All three overt recovery cases came from Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. One detailed case study was Task Force Ranger’s organic recovery attempt conducted 3-4 October 1993 during Operation GOTHIC SERPENT. There is also a detailed case study of the recovery of a UH-60 crew shot down on 25 September 1993 in Mogadishu Somalia, and the Tiger Company’s recovery of the Quick Reaction Force “Lost Platoon” in Mogadishu, Somalia on 4 October 1993.

In all overt case studies, the authors conducted interviews with most key participants and decision-makers, and all leaders personally involved with the recovery. Citations from interviews with various agencies involved in the most recent NAR operations are also included. Much of the information regarding NAR operations is classified. However, enough information is available through open source historical case studies, and unclassified data on recent conflicts to adequately support the authors’

hypothesis. The thesis uses a case study of NAR from the French theater of operations during World War II, a case study from the Korean War and one from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

The next seven chapters will present the hypothesis and case studies briefly mentioned above in greater detail. Chapter II introduces the overt recovery model. Following this, Chapters III through V each discuss three different PR cases that occurred in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. Then, Chapter VI introduces the NAR model. Chapters VII and VIII follow this, and include a case study from WWII, Korea, and Iraq, respectively. Chapter IX then offers the conclusions and recommendations of the study. The analysis contained in this thesis will show that RS of IP and both types of RF, while non-quantitative and somewhat theoretical, do exist and can be an effective tool for explaining success and failure in the conduct of SOF PR operations in urban environments.

## II. MODELING OVERT URBAN PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

### A. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY AND THE PRINCIPLES NECESSARY FOR THE OVERT RECOVERY FORCE'S SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

#### 1. Relative Superiority

In his model and theory of special operations William H. McRaven (1996) defines RS as a condition existing when a generally smaller attacking force gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy. He asserts there are three basic properties of RS. First, the attacking force usually achieves RS within five minutes of the initial engagement—when the attacking force achieves a decisive advantage at a pivotal moment. Second, in order to guarantee victory, an attacking force must sustain RS after achieving it. Finally, it is difficult to regain RS once it is lost. The key to successful special operations missions is to achieve RS early in the engagement because “the longer an engagement continues, the more likely the outcome will be affected by the will of the enemy, chance, and uncertainty, the factors that comprise the frictions of war” (pp. 4-6).

McRaven (1996) also uses a graph to show how and when each special operations force achieves RS (see Figure 2). This graph effectively illustrates “how special operations forces, with their cutting-edge technology, access to national-level intelligence, high-quality training, and elite troops, are able to minimize the frictions of war to achieve relative superiority.” The graph also “provides a visual demonstration of the three properties of RS: the pivotal moment can be seen as a dramatic rise in the probability of mission completion; sustaining RS is a gradual rise from the pivotal moment to mission completion; and a decisive drop in the probability of mission completion shows a loss of relative superiority”<sup>5</sup> (pp. 6-7).

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<sup>5</sup> According to McRaven (1996), the intersection of the X-axis (time) and the Y-axis (probability of mission completion) is the point of vulnerability (PV). “The PV is defined as the point in a mission when the attacking force reaches the enemy’s first line of defenses. ...The area of vulnerability (AV) is a function of mission completion over time. The longer it takes to gain relative superiority, the larger the area of vulnerability, and hence the greater the impact of the frictions of war. ...the special operations forces succeeds because its inherent advantages allow it to reduce the AV, and hence the frictions of war to a manageable level” (pp. 7-8).




Figure 2. Sample RS Graph for DA Recovery Forces. (From McRaven, 1996, p. 7).

According to McRaven, “six principles of special operations ... simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose ... dominate every successful mission.” He further asserts that, “gaining relative superiority requires proper integration of all six principles ... [and] the practitioner of special operations must take account of the principles in the three phases of an operation: planning, preparation, and execution.” The principles are interdependent and rely on each other for mutual support in what he refers to as a synergistic nature. When depicted graphically (see Figure 3), the model reflects the theory of special operations and “represents the idea that special operations forces succeed, in spite of their numerical inferiority, when they are able to gain RS through the use of a simple plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, and purpose. Failure results when the frictions of war overcome the moral factors.” Although gaining RS over the enemy is essential to success, it is not a guarantee. The success of the mission, like the inverted pyramid, precariously balances on a slender apex. Courage, intellect, boldness, and perseverance are some of the moral factors that have to support the pyramid, preventing frictions of war from toppling it and causing defeat (pp. 8-11).




Figure 3. McRaven's Special Operations Model. (After McRaven, 1996, p. 11).

## 2. The Principles of Special Operations Defined and Refined

### a. *Simplicity*

McRaven (1996) explains that “simplicity is the most crucial, and yet sometimes the most difficult, principle with which to comply” and that “there are three elements of simplicity critical to success: limiting the number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation.” He believes that “it is essential to limit the number of tactical objectives to only those that are vital. ... Limiting the objectives to only what is essential focuses the training, limits the number of personnel required, reduces the time on target, and decreases the number of “moving parts.”” He insists that good intelligence “simplifies a plan by reducing the unknown factors and the number of variables that must be considered. ... There will, however, always be gaps in the intelligence ... [forcing the planners to build] their plans around what [is] reasonable to expect.” Further, he states that “innovation simplifies a plan by helping to avoid or eliminate obstacles that would otherwise compromise surprise and/or complicate the rapid execution of the mission” and that “innovation is normally manifested in new technology, but it is also the application of unconventional tactics. ... Either new technology or innovative tactics [must] assist the assault element in reaching the objective and then quickly and effectively eliminating the enemy” (pp. 11-14). The authors have adopted the definition of simplicity in full for the SOF-specific overt urban PR model.

*b. Security*

In general terms, McRaven (1996) says, “the purpose of tight security is to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage through foreknowledge of the impending attack.” Due to the nature of special operations, “it is not so much the impending mission that must be concealed as the timing and, to a lesser degree, the means of insertion.” Security on the part of the attackers, “prevent[s] the enemy from knowing the time, and in some cases, the method of the attack, although it [does] not prevent the enemy from preparing for an assault.” Furthermore, McRaven argues that, “security should be as tight as possible, without unduly impeding the preparation or execution of operations,” and is important in achieving RS “because it prevents the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage.” A prevailing reason for the success of special operations is the ability of the attacking force to know what defenses the enemy has prepared. A failed security effort could result in the enemy preparing a surprise of his own and subsequently preempting the attack or reducing the speed on target, both of which would dramatically reduce the possibility of achieving relative superiority” (pp. 14-15). Additionally, greater firepower available to SOF preserves and enhances the security of these smaller, more vulnerable, units. The authors have adopted the definition of security in full for the SOF-specific overt urban PR model.

*c. Repetition*

Addressing repetition, McRaven (1996) states, “in the preparation phase, repetition, like routine, is indispensable in eliminating the barriers to success” and that “certain combat units, such as counterterrorist [CT] teams … perform standard mission profiles as a matter of routine. This routine hones those tactical skills to a degree that allows quick reaction to a threat, provided that threat fits within the standard scenario for which the unit has been practicing.” Additionally, he believes that, “repetition hones individual and unit skills, while full-dress rehearsals unmask weaknesses in the plan,” and that “both are essential to success on the battlefield” (pp. 15-16). For the purposes of PR, this definition will require modification. McRaven intended this principle to address rehearsals for a specific objective known ahead of time. In the case of the IP evading capture in the urban environment, extensive mission-specific rehearsals are impractical given the desire to affect recovery prior to capture. For the purposes of these analyses,

the authors will amend the definition of the principle of repetition to emphasize the unit's routine and standard operation procedures (SOPs). Rehearsals are just as essential for successful PR missions, but are not mission-specific and generally take place during joint and unit exercises.

*d. Surprise*

According to McRaven (1996), "special operations forces do not generally have the luxury of attacking the enemy when or where he is unprepared." Such forces must typically attack in spite of enemy preparations. Therefore, in McRaven's opinion, surprise means simply catching the enemy off guard. "In a special operation surprise is gained through deception, timing, and taking advantage of the enemy's vulnerabilities" (p. 17). For use with PR, this definition also requires further refinement to account for the increased lethality and precision of technologically advanced warfighting systems now available to smaller forces. This significant increase in firepower available for the conduct of special operations was not previously considered in McRaven's cases, which all occurred prior to 1976. With more abundant and accurate firepower immediately available to special operations units, there is a significant increase in an adversary's vulnerabilities that recovery forces can exploit to achieve surprise—with even smaller forces. It is important to clarify that enhanced firepower, possessed by increasingly smaller forces, will not generally equal or exceed that of the adversary. Instead, SOF can achieve surprise because their firepower exceeds that which the enemy expects from such small forces. Therefore, firepower, in the hands of a numerically inferior force, can consistently surprise an opponent who directly correlates unit size with firepower.

*e. Speed*

According to McRaven (1996), the principle of speed in a special operations mission is critical because "any delay will expand [the] area of vulnerability and decrease [the] opportunity to achieve relative superiority ... [because] in special operations the enemy is in a defensive position and his only desire is to counter [the] attack." Therefore, McRaven's theory assumes that the enemy's will to resist is understood, and his ability to react a constant. This ability to react makes it essential, "to move as quickly as possible regardless of the enemy's reaction," and that

Relative superiority can be gained, despite the efforts of the enemy, primarily because the attacking force moves with such speed that the enemy's reaction is not an overriding factor. ... In order to gain surprise and speed, special forces are generally small and lightly armed, and therefore they are unable to sustain action against a conventional enemy for long periods of time (pp. 19-21).

With more strength now available to smaller units, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, there should be a relative increase in the duration that a SOF recovery force can operate without sacrificing the principle of speed. With only this clarification, the authors will adopt the definition of speed in full for the SOF-specific overt urban PR model. As discussed in the previous paragraph, the gains realized with increased firepower allows for some sacrifice of the principle of speed. The addition of firepower does not mean that conventional forces can be more "SOF-like." Rather, it simply gives SOF the ability to conduct successful missions with increasingly smaller units.

*f. Purpose*

According to McRaven (1996), "purpose is understanding and then executing the prime objective of the mission regardless of emerging obstacles or opportunities." He concludes that there are two aspects to the principle. First, "the purpose must be clearly defined by the mission statement. ... The mission statement should be crafted to ensure that in the heat of battle, no matter what else happens, the individual soldier understands the primary objective." The second aspect of purpose is personal commitment to the extent that "the men must be inspired with a sense of personal dedication that knows no limitations" (pp. 21-23). The authors will adopt the definition of purpose in full for the SOF-specific overt urban PR model.

**B. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY AND THE PRINCIPLES NECESSARY FOR THE ISOLATED PERSONNEL'S SUCCESS**

**1. Relative Superiority**

Almost by definition, an IP faces a numerically superior force. If the IP is to prevail, he or she must establish RS over this force. The authors define RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> as a condition that exists when a person who is isolated in an uncertain or hostile operational environment gains a decisive advantage over any/all element(s) in pursuit, virtually disappearing into the urban landscape. The authors can represent RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> as in the graph in Figure 4; conceptually, this illustrates the revised properties of

RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>. The pivotal moment where the IP achieve RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>, shown as the vertical rise in the probability of mission completion. From the point where IP achieve RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>, the graphical representation shows sustaining RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> as a gradual increase in the probability of mission completion. Any loss of RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>, such as recognition by local inhabitants and reported to the authorities, would show a drop in the probability of mission completion. Capture is the ultimate loss of RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> and is a recovery mission failure in most scenarios; the authors only intend that this model apply to the evading IP (who has not yet been captured).




Figure 4. Sample RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> Graph.

The authors do not believe that McRaven's six principles of RS apply to the IP because the IP is not an attacking but an evading "force." Therefore, it is necessary to identify IP-specific principles. Based on an analysis of the relatively few case studies involving SOF recovery forces in both overt and clandestine urban recovery operations, the authors argue that the four variables critical to gaining RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> are

communication, adaptability, exploitation, and the Gonzales principle. These variables dictate the degree of success for every PR operation. As with McRaven's principles, the four IP-specific principles that establish RS are equally important and mutually supportive.

## **2. The Principles of Success for Isolated Personnel**

### **a. Communication**

There are two critical elements to successful communication for the evader. First, the evader must be able to convey his location to friendly forces by use of a radio or other means such as ground-to-air signaling. In the urban environment, anything other than radio communication will be difficult at best, especially if done at any time other than during hours of limited visibility. A SOF recovery force will not launch a recovery mission without first knowing the location of the evader, though NAR forces may be activated to provide this location to the recovery forces. Second, evaders need the ability to positively identify or authenticate themselves to the recovery force. Because of the degree of vulnerability during recovery operations, recovery forces will normally verify an IP's identity before conducting the recovery (JP 3-50, p. VI-42). Additionally, NAR forces typically do not initiate linkup during the contact process. It is a much more dangerous task for the NAR forces to initiate contact with an IP who does not know what to expect, as in the case of an IP who has not been instructed on how, where, or when to enter the recovery mechanism (RM), and lacks radio communications to receive such instructions.

### **b. Exploitation**

The principle of exploitation consists of those things an evader does to alter his environment to gain an advantage over his/her would-be captors. When analyzing key aspects of this principle, two observations emerged. First, the evader must make the most of what is available by being both opportunistic and resourceful in order to put time and space between themselves and those who would like to pursue. The principle of exploitation is an active practice, and requires the IP to expose himself by taking action that has a higher level of risk. Generally, it takes some time for military or police forces to get to the scene of an incident; this time must be productive for the evader. Second, the evader must be able to walk a fine line between a gambler and

someone who takes carefully calculated risks, often acting in a manner that the enemy would consider unpredictable. In the absence of an unpredictable action, the shock value of bold and audacious behavior may be sufficient to gain an advantage in time and space against a hesitant or uncommitted adversary or civilian inhabitants. Diverting attention immediately upon becoming an IP, and the use of tactical deception such as ruses, may be other methods of exploiting opportunities in order to gain an advantage.

**c. Adaptability**

The first of the two facets of adaptability needed by the urban evader involves assuming a chameleon-like quality of being able to blend in with ones environment. Adaptability is a more passive practice, and differs from exploitation in that the IP adjusts to the environment instead of trying to change it. Camouflage, in the sense of being anonymous or invisible though clearly out of place, is as essential as speed is to most offensive military operations. There is great talent in being able to hide in plain sight or right under the nose of one's enemy, and in the urban environment, an inability to do this immediately will almost certainly lead to capture. The second closely related facet of adaptability involves the evader fitting in with the patterns of normalcy; evaders can only achieve this with knowledge gained from area, cultural, and linguistic familiarization. If there are nightly curfews in an area, or on occasions when local religious practices prohibit leaving one's home after dark, then evading at night would only bring unwanted attention. The evader must temporarily adopt the customs and idiosyncrasies of the locals; anything else would be out of place.

**d. The Gonzales Principle<sup>6</sup>**

In general terms, the Gonzales principle is a “composed” warrior mindset that develops, during times of peace through realistic training supported by senior leadership. It is only when the evader is placed in a situation requiring self-preservation that this mindset can become a tool for survival. This principle has two essential

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<sup>6</sup> The authors derived the term Gonzales principle from the ideas contained in Laurence Gonzales' (2003) Book *Deep Survival*. The principle involves a balance of skill and emotional control when in the midst of a survival emergency. Manifestation of this principle involves a person perceiving a situation clearly, planning, and then taking, the correct action. Another characteristic of this principle is self-control. Exercising this element properly will often decide the outcome of a survival emergency. Training is critical to exercising self-control over the instinctive emotions that manifest themselves in persons in stressful situations. Gonzales, in his appendix, sums up these elements in twelve points concerning how survivors think and behave in the clutch of mortal danger.

elements critical to success for an IP: critical thinking skills and continuous realistic training. While the other IP-specific principles are action based, the critical thinking facet of the Gonzales principle more closely relates to the process of deciding how, when, and where to apply the other principles. The ability to quickly assess and appraise a crisis, evaluate alternatives, and decide on an appropriate solution only gets better with rehearsals and training. Rapid crisis decision-making executed poorly, such as risking movement or contact at the wrong place or time, can mean the difference between evading and capture.

The second element of the Gonzales principle is survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training, including initial training, subsequent refresher training, and advanced education. The potential evader must have an ingrained sense of duty to become the “street smart” evader before combat. This sense of duty can only exist in an institutional environment conducive to the production of smart evaders, with unit commanders ensuring opportunities are available for such education and training, and with individuals who realize the necessity to accept and maximize those training occasions.

### **C. CONSTRUCTING THE SOF-SPECIFIC OVERT URBAN MODEL FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

Figure 5 shows the relationship of McRaven’s principles of special operations and the four IP-specific principles. The special operations model (DA recovery force) is the inverted pyramid, and functions just as it does when used as a stand-alone model. In PR, however, there is an additional element. The IP’s survival precariously balances on the pyramid’s inverted “base,” steadied by the presence of the four IP-specific principles. If any one of these IP-specific principles is wanting, then the evader’s survival could be in jeopardy. Successful application of the four IP-specific principles reduces the area of vulnerability and frictions of war to a manageable level, but there are still factors in war over which the IP has little or no control. The principles are necessary but not sufficient to guarantee success; missing from the model is the lack of control of these other factors that could affect the IP’s ability to achieve RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>. An IP could do everything perfectly, but fail to successfully evade because the recovery force poorly executed the mission, resulting in the pyramid toppling over. Since the evader’s fate rests on the

inverted pyramid, if the frictions of war cause the pyramid to topple, gravity will cause the ball representing the evader's survival to roll off the pyramid.

The SOF-specific overt urban PR model graphically represents the idea that SOF DA recovery forces succeed in achieving situational superiority, in spite of their numerical inferiority, when two things occur: 1) the DA recovery force is able to gain RS through the use of a simple plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, and purpose, and 2) the IP with a composed warrior mindset (from applying the Gonzales principle) is able to gain his/her own RS through exploiting opportunities in order to adapt to the urban environment long enough to make contact with friendly forces to assist in their own recovery.




Figure 5. Authors' SOF-specific overt urban PR model.

#### D. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

To test the specific theory of SOF-specific overt urban PR model for overt personnel recovery missions, this thesis will present three historical cases from U.S. operations in Somalia and provide an analysis of each. The authors selected these particular cases because of the abundance of open and classified source data relating to them, and because of the extremely limited number of overt urban recovery cases available. While there are several other operations that may seem relevant, the majority

of those cases involve hostage recovery after the enemy had already captured the IP. In addition, little open-source information is available on the more recent cases.

The TF Ranger case in Chapter IV represents a PR event executed by SOF. McRaven (1996) based his model and theory of special operations on his refined definition of a special operation.<sup>7</sup> While the cases in Chapters III and V were conducted by conventional light infantry forces, they satisfy the refined definition of a special operation as discussed earlier; specially trained, equipped, and supported forces conducted the mission on a target whose rescue was a political or military imperative.<sup>8</sup>

The analyses will be sufficiently detailed to provide a practical and powerful model that is simple, yet universally applicable. When examining the urban environment throughout these case studies, the analyses suggest that it is the degree of relative superiority (RS), which combines RS<sub>Recovery Forces</sub> and RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>, that results in an increase in the probability of mission success.

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<sup>7</sup> This definition has not been widely accepted within the DoD, but it is both acceptable and reasonable as a part of the only special operations model available. McRaven (1996) asserts that, “a special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative” (p. 2). Additionally, the tactical-level DA or “strike” missions he analyzed were “always of a strategic or operational nature and had the advantage of virtually unlimited resources and national-level intelligence” (p. 3). Fitting perfectly within the confines of these broad categorizations, TF Ranger’s 3-4 October raid and ensuing immediate PR operation are extremely well suited for evaluation using his model and theory of special operations, especially given that TF Ranger was “a special operations force with inferior numbers and the disadvantage of attacking the stronger form of warfare [defense]”...paradoxically attempting to “...gain superiority over the enemy” (p. 4).

<sup>8</sup> In both of these cases, the Quick Recovery Company (QRC) had extensively trained in Mogadishu for this very scenario; it had been in Somalia for weeks, and had trained specifically for the “rescue” of engaged, distressed, or trapped UN Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) forces. TF 2-14 augmented the QRC’s task organization with medical specialists instead of just the more commonly assigned mortar and anti-tank squads—specifically for the purpose of sustaining the lives of those being rescued.

### **III. THE SHOOT DOWN OF “COURAGE 53”**

#### **A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION**

This chapter is a detailed case study of an overt, direct action (DA)-type personnel recovery (PR) mission conducted by Task Force (TF) 2-14. The operation was to recover a UH-60 crew shot down on 25 September 1993 in Mogadishu Somalia. The case begins with some of the background and historical context before beginning the detailed case study. Following the case study is an analysis of relative superiority (RS) for both the IP (RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>) and the recovery force (RS <sub>Recovery Forces</sub>), in accordance with the SOF-specific overt urban PR model. Following this is an evaluation of how each of the overt recovery force’s six principles, and the four IP-specific recovery principles affected the respective participant’s level of RS.

On 4 May 1993, UN Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations in Somalia under the name Operation CONTINUED HOPE. When UNOSOM II assumed responsibility for Somalia operations, the U.S. “left approximately 6,000 of its soldiers to ensure that the UN operations could continue without interruption” (Ferry, 1994, p. 23). These QRF forces were the only U.S. combat forces in country, and in September of 1993, were comprised of “one light infantry battalion [Task Force 2-14, from the 2<sup>d</sup> Battalion, 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light)], [one aviation task force, TF 2-25 or TF Raven, consisting of] one attack [company consisting of AH-1F Cobras and OH-58 Light Observation Helicopters (LOHs)] and one assault helicopter company [manned by Team Courage pilots from Company B, 9<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 101<sup>st</sup> Aviation Regiment, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (Air Assault)], and a brigade headquarters [the QRF or Falcon Brigade headquarters from the 10<sup>th</sup> Aviation Brigade, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division]” (p. 23). On Friday, 24 September 1993, while staged out of the University Compound, Company C “Tiger Company” of TF 2-14 had the responsibility of providing the Quick Reaction Company (QRC) to the UN’s QRF manned by U.S. forces assigned to the Falcon Brigade of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division. The QRC had to be able to react to a crisis situation within thirty minutes of notification. The other two rifle companies had up to an hour to prepare to react and launch to a quick reaction mission (Ferry, 1994).

## B. DETAILED CASE STUDY

Early on the morning of 25 September 1993, a UH-60 from the assault helicopter company, callsign Courage 53, was part of a multiple-aircraft mission conducting a “show of force” night vision goggle (NVG) mission known as “Eyes over Mogadishu.”<sup>9</sup> The purpose of the flight was to protect UNOSOM and U.S. bases located in Mogadishu, and to conduct aerial reconnaissance. While refueling between 0110 and 0120 hours, the crew observed three mortar rounds explode in succession a few hundred yards from the UH-60. Piloted by CW2 Granville “Dale” Shrader, and co-piloted by CW2 Perry W. Alliman, the crew of five unhooked from the refuel point, boarded the aircraft, and immediately relocated to the south portion of the runway to inspect the aircraft for damage. Upon their departure from the airfield, the crew received coordinates to the Somali mortar site from the recently emplaced Q-36 Anti-Battery Radar located on the airfield (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.); personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004).

Shrader first flew to Checkpoint 42 near the complex in northern Mogadishu referred to as the “Pasta Factory.” Shrader wanted to start there in order to show his crew where the downed aviator points were located in the city. Shrader then flew to “Coni Stadium,” to identify for his crew the known safe-haven for aircrews (Shrader, 1993). After moonset and just prior to 0200 hours, Shrader flew southeast of the area near the old presidential palace at Villa Somalia in order to make one pass near the area of the suspected mortar site before heading back to the airfield to refuel. Flying between 100 to 110 knots approximately 100 to 130 feet over the city, Somalis downed the UH-60 with a

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<sup>9</sup> Typically flown by two UH-60's between the hours of 2200 to 0600 hours, and referred to by the mission crews as "Eyes Over Mog," this mission was one of the more dangerous missions performed during the entire U.S. involvement in Somalia. Its primary purpose was to provide an armed presence in the nighttime skies, while also monitoring the movement of hostiles, and responding to possible threats throughout the city. The tactic was to fly an aircraft in lead, and if it took ground fire, the trail or sniper aircraft would return fire. Typically, the lead aircraft flew slowly at lower altitudes, looking for unusual activity. A normal crew consisted of the two pilots, two door gunners/crew chiefs, two snipers armed with Barrett .50 caliber and M-24, 7.62mm sniper weapon systems, and two armed sniper/observers. All crewmembers wore night vision goggles, and unknown to the Somalis, the UH-60 employed an infrared (IR) spotlight that was used to illuminate a suspect area for those wearing NVGs.

rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) in a street near Mogadishu's New Port area.<sup>10</sup> The RPG struck in the rear of the aircraft, causing an explosion in one of the fuel cells that engulfed the back of the UH-60 in flames. The aircraft streaked across the sky for a quarter of a mile as Shrader unsuccessfully tried to gain control and reach the safe haven of the New Port. Before crashing, Shrader made at least five consecutive unanswered radio calls that his helicopter was going down, as he was unable to coach the crippled UH-60 to reach the visible lights coming from the New Port area. In a command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) UH-60, pilot 1LT Jeffrey Riedel, callsign Courage 46, had just departed the *Digfer* Triangle area, when he saw the sky light up to his front. Riedel monitored Shrader's multiple Mayday calls saying that he was hit, on fire, and going down (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.); Casper, 2001, p. 25; personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004).

After the QRF Tactical Operations Center's (TOC's) notification at 0200 hours, the TF-2-14 duty officer (CQ) awakened CPT Michael Whetstone within one minute, and told him to report to the TF 2-14 TOC as soon as possible. The QRC commander had the presence of mind to tell the CQ to awaken the rest of his company's leadership to tell them to be ready to move at a moment's notice. Whetstone raced up the steps to the battalion's command post as his company was already beginning to prepare. When Whetstone arrived at the TF 2-14 TOC already clothed in full combat gear, LTC Bill David (Commander, TF-2-14), and MAJ Mike Ellerbe (Operations Officer (S-3), TF 2-14), immediately began briefing the QRC commander on the emergency mission. He was told that the Somalis had shot down a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter in the vicinity of the New Port while flying a routine "Eyes over Mogadishu" mission. He was also informed that the aircraft apparently had been hit by an RPG, had crashed, and that his wingman would remain on station until the QRC arrived (Whetstone, 2004, p. 3; Whetstone, 1993).

The burning helicopter skimmed off the top of a three-story building before it severed a telephone pole, and then slid 100 yards down a street to finally come to rest

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<sup>10</sup> Later, an Army Captain who had a human intelligence (HUMINT) source told Shrader that the mortar site was there the entire time, covered in the back of a parked truck. The Somali's had dug a trench or hole close to the truck, in which a man could lie flat on his back in order to fire a RPG without injuring himself with the back-blast. This also provided an almost perpendicular trajectory, making it truly a "one and an million shot" (personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004).

when it hit an embankment near a concrete-block building (Casper, 2001, pp. 25-26). The two pilots quickly exited the aircraft to escape the flames.<sup>11</sup> Alliman immediately moved to the crew chief's window in an attempt to pull out SGT Eugene Williams, but the flames were already coming out of the window—there was no movement from any of the three crewmembers located in the rear section of the aircraft. Shrader located Alliman at the front of the aircraft, and then pulled him 30-40 feet away from the fire. When the 7.62mm ammunition inside the aircraft started igniting from the intense heat, Shrader moved Alliman into an alley in order to seek refuge in a doorway, and then returned to the aircraft in an attempt to rescue the remaining crew. Unable to approach the aircraft due to the intense heat, Shrader quickly returned to Alliman, loaded his 9mm Beretta Model 92F pistol, and attempted to call for assistance on his AN/PRC-90 survival radio<sup>12</sup> (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.); personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004).

Between five and fifteen minutes after the crash (0210-0220 hours), two Somalis with AK-47s walked down the alley to observe the wreckage. The Somalis did not notice the hiding pilots, and soon left the same way they came—from the condition of the aircraft, they likely assumed no one could have survived the crash. Shrader then left Alliman in a corner in the shadows and positioned himself near a stairway for cover. From this position, he could both see Alliman, and observe the alley. A few minutes later at 0220 hours, the Somalis returned to look at the wreckage. After turning away to head back down the alley, the closest Somalia stopped and began walking towards Shrader's position. Shrader emptied his first fifteen-round magazine firing at the Somalis as they fled. Moments later there were three to four successive grenade blasts, as well as sporadic rifle fire intermixed with the grenade blasts which lasted approximately fifteen minutes. The Somalis were trying to flush out any survivors or kill those who remained. Two Somalis then came back down the alley, likely noticing Shrader due to his light-

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<sup>11</sup> Shrader broke his wrist while exiting the aircraft, and sustained burns over 18% of his body. Alliman injured his right eye and jaw on impact, and sustained third-degree burns over 31% of his body (Alliman, (n.d.)).

<sup>12</sup> CW2 Shrader had two full 15-round magazines of 9mm ammunition. CW2 Alliman also had a 9mm Beretta Model 92F pistol, but CW2 Shrader could not find any of CW2 Alliman's magazines. CW2 Alliman flew with a M16A2 rifle and approximately 150 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition, but neither man retrieved the weapon when exiting the aircraft (personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004).

colored two-piece desert flight suit. One of the Somalis moved towards him with his hand raised, as though gripping a grenade. Shrader shot at both men at approximately 0235 hours, and they disappeared (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.) personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 27, 2004).

At about 0225 hours, David took Whetstone outside when the first High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) arrived and placed a large map on the hood of the vehicle. David, while identifying an area northwest of the New Port area on the map, told Whetstone “the bird is down somewhere in this area here. The wreckage is burning. Go find the glow” (as cited in Whetstone, 2004, p. 3). David also gave Whetstone a frequency and the callsign to an OH-58. Whetstone was to link-up with the pilot at the airfield, and then use the OH-58 to guide the company to the objective (Whetstone, 2004, p. 3; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004).

The QRC mounted the marshaled vehicles at 0240 hours, and finally departed the University Compound through the Tunisian Gate at 0305 hours. The QRF proceeded through the K4 circle, and then on to the airfield. Once arriving at the airfield at 0325 hours, Whetstone contacted with pilot of the OH-58, who assured the QRC commander that he would lead the company to the objective in the most expeditious manner possible (Whetstone, 2004, p. 4; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Bill David, April 1, 2004). The OH-58 would guide the unit through the city using an on-board laser. When viewed with NVGs, the laser created a “sparkle” effect, which the OH-58 would use to create a “yellow brick road” to the crash site, which was not visible to the naked eye. Trying to navigate at night, with a map and compass in a hostile city, did not compare with allowing the OH-58 to use its superior optics and field of vision from above to guide the QRC to the objective.

Meanwhile at the crash site, the pilots continued to receive sporadic and probing small-arms fire above their heads, as they listened to the Somalis yelling obscenities at them in broken English—telling the pilots to come out so they could kill them. The Somalis could not determine the actual location of the pilots, so the Somalis could only

attempt to provoke some type of response or noticeable movement. Approximately thirty minutes after the last grenade attack (0300 hours), Shrader got out his white strobe signal light and AN/PRC-90 survival radio, and attempted to signal the AH-1Fs and OH-58s above them. After approximately two hours (0350 hours), Alliman left his concealed position, and moved to Shrader's more exposed location. Fearing the Somalis were getting desperate because of the sounds of the now approaching helicopters, the two pilots prepared for another Somali attack. Within three to four minutes, a Somali ran down the alley firing his AK-47 on full automatic above the pilots' heads. Shrader fired all remaining ammunition at the Somali, finishing off the last of his 9mm ammunition at around 0355 hours (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.) personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 27, 2004).

Just north of the New Port area, the QRC's trucks stopped at 0345 hours. The QRC mounted its NVGs, dismounted the vehicles, conducted last minute pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and got into march order: 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon, Company Headquarters element, 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon, and 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon. Whetstone gave his last minute instructions and final brief, and then fell-in with the lead platoon. With no street signs to follow, and no definitive information about the location of the crash site, the QRC moved as quickly as possible. During the dismounted trek into the heart of the city, the men were expecting Somalis to ambush them at any moment. Guided by the OH-58's sparkle, the QRC wasted no time moving down the wider streets of northeastern Mogadishu. The QRC advanced steadily west, block-by-block, following the sparkle, and searching for the glow. As he moved closer to the wreckage, Whetstone pondered the point that "No enemy would shoot down a bird and then not have a look. An age-old guerrilla tactic is to wound something and then wait for the rescuers. We were living that scenario right now." Then Whetstone saw it—the glow. At about 0400 hours, an almost blinding white light filled Whetstone's NVGs. The wreckage of the UH-60 seemed to grow from a building—the main compartment had smashed into the side of a corner building. The section where the pilots sat was either completely sheared, or crushed beyond recognition. Whetstone thought to himself, "How could anyone survive that?" (Whetstone, 2004, pp. 4-6; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004).

Shrader then noticed bright lights approximately 100-200 meters from his position at around 0400 hours, and incorrectly assumed that more Somalis had joined the effort to look for survivors.<sup>13</sup> At that instant, while out of ammunition and with Alliman unable to see, a Somali man in his late twenties approached their position holding a flashlight, and yelled in English, “American boy, American boy” (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.)). Of this incident, Shrader later said, “I was between a rock and a hard place, so I had to take a risk” (“Faith pulls pilots through Somali terror,” 1993). Shrader approached the man with his empty weapon at the ready, and the friendly man pointed down the street to a friendly UNOSOM II United Arab Emirate (UAE) armored personnel carrier (APC) around the block and about 100 yards from their current position.<sup>14</sup> Shrader then carried Alliman to the UAE vehicle through a spray of automatic weapon fire. Somalis struck Alliman in the leg with a ricochet during the short movement. The UAE APC evacuated the pilots to an aid station where they received their initial medical attention (Shrader, 1993; Alliman, (n.d.); personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 10, 2004).

Somalis did not intend their automatic weapon fires to further injure the wounded pilots. As the QRC approached the wreckage, Somali rifle and machine gun fire tore into the advancing formation. Fortunately, the initial fire was characteristically high and inaccurate. Whetstone immediately called forward 1LT Furman Ray’s anti-tank (AT) platoon before the Somalis were able to pin the company down. Ray’s HMMWVs quickly moved towards the fight, and established a base of fire next to the UH-60. One maneuvered left, one deployed right, and another stayed in the center, and then immediately began suppressing the Somali positions with the 40mm MK-19 grenade

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<sup>13</sup> In all likelihood, the flashlights Shrader saw were probably from the approaching QRC. As the unit approached the burning aircraft at around 0400 to 0405 hours, the bright light emanating from the wreckage rendered the QRC’s NVGs virtually useless. At about that time, Shrader saw bright lights, and with the QRC unable to use their NVGs, the QRC employed their flashlights in order to have some level of vision in the darkness. From a distance, Shrader might have assumed that approaching lights were from the Somalis, but the Somalis were not typically known for using flashlights at night. The timing of the two independent events would seem to imply, with a high probability of certainty, that this was the same event (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Shrader, 1993).

<sup>14</sup> It could not be determined exactly why the UAE APC was located where it was. According to LTG (Ret.) Montgomery, apparently the UAE Commander dispatched the APC without waiting on UNOSOM headquarters to formally request assistance. It was highly uncommon to venture outside of the UNOSOM compound, or leave the security of the airfield at night, but on that evening, the UAE stepped up to help. LTG (Ret.) Montgomery could not recall with 100 percent certainty, but thought that a Somali approached the UAE checkpoint and told them that there were American survivors near by (personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004).

launcher machine guns mounted on their roofs. The Somalis had positioned themselves in an “L,” and then a “U” shaped ambush around the QRC’s position from the west and north. A steady firefight ensued, and the QRC fought diligently for the next forty minutes to establish a defensive perimeter around the wreckage. 2LT Ken Haynes’ 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon moved to the left with one squad and emplaced the remainder of his platoon around the base of the downed aircraft, forming one arm and the base of a “T” by 0415 hours. By 0425 hours, 2LT Robert Love’s 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon had positioned their soldiers along the street that afforded the egress route and logistical support line to the QRC (Whetstone, 2004, p. 6; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004).

With a fire still intensely burning in the main cabin of the aircraft, Whetstone directed the men to improve their positions, and to secure the high ground of a three-story building in 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoons’ sectors. Whetstone ascertained that a vantage point from that key terrain would offer the company the ability to observe the local neighborhood, and to better develop the situation. While the QRC’s riflemen and crew-served weapons teams continued to suppress Somali firing positions, the company’s recovery elements could finally begin the search of the wreckage. With the site somewhat secured by 0445 hours, Whetstone first called for fire extinguishers. 1LT Andrew “Mac” McDonald, the company’s executive officer, brought forward the HMMWVs with on-board fire extinguishers. The recovery forces attempted to put out the fires, but after they used five extinguishers, Whetstone realized that the fire would have to burn itself out (Whetstone, 2004, p. 6; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004).

Between 0530 and 0545 hours, with a small fire still burning, the searchers discovered the remains and “dog-tags” of SGT Ferdinand C. Richardson, the intelligence specialist (S-2) aboard the aircraft.<sup>15</sup> For the next forty-five minutes, the recovery crew diligently searched the area for remains and sensitive items. Since nothing in the

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<sup>15</sup> Richardson was not a routine crewmember aboard the “Eyes over Mog” flights. In an effort to “gain some practical experience … [and] see his work from a different perspective” (personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004), the motivated intelligence specialist requested to accompany the pilots. In his drive to provide the best possible support to the QRF, he “just wanted to see the area he was gathering data on every night” (personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004).

aircraft's hulk was recoverable for either PFC Matthew K. Anderson, the M-60 door gunner, or the crew chief, SGT Eugene Williams, the recovery forces collected the remains of Richardson, and completed the search around 0630 hours. Somali fires intensified to the point where everyone had to take cover, and MG Thomas Montgomery (Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSCOM), as well as the Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II) personally authorized Whetstone to employ the Cobra's TOW<sup>16</sup> missiles from the three scout weapons teams (SWTs) that covered his ground forces during the operation. Just before David ordered the QRC to withdrawal at 0640 hours, Somali small-arms fire wounded two QRC soldiers. As the QRC egressed and began to load trucks, the QRC took another casualty, SGT Reid, who Somalis hit with an RPG. The blast resulted in Reid initially losing his sight and hearing, severing his right arm, and nearly severing his right leg. The QRC immediately loaded the wounded into the front-line ambulance (FLA), and departed the area. The QRC closed on the east gate of the airfield at 0715 hours, and transferred control of the recovered remains and equipment to battalion assets (Whetstone, 2004, p. 6; Whetstone, 1993; personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004).

## C. ANALYSIS

### 1. Relative Superiority

Analyzing the QRC's recovery operation in the construct of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that the QRC's successes directly correlated with its ability to achieve and maintain RS Recovery Force. Figure 6 shows a RS Recovery Force graph for the QRC's 25 September 1993 recovery. This diagram graphically represents how the QRC entered the engagement already having RS Recovery Force over their Somali adversaries because of the overwhelming organic and supporting firepower at their disposal, relative freedom of movement in the hostile city, and their access to a guide to assist in navigation. As McRaven (1996) states, entering an engagement with RS can occur by developing a plan to overwhelm an enemy's defenses at their weakest point, which "makes the enemy's defenses ineffective, and 'guarantees' an advantage before one reaches the point of vulnerability" since "overwhelming the enemy does not require

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<sup>16</sup> "TOW is an acronym standing for Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile. The missile, armed with a shaped explosive charge, trails a thin wire that transmits flight instructions back to the missile from the acquisition sight located on the nose of the aircraft" (Casper, 2001, p. 6).

numerical superiority” (pp. 383-384). Once fired upon at the crash site, the QRC never lost its RS Recovery Force because it quickly responded by suppressing the Somali positions, and claiming the dominant or key terrain in the area. While sacrificing some speed on the objective in order to recover remains under less than ideal conditions, the QRC’s simple plan, quickly launched to gain security, and executed with surprise and purpose, overcame the lack of specific rehearsals for the recovery operation. The only injuries the QRC sustained were a result of withdrawing under fire, when the QRC forces were not applying the same volume of organic firepower towards Somali positions.

Analyzing the RS Isolated Personnel of the two evaders who survived the initial impact of the crashes in the construct of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that the survival of the pilots was directly correlated with their ability to quickly gain RS Isolated Personnel, even in instances where the pilots had to defend themselves and make their survival known. It was not until the uncommitted Somalis finally identified, or reacquired, the hiding pilots that they lost RS Isolated Personnel. Fortunately for the pilots, who had just expended their last round, the arrival of friendly forces precluded the necessity to become reabsorbed into their environment. In the end, the pilots affected their own recovery by gaining a decisive advantage over the Somalis, not by disappearing into the urban landscape, but by removing themselves from the urban landscape by means of opportune personnel recovery<sup>17</sup> made possible with the assistance of a helpful civilian and an APC from the UAE. The pilots “disappeared” and achieved RS Isolated Personnel at the same time—when they boarded the APC. Figure 7 depicts the opportune recovery as the vertical rise in the probability of mission completion that crossed the RS line only at mission completion. As shown in this figure, the sustainment and two losses of RS Isolated Personnel are the dips below the RS line. Mission completion is determined at the point where the pilots were no longer responsible for their own welfare when they successfully reached friendly forces.

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<sup>17</sup> The proposed definition of opportune personnel recovery from JP 3-50 (first draft revision) is “unplanned personnel recovery performed by military forces, indigenous persons, or others not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for personnel recovery, but which, due to proximity and/or availability, and willingness to assist, are able to assist in the recovery of isolated personnel” (2003, p. GL-20).




Figure 6. Authors' RS Recovery Force Graph for the QRC, 25 September 1993




Figure 7. Authors' RS Isolated Personnel Graph, 25 September 1993

## **2. Principles Necessary for the Overt Recovery Force's Successful Operations**

### **a. *Simplicity***

The QRC had one mission, to find the glow, and then search for survivors. This number of tactical objectives that the small force needed to accomplish was limited to only the most vital of tasks. The effect of this focus limited the number of personnel required, reduced the amount of time on target, and decreased the number of moving parts that Whetstone had to control.

There were considerable gaps in intelligence for this mission. Before deploying, Whetstone said he was moving “toward a tragedy with no known enemy or friendly situation” (Whetstone, 2004, p. 4). The commander never knew the location of the downed aircraft until he saw the “glow,” and only his instincts warned him that they probably would be ambushed by the Somalis at any moment while moving dismounted to the site. With little intelligence to reduce the number of unknown factors and variables that Whetstone had to consider, the QRC commander was forced to employ his forces in a risky manner that was responsive and flexible, given the guerrilla tactics employed by the Somali militia. Whetstone’s prior experiences in Mogadishu told him what to expect, and his unit’s training would have to make up for the intelligence gap. This lack of intelligence could have just as easily resulted in a total disaster.

Whetstone was innovative in his use of aviation assets to assist the QRC in reaching the objective and accomplish its mission. Instead of navigating by slower, more traditional methods, Whetstone relied on the OH-58’s technology to produce a “sparkle” to guide him to the objective quickly. Moving quickly in the hostile urban area allowed the Somalis little time to engage the force while en route to the crash site.

### **b. *Security***

Because the QRC reacted so quickly to the initial notification of the crash, the Somalis could gain little advantage by exploiting security failures. The QRC’s speed of response was its security. While the Somalis had to be reasonably sure that recovery forces would eventually arrive at the site, it is doubtful that the Somalis had any foreknowledge of the timing or means of insertion for the QRC. While the Somalis had

somewhat prepared for the arriving recovery force, they had limited knowledge and understanding of the combat power available to such a numerically inferior unit. The Somalis' easily exploited and ad hoc defenses were unable to reduce Whetstone's speed on target. Whetstone achieved the principle of security, in part, due to the mutually supportive principle of surprise gained by his employment of dominant and suppressive firepower, which prevented the Somali ambushers from gaining an advantage by pinning-down the dismounted soldiers as they approached and searched the wreckage.

*c. Repetition*

The preparation phase of this operation was in Whetstone's unit training plan. The QRC conducted no specific or "full-dress" rehearsals prior to deployment. This was a "standard mission profile" for a properly trained QRC. The QRC's standard operating procedures (SOPs) had reinforced the routine nature of its quick-reaction operations. After just completing a successful training cycle, Whetstone had his QRC at a high-level of readiness and training—it had finely honed the individual skills so vital to the urban battlefield, and the collective tasks were now second nature. As the QRC commander would later comment on the mission:

Thank the Lord we had practiced and proven SOPs, Standard Operating Procedures that carried the night and the day. From the time my men rolled out of the rack, even as we got onto the trucks, we were following our SOPs. The men trusted what we had trained, and we were using it full steam ahead now (Whetstone, 2004, p. 4).

While the QRC conducted no specific "recovery" training for this mission, the mission parameters of moving to, securing, and searching and objective are fundamental tasks for an infantry company, and Whetstone's QRC was at the peak of their training level when he received this mission.

*d. Surprise*

If there was anything that caught the Somalis off guard, it was the quickness of the QRC's response to the incident, and the amount of suppressive fires the recovery forces had at their disposal. The Somalis knew that a recovery force would have to come to that exact location, so Somalis did not afford Whetstone the luxury of attacking the Somalis where they were wholly unprepared. Whetstone did not attempt to deceive the Somalis in order to gain a slight advantage, nor did he attempt to throw the

Somalis off as to the timing of the attack. Instead, Whetstone exploited the Somali's weakness of defense—the Somalis had no idea exactly how effective the QRC's firepower would be, or how ineffective their defensive positions actually were. Compared to “typical” reinforced and mutually supportive defensive positions, the tin shacks and poorly constructed buildings used by the Somali fighters provided little protection from the firepower Whetstone would bring to bear that morning. This weakness of the Somali defensive preparations, while not known to Whetstone before his arrival at the crash site, offered an exploitable weakness that the QRC used to achieve surprise.

*e. Speed*

To the greatest extent practical, U.S. forces will not leave a fallen comrade on the battlefield, even if he or she is deceased. With the mission of personnel recovery in situations where remains must be exhumed or carefully collected due to difficult circumstances, generally more time will be necessary for the recovery forces to accomplish the mission. This means that in many personnel recovery operations, where the isolated person is not an active or contributing participant, there will be a greater amount of time needed to conduct the operation, and thus a greater vulnerability to recovery forces. Whetstone’s immediate gain of RS Recovery Force, and his subsequent ability to maintain that dominance, allowed the QRC to sacrifice some speed on the objective—and as discussed in the previous chapter, the Somalis were not organized as a national military force, so Whetstone could afford to spend more time on target. Whetstone’s QRC remained on the site searching for remains as long as was necessary in order to ensure that they had conducted a thorough search. Mitigating circumstances that probably resulted in a loss of speed on the objective were the sheer heat of the wreckage, which recovery forces could not safely approach in order to search, and the absence of either five survivors or five sets of remains.

*f. Purpose*

“No one gets left behind,” is a well-understood creed in the Infantry. As the QRC set out on its mission to recover a downed aircrew, there was no doubt in anyone’s mind as to what the mission was, or how important it was. Whetstone clearly defined the mission statement to his subordinate leaders, if for no other reason than by its

lack of details. In this specific case, with no details to offer the possibility of creating confusion, all the QRC had to do was maneuver to the glow and recover the aircrew. Everyone in the QRC understood this primary objective, and the camaraderie within Tiger Company manifested the pride and sense of personal dedication that inspired the soldiers to ensure that they would leave no man behind—including all forces benefiting from the QRC’s employment. Two soldiers who demonstrated the limitless nature of their dedication to this principle, eventually received Silver Star medals.

### **3. Principles Necessary for the Isolated Personnel’s Success**

#### **a. *Communication***

Shrader radioed his Mayday at least five times before crashing. While he got no response before impact, Riedel monitored his transmission and initiated the reporting procedures. In this instance, the burning aircraft on the dark Mogadishu night made locating the actual position of the aircraft relatively easy—no additional effort on the part of the pilots would be necessary unless they moved. Shrader did attempt to signal the aircraft orbiting overhead, but his AN/PRC-90 survival radio malfunctioned, and all he could hear was the a loud “squench.” Shrader also tried to signal the overhead aircraft with his white strobe light, though this turned out to be another unsuccessful attempt at communication. Speaking with the pilot of the OH-58 after his recovery, two pilots agreed that the illumination from the aircraft’s intense fire prohibited the aircraft from noticing the strobe.

Unlike a true SOF recovery force, which will generally not launch a recovery mission without first knowing the location of the evader, the QRC’s mission of reacting quickly to an incident precluded this luxury. Therefore, the pilots’ process of positively identifying or authenticating themselves to the recovery force would have been much less of a governing consideration given the conditions and circumstances of the crash and the QRC’s mission. The QRC would have conducted a visual recognition and authentication process—if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it’s probably a duck. In any event, the pilots never had the opportunity to identify themselves to the QRC forces because their opportune recovery by UNOSOM II forces happened first.

**b. *Adaptability***

Shrader's quick response in relocating himself and Alliman into a dark and shadowy alley resulted in quickly gaining RS Isolated Personnel. The first two Somalis that came to observe their handiwork did not notice the pilots, and probably assumed that nobody could have survived such a crash. The "invisible" pilots had successfully camouflaged themselves by blending in to the darkness. Unfortunately, this advantage would not be maintained for long, which was probably inevitable without moving farther away from the wreck, since more and more curious observers would likely come to see the fruits of their guerrilla labor. The pilots did benefit from some lower level of visibility after the grenade incident. Since Shrader likely killed the two attackers, the Somalis that initiated the tactics of harassment and probing fires did not know with any certainty where the survivors were hiding. Without the ability to positively identify the position of the pilots for more than an hour, the pilots secured valuable time that ultimately resulted in their successful recovery. Without knowing the pilots' location, the threatening Somalis feared the same fate as those that had gone before.

Since the pilots never moved more than 150 meters from the wreckage, there was never an opportunity to temporarily adopt the customs and idiosyncrasies of the locals in order to fit in with the patterns of normalcy in Mogadishu, so this aspect of adaptability can not be assessed in this case.

**c. *Exploitation***

Exploiting the kindness of the one Somali who did not want to kill the pilots resulted in a successful recovery. When the opportunity presented itself, Shrader took advantage of the opportunity to escape from his pursuers. Fearing that the bright lights in the distance were more Somalis, and knowing that daybreak was quickly approaching, the pilots made a decision to take a risk out of desperation. Had Shrader's survival radio functioned, and had someone informed him that the QRC was en route or just around the corner, he might not have had the necessary incentive to make such a potentially risky decision. In either event, he made the correct decision, and took advantage of what his environment offered him. With no better alternatives to choose

from, Shrader gained an advantage in time and space against his hesitant and uncommitted adversaries by carrying his copilot the 100 meters to the UAE vehicle, thus accomplishing an opportune recovery.

*d. The Gonzales Principle*

CW2 Shrader's successful evasion was largely a result of his realizing the importance of making ones own opportunities in life. Early in life he had developed a competitive nature, which fostered his sense of duty to become strong-willed survivor and the "smart evader"—long before he experienced combat. In a PowerPoint briefing he currently gives on his shoot down and subsequent evasion, CW4 Shrader says this about realizing the necessity to make and maximize training opportunities:

I had no formal specialized SERE [survival, evasion, resistance and evasion] or Urban Combat training. However, in high school I was very active in sports. In my school the head varsity coach wore multiple hats, so I spent a great deal of time with him. His greatest impact on me was that of being a competitor. No matter the sport or in life—play to win, I don't care if you're playing tidily-winks—play to win. Life may knock you down now and then, but you have to get back up and keep fighting. This internal drive, or will to survive, must be accompanied with the proper assets—from passive systems for sustained survivability in a low threat environment, or a situation like mine where survival means you have to use deadly force. The challenge lies with us all. The commander must allocate time for training—from the vest that the aircrew wears, to getting help from special ops people for evasion training. The individual has responsibilities he or she must account for, from seizing the opportunity to attend the SERE B or C course, or just taking advantage of the next weapons range (personal communication, CW4 Dale Shrader, April 9, 2004).

Shrader was a smart evader. His general mindset was developed, enhanced, and optimized through realistic training, and his devotion to self-improvement. Once placed in a survival situation, his outlook on life became his tool for survival. Shrader's demonstrated ability to quickly assess and appraise his predicament, evaluate his alternatives, and decide on an appropriate solution was something that only got better with rehearsals and training prior to his deployment to Somalia. His rapid crisis decision-making, and decision to risk movement and contact when he did, resulted in his successful evasion and recovery.

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## **IV. THE RECOVERY OF TF RANGER**

### **A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION**

The example chosen for the detailed case study of an overt, direct action (DA) Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel recovery (PR) is the raid and recovery conducted by Task Force (TF) Ranger in Somalia on 3-4 October 1993 during the conduct of Operation GOTHIC SERPENT. Unless the authors cite otherwise cited, or state the time as an approximation, they derived all times from a compilation of official timelines from both the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and TF Ranger.<sup>18</sup> Following the case study is an analysis of relative superiority (RS) for both the IP (RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>) and the recovery force (RS <sub>Recovery Forces</sub>), in the context of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model. The authors will follow this analysis with an evaluation of how each of the overt recovery force's six principles, and the four IP-specific recovery principles affected the respective participant's level of RS.

### **B. DETAILED CASE STUDY**

On 3 October 1993, TF Ranger executed a raid into General Mohamad Farah Aidid's stronghold near the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia, seeking to capture two of his key lieutenants. Although the task force accomplished its mission and captured twenty-four Aidid supporters, Somali clansmen shot down the first of two MH-60L Black Hawk helicopters using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). With the downing of the first of these MH-60Ls, the mission of TF Ranger changed from one of capturing Aidid's supporters to one of safeguarding and recovering American casualties. From a tactical perspective, the subsequent actions of all TF Ranger members to defend the position of the first downed Black Hawk and to retrieve the dead and wounded reflected credit on their training, courage, initiative, individual soldier skills, and dedication to one another. However, at strategic and policy levels, the events following the raid have affected, and will continue to affect, U.S. foreign policy for years (Warner-Levin Report,

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<sup>18</sup> 1) QRF official timeline (version 1, narrative with COL Casper's signature block) attached as Appendix F to CPT Lee Rysewek's 1994 monograph, "Experiences of Executive Officer from Bravo Company, 3d Battalion, 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment and Task Force Ranger during the Battle of the Black Sea on 3-4 October 1993, in Mogadishu Somalia;" 2) TF Ranger official timeline attached as Appendix D to CPT Lee Rysewek's 1994 monograph; 3) QRF official timeline (version 2, narrative with no signature block), from the personal files of BG (Ret.) Bill David; and 4) QRF official timeline (version 3, by time, not narrative), also from the personal files of BG (Ret.) Bill David.

1995). By applying the SOF-specific overt urban PR model within the context of the recovery forces' failure to sustain the RS Recovery Force gained in the first ten minutes of "The Battle of the Black Sea," and the mixed results of attaining RS Isolated Personnel for the two different groups, this case study will show the interdependent and causal relationship between RS and successful SOF personnel recovery operations in urban areas.

The United Nation's (UN) decision to get involved in Somalia was unique in that it was the first time the UN intervened in a nation where it was not only uninvited, but warned not to intercede by the local antagonists. A 5 June 1993 ambush by one of the antagonists, Somali warlord Mohamad Aidid, resulted in the deaths of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers who were part of UN Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II).<sup>19</sup> In response, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 837. This resolution called for the apprehension of those responsible for the ambush of the Pakistani soldiers. Retired U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) in Somalia, pressed the Clinton administration to deploy a special operations task force specifically trained and equipped for the task of hostile apprehension, and capable of responding if any UN workers were taken hostage by Aidid's clan (Akers & Singleton, 2000, p. 4). Partially in response to Admiral Howe's persistence, the administration finally approved the deployment only after Somalis killed four U.S. Marines and wounded seven others, in two separate incidents involving remote-controlled land mines on 21 August 1993. U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) numerous objections through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, concerning the appropriateness of the mission had been ignored; the task force departed for Somalia on 24 August 1993.

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<sup>19</sup> UNOSOM II, during the period of TF Ranger's involvement, was a coalition of only twenty-one nations with an approximate strength of 17,200 (USFORSCOM AAR, 1997, Vol.1, p. 7). For the first time, the UN invoked its own charter to conduct a peace enforcement intervention in Somalia, which it considered a failed nation-state. UNSCR 837, passed on 6 June 1993, "called for the arrest of those responsible for the murder of UN peacekeepers, authorized the neutralization of Radio Mogadishu (also known as Radio Aidid)" and "marked the beginning of a military campaign to regain control of the city, neutralize the USC/SNA militia, and destroy militia weapon and ammunition storage sites" (p. 11). "Although authorized to arrest those responsible for the deaths of UN peacekeepers, UNOSOM II did not move expeditiously on that task, due to inadequate UN military capabilities to execute such a mission" (p. 12). The rush to approve and implement UNSCR 837 also failed to gain consensus with the UNOSOM II contributing nations, most of whom were not members of the Security Council" (p. 33).

TF Ranger, under the command of Major General William “Bill” Garrison, was a battalion-size, self-contained, joint force consisting of approximately 440 personnel from each SOCOM component with selective augmentation from conventional forces (Adams, 2001, p. 261; Marquis, 1997, p. 253). TF Ranger’s chain of command was separate from that of the other U.S. Forces in UNOSOM II (see Figure 8). Garrison reported directly to General (GEN) Joseph P. Hoar, the Combatant Commander (referred to at the time as Commander-in-Chief or CINC) of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) without going through the UN channels, but maintained a close working relationship with MG Thomas Montgomery, the commander of U.S. forces supporting UNOSOM II (USFORSCOM).<sup>20</sup> With the most sophisticated equipment available, and access to virtually every product of the national-level intelligence collection architecture, the task force was prepared to launch an assault on short notice, usually a matter of minutes. This level of readiness required an extreme level of organization, training, and rehearsal. TF Ranger depended on rapid response and minimal time on target once they conducted the assault in order to ensure tactical surprise. The raid of 3-4 October was the seventh assault the task force had conducted since their arrival in Mogadishu.




Figure 8. UN/U.S. Force Structure and Relationships with TF Ranger. (After AAR for TASK FORCE RANGER, 1994, p. 1-A-1).

<sup>20</sup> USFORSCOM’s mission was to “conduct military operations in Somalia in support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR)” (USFORSCOM AAR, Vol 1, 1994, p. 19). Under the operational control of USFORSCOM, there was a UN Quick Reaction Force (QRF) maintained by elements of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division. Their mission was to be able to reinforce any UN force within 30 minutes notification. TF Ranger assigned a liaison officer (LNO) [MAJ Craig Nixon, XO, 3/75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment] to bunk with the QRF in order to notify the QRF when TF Ranger launched a mission—in case they needed reinforcements.

TF Ranger depended on tactical surprise for success. It was able to achieve this in part through the use of sophisticated assault aircraft such as the MH/AH-6 Little Birds and the MH-60L, as well as the aerial reconnaissance assets like the P-3C Reef Point and OH-58 Kiowa Warrior. With few exceptions, the robust communications architecture was virtually flawless. However, TF Ranger contributed to the Somali learning curve. The task force conducted operations during daylight hours, and repetitiously used the same operational templates that allowed for rapid planning and execution. Daylight operations gave the Somalis the opportunity to observe TF Ranger's tactics, techniques, and procedures and benefited the Somalis. To minimize the increased risk of these daylight operations, TF Ranger employed "profile flights"<sup>21</sup> and rapid planning processes. Because of the inherent difficulties of tracking specific persons or vehicles in a dense urban environment, "assault[s] had to be planned and initiated as quickly as possible (using pre-rehearsed battle drills fine tuned for the actual situation)." TF Ranger developed two mission templates—one for strongpoint assault and the other for assault against a moving convoy (Northacker, 1998, p. 3).

TF Ranger's mission was to capture General Aidid and his principal lieutenants. Before the transition of control to UNOSOM II, the U.S. led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) underestimated the intentions and military capability of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance's (USC/SNA) militia. Led by Aidid and Osman Hassan Ali Atto, the USC/SNA was one of the most powerful factions in Somalia,<sup>22</sup> retaining influence over 70 percent of Mogadishu. The USC (Mahdi) influenced those areas in Mogadishu not under USC/SNA control. Aidid had not been sighted since 29 July 1993, and it is speculated that "this extended period of hiding may have resulted in part from media announcements of TF Ranger's deployment, with open speculation that capturing Aidid was [TF Ranger]'s primary mission" (AAR for TASK FORCE

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21 "TF Ranger randomly launched missions for training and rehearsal at all times of the day and night. We could not protect our launches but the idea was to put the challenge on the surveillance to determine if it was a real launch or not" (Faust, 1999, p. 16).

22 Further contributing to the difficulty in achieving simplicity, there were fourteen recognized political factions (also referred to as clans and sub-clans) in Somalia, eleven of which UNITAF considered "warring factions." The most active militia were the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA), United Somali Congress (USC-Mahdi), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Patriotic Movement/Somali National Alliance (SPM-SNA), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM-Gabio), Somali National Front (SNF), and the Somali National Movement (SNM) (USFORSCOM AAR, Vol 1, 1997, p. 2-8).

RANGER, 1994, p. 2). Aidid, hiding amongst his extremely loyal clan members, had the ability to hide at will with little fear of successful human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.

The initial focus of all of TF Ranger's intelligence collection and analysis efforts was to locate Aidid (Northacker, 1998, p. 2). Mission success for TF Ranger was highly dependent upon, and highly unlikely without, the accurate and timely HUMINT that was extremely difficult to obtain in Aidid's center of gravity—the “hornet's nest” of the *Bakara* market. Decision-makers knew this fact before TF Ranger's final raid, as evidenced in a statement by GEN Wayne Downing, the Combatant Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM):

‘I kept telling [Garrison] not to do anything crazy...be patient, be careful, eventually you will get a shot at Aidid.... I told him that (1) he needed to be careful in populated areas, and (2) in certain circumstances not to go near the *Bakara* market.... we did not have good intelligence about that part of the city. We didn't have any presence there or good HUMINT’ (as cited in the Warner-Levin Report, 1995, pp. 39-41).

The Somali clan system stresses segmentation over community, and as such preservation of clan identity meant fighting for turf; shifting loyalties and fluid allegiances within the Somali clan structure characterized their will to survive. Aidid arguably had no interest in a national reconciliation; he would fight unconventionally, as his ancestors had, only to reconcile within his own clan (Stevenson, 1995, pp. 1-6). The mindset of the U.S., which is fundamentally European in tradition, could not (or did not) grasp this concept for possible exploitation. TF Ranger had effective technical intelligence collection capabilities, but these were never able to completely overcome the archaic culture or society in Mogadishu.<sup>23</sup>

On 3 October 1993, TF Ranger caught a break; HUMINT indicated that several of Aidid's lieutenants would be meeting near the Olympic Hotel. The HUMINT source said that Omar Salad Elmi, Aidid's principle political advisor, Issa Mohammad Siad, and

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<sup>23</sup> Access to certain areas of Mogadishu depended on having the proper clan, tribe, sub-clan, even so far as family pedigree. Somalis, being totally dedicated to these hierarchies, made it very difficult for TF Ranger to recruit Somalis to work against their own. The chaos and disorder of Mogadishu created situations in which the ability to safely gain access to an area once did not mean it could be accessed safely again.

possibly COL Abdi “Qeybdid” Hassan Awale, the alleged Minister of Interior were at the meeting site. For two hours the TF Ranger JOC’s “intelligence fusion cell” frantically managed, redirected, and orchestrated collection and surveillance assets trying to determine the credibility of the information. Reconnaissance assets eventually identified a vehicle reportedly associated with Salad (Loeb, 2000, p. W6; Faust, 1999, p. 51). Satisfied that he had actionable intelligence, Garrison approved the mission launch. Based on previous experience, TF Ranger did not anticipate and plan for all contingencies. For example, the mission began in daylight and all were certain that the mission would end hours before dark. Using all six previous missions as an indicator, most of the assault and blocking forces had not brought their night vision devices (NVDs), water for more than two hours, or sufficient ammunition for sustained combat operations.

Garrison finalized coordination with Montgomery, informing him of the pending mission’s location and target, confirming that no non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were operating near the target area, and deconflicting all airspace. MAJ Craig Nixon, the habitual TF Ranger liaison officer to the QRF, notified the QRF of their “be prepared to” mission of securing the ground extraction route. After finalizing the plan, preparing for combat, and loading the aircraft, TF Ranger launched the assault force of eight AH/MH-6 and eight MH-60L helicopters at 1532 hours. The task force had taken no time to conduct “mission specific” actions on the objective rehearsals, due to the timeliness of the actionable intelligence.

In launching the raid, TF Ranger did little to protect essential elements of friendly information.<sup>24</sup> The Somalis had an unobstructed view of the airfield from the surrounding hills. Somalis had a clear view both day and night of the soldiers’ billets as well as the JOC. Whenever TF Ranger prepared for a mission, the word rapidly spread through the city. On this day, Aidid’s followers immediately knew that aircraft had taken

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<sup>24</sup> JP 1-02 (2003) defines essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) as key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness (p. 185).

off. Based on the Somalis' pattern analysis of TF Ranger's previous raids, RPG teams rushed to the rooftops along the flight paths of the task force's helicopters (FM 3-06, 2003, p. C-7).

After his initial notification by Garrison, Montgomery immediately started coordinating additional support. Upon committing the QRF's Quick Reaction Company (QRC), it was clear to Montgomery that if recovery forces were piecemealed into the fight, they would suffer additional casualties, so he determined that additional heavy forces would be required. He had determined that the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division's QRF should not attempt a relief/extraction of the northern crash site in unarmored vehicles, so he coordinated with the Pakistanis, Malaysian, Italian, and finally the Indian UNOSOM forces, all of whom had armored vehicles ("Ambush in Mogadishu," personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004).

At 1542 hours, helicopters begin inserting the blocking force and assault elements at the target location. The ground reaction force (GRF-1) then positioned itself in its staging area, and awaited the signal to move forward to the target location. At this same time, the TF Ranger JOC notified the QRF TOC that cordon and search elements were on the objective in the *Bakara* market area. Shortly after the helicopter insertion, GRF-1 began movement from their staging area towards the link-up point at the target building. As the mission was progressing as planned on the target itself, TF Ranger helicopters began to notice increasing hostile activity by the local inhabitants.

Aidid gained an advantage using civilians as part of his prepared defenses; Aidid's was willing to put his civilians into harm's way, even using them as human shields for his fighters.<sup>25</sup> Aidid's knowledge of the rules of engagement (ROE) gave him an advantage that he further exploited in order to preempt and then hinder TF Ranger's raid. On the assumption that the Somali crowds would be largely neutral, TF Ranger first exercised all measures other than deadly force—but Aidid's manipulation of the ROE

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<sup>25</sup> In a report to the UN Security Council on 1 July 1993, Howe stated that there was "increasing evidence that General Aidid deliberately and personally directed the use of women and children for attacks on UNOSOM II soldiers; and that he directed his militia to shoot into the crowd on June 13 in order to create casualties and embarrass...UNOSOM II before the assembled world press" (Warner-Levin Report, 1995, p. 22).

gave him an exploitable advantage that quickly overwhelmed the Americans. The Rangers quickly realized that they would have to fire through the women and children to kill Aidid's fighters and protect themselves.

As Aidid apparently knew, "regardless of the size or quality of defensive forces, the defender in the urban environment usually extracts large costs from the attacker in time, resources, and casualties" (MCWP 3-35.3, 1998, p. 1-16).<sup>26</sup> By drawing U.S. forces into a fight on his home turf in Mogadishu, Aidid successfully employed guerrilla tactics and noncombatants within the confining nature of the urban jungle to make it difficult for TF Ranger to employ their technological superiority. If U.S. forces were unwilling to risk harming civilians, Aidid surmised that he could inflict heavy casualties on the task force, thereby degrading U.S. public support for operations in Somalia. Either way, civilians on the battlefield benefited Aidid. If TF Ranger were willing to risk increased civilian casualties to protect themselves, those casualties would likely have the same effect on public support (FM 3-06, 2003, p. C-5). Killing civilians would have undermined the perceived legitimacy of the intervention. In urban guerrilla warfare, the populace is similar to key terrain in military terms; the side that manages it best has a distinct advantage over the other.

While sniping was more of a nuisance to the ground forces, a much more fruitful tactic for the Somalis was attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars. At most of the roadblocks at key intersections, as well as along main avenues of approach, the Somalis had emplaced RPGs teams to disable ground forces traveling in wheeled and tracked vehicles. This use of RPGs proved extremely effective at creating additional obstacles along the narrow streets, and was an extremely difficult tactic to counter. Somalis gave TF Ranger its first casualties when they hit a 2½-ton truck with an RPG while it was en route to link-up with the assault force at the target site. This would provide foreshadowing of the devastating effects of RPG use throughout the next fifteen hours.

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<sup>26</sup> It could be argued that it was clearly not Aidid's intent to win the tactical battle against the UN's operational center of gravity—the well-trained and technologically advanced American military forces, which he could not attack directly. Aidid chose, instead, to strike at a potential American vulnerability and strategic center of gravity—the inability to accept casualties for an operation not vital to national interests, since most Americans still viewed Somalia as a humanitarian effort.

Unknown to the task force, “Aidid brought in fundamentalist Islamic soldiers from Sudan, experienced in downing Russian helicopters in Afghanistan, to train his men in RPG firing techniques” (FM 3-06, 2003, p. C-6). Given the low altitudes and the relatively low air speeds of TF Ranger’s helicopters in this urban operation, the helicopters were much more vulnerable than anticipated. Somalis had attempted to use massed RPG fires during earlier raids—during the fifth and sixth assaults conducted by TF Ranger (both during daylight hours on 18 and 21 September respectively), the use of RPGs had begun to increase. Somalis fired at least twelve RPGs at TF Ranger helicopters on its previous (sixth) mission, and they had even succeeded in shooting down a UH-60 flying at rooftop level at night just one week before the battle. During the 3 October raid, the MH-60Ls loitered for forty minutes over the target area in an orbit that was well within Somali RPG range.<sup>27</sup>

By 1602 hours, TF Ranger had secured the target building and detained twenty-four Somalis. After GRF-1 linked up at the target house, the TF Ranger assault force began consolidation at the point of extraction in order to begin the process of withdrawing. Shortly after all of the Somali detainees departed for the airfield, Somalis used a RPG to hit and down a MH-60L, callsign Super 61, “Thunderstruck,” at a location referred to as the northern crash site, or crash site #1. This event “cracked the task force’s sense of righteous invulnerability...[since] they were the trump card in this God-forsaken place. ...the Somalis couldn’t shoot [Black Hawks] down” (Bowden, 1999, p. 80). The pilot, CW4 Clifton P. Wolcott had the presence of mind to alert the crew via radio to brace for impact while the helicopter spun out of control toward the street below. This radio report alerted friendly forces that there were now isolated personnel on the

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<sup>27</sup> When questioned about his decision to ignore increased Somali RPG use against helicopters during a question and answer luncheon in the Del Monte Room in Herrmann Hall, at the Naval Postgraduate School on 28 May 2003, MG (Ret.) Garrison stated that the fact was not ignored. He stated that he made his decision to continue using helicopters in the same manner as the previous six missions based on advice provided by the pilots and the unit commander of the attached 1/160<sup>th</sup> SOAR(A). They informed MG Garrison that it was an acceptable risk, and recommended that it should be mitigated at their level. This seems to suggest that the pilots believed that such a non-precision weapon was ultimately no match for their flying skills. COL Faust corroborated this assumption in his monograph. After talking to one of the pilots who had met with other pilots to discuss the 25 September shoot down of the UH-60 from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division’s Aviation Task Force, “In their [the pilots’] opinion, the shoot down was lucky, i.e., ‘big sky, little bullet.’” The pilot suggested that TF Ranger aircraft “flew rapidly random and irregular flight profiles,” and that “the combination of experience and better tactics minimized the RPG threat to TFR aircraft” (Faust, 1999, p. 40).

battlefield. The other helicopters in the area visually observed the crash at 1620 hours, so the location of the aircraft was a known point; the aircraft smashed into an alley about 500 yards northeast of the target.

At 1624 hours, an unarmed MH-6 (callsign Star 41) piloted by CW3 Karl Maier and CW3 Keith Jones landed in the narrow street. Maier fired on approaching Somalis from the cockpit with a Heckler and Koch MP-5 light submachine gun in his right hand, while he simultaneously maintained the aircraft at a hover with his left hand. The alley was so narrow that the rotor blades barely cleared the houses on both sides. Jones confirmed that both Wolcott and CW2 Donovan L. Briley had died upon impact while he assisted two wounded snipers onto the MH-6 for extraction at 1631 hours (Rysewyk, 1994, p. 10). Unfortunately, only SFC Jimmy Smith made it back alive as the other sniper, SSG Daniel Busch, died en route to the airfield from injuries sustained defending the crew of Super 61. The six-man Ranger squad from blocking position #2, led by 1LT Thomas Di Tomasso, arrived at the site at 1628 hours. Shortly after Star 41 departed, CW3 Dan Jollota and MAJ Herb Rodriguez, in CSAR MH-60L (callsign Super 68), inserted fifteen CSAR personnel via fastrope. Commanded by CPT Bill Coultrup, the CSAR personnel assisted in securing the crash site and treating the wounded. TF Ranger notified the QRF that assistance might be required—the QRF left University Compound to preposition itself at the airfield.

At 1641 hours, Somalis struck and downed a MH-60L, callsign Super 64, “Venom,” with a RPG at a location referred to as the southern crash site, or crash site #2, approximately 800 meters south of Super 61. As command and control aircraft loitered overhead, they witnessed Super 61 going down—just as pilots CW3 Michael J. Durant and CW4 Raymond A. Frank reported their dilemma over their radio. While two of the AH-6’s orbited the position to provide cover fire, TF Ranger’s LTCs Gary Harrell (Commander, C Squadron, 1<sup>st</sup> Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta and overall Ground Forces Commander for the operation) and Tom Matthews (Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and Air Mission Commander for the operation) finally authorized MH-60L (callsign Super 62) pilots CW3 Mike Goffena and CPT Jim Yacone, to insert two snipers (MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randy Shughart) after their third plea to provide protection for the crew as they

watched Somali crowds close in on the position. Within minutes of the crash, and before any of the crew were able to exit the aircraft, Super 62 inserted the two-man recovery force who assisted the wounded out of the wreckage while keeping the Somalis at bay. Jones and Maier again landed their MH-6 in an alley approximately 100 meters from the wrecked aircraft at this site—but this time they could only stay for about one minute due to enemy fire they received; they would not have another opportunity to return. The snipers ran out of ammunition before additional recovery forces could arrive—there was nothing more they could do. Though unknown to the task force, with the exception of Durant, all of the wounded crew (including crew chiefs SSG William D. Cleveland, Jr., and SGT Thomas J. Field), and both of the snipers were overrun and killed by the Somalia mob within twenty minutes of the crash (Durant, 2003, pp. 35-37).

TF Ranger's assault forces were pinned down in the vicinity of the northern crash site, the convoys had to return to the airfield and await QRF assistance since they could not successfully navigate to the site, and no more forces could be inserted via helicopters due to the heavy Somali presence. Though all crewmembers had survival radios, the only AN/PRC-112 survival radio ever activated belonged to Durant (personal communication, MG (Ret.) William Garrison, February 2, 2004). Shughart used it to contact 1LT James O. Lechner on Channel B, the Fire Support Net. Lechner forwarded the call to LTC Matthews and LTC Harrell in the C<sup>2</sup> MH-60, who in turn ordered him to inform Shughart that “a reaction force is en route” (Durant, 2003, pp. 35-37; Lechner, 1994, p. 23). The Somalis were in control of that radio shortly after that transmission. Typically, a SOF recovery force will not launch a recovery mission without first knowing the location of the evader, but in this instance, the task force knew the last known location, and had to be sure that no bodies or survivors remained at the site.

The majority of TF Ranger's forces had converged on the northern crash site, and had become pinned-down by heavy enemy fires. Soon after the Somalis shot down the second MH-60L, Garrison launched two unsuccessful recovery forces to the southern crash site because no friendly forces had been able to reach the site. These forces, consisting of a second TF Ranger ground reaction force (GRF-2) and the QRC, met heavy Somali resistance. At around 1740 hours, both GRF-1 and GRF-2 returned to the

airfield after failing to reach any of the trapped soldiers. The QRC would not return to the TF Ranger JOC until 1907 hours, when Garrison placed GRF-2 under the operational control (OPCON) of the QRF.

After the QRF completed its initial mission analysis, LTC Bill David (Commander, TF 2-14, or the QRF's ground forces) directed elements of TF 2-14 and GRF-2 to move to the New Port. Upon arrival at New Port, the units conducted final pre-combat inspections (PCI), and issued more ammunition. By 2130 hours, David had linked-up at the New Port with all of the assets under his control, which included only the Malaysian and Pakistani forces. When David arrived, all forces had arrayed themselves administratively, and were not task organized for combat, or marshaled in proper order of movement (personal interview, BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19, 2003).

David's initial plan was simple—Pakistani tanks would lead the convoy of German-built Malaysian Condor armored personnel carriers (APCs) carrying TF 2-14 soldiers.<sup>28</sup> Company A would attack to break through to TF Ranger at the northern crash site. The TF 2-14 TAC CP and TF Ranger attachments would remain at Release Point Yankee approximately 1200 meters past Pakistani Strongpoint 207 on National Street. Company C, in the remaining APCs, would pass through the release point, and attack to break through to the southern crash site. Company B, would stage at the airfield to serve as the task force reserve. The attacking elements were to move as far as possible while mounted, dismounting only when reaching the assigned objectives (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

Somewhere between 2310 and 2324 hours, TF David departed the New Port en route to the two crash sites. For roughly three hours, TF David fought a vicious battle until they reached their respective release points. By 0155 hours CPT Drew Meyerowich

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<sup>28</sup> David was placed in charge of an ad hoc task force, and given what seemed to everyone to be a mission that he could not accomplish. At the outset of the operation, it appeared to have the makings of another Task Force Smith, an ad hoc organization that also lacked interoperability between coalition forces, detailed intelligence on the enemy disposition, and time to sufficiently plan a complex operation. David's ad hoc task force, sometimes referred to as "Task Force David," consisted of two organic rifle companies, two Malaysian mechanized companies (between 24 and 32 APCs with vehicle commanders, drivers and gunners only), a composite platoon (+) from TF Ranger, one Pakistani tank platoon, UN LNOs, an anti-armor platoon from C-1/87<sup>th</sup> Infantry, and two aviation task forces from both TF 2-25 and TF Ranger. By operation's end, "Task Force David" had successfully achieved what many believed to be impossible. The fact that so few casualties were sustained by this ad hoc organization, in the execution of a near insurmountable task, was nothing short of miraculous.

(Commander, Company A, TF 2-14) reported that the Malaysians APCs carrying his company reported linking-up with the TF Ranger assault force at the northern crash site, and began the slow process of removing the trapped body from the crashed helicopter. At 0228 hours, CPT Michael Whetstone (Commander, Company C, TF 2-14) reported being on the southern objective, at the crash site. At this time, all elements had reached their objectives. Within thirty minutes, Whetstone had recovered all remaining sensitive items from the aircraft, and had supervised the placement of a “thermite” grenade to destroy what remained of the aircraft (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 9 and 11, 2004). For the next two and a half hour, the QRF continued to secure the two crash sites waiting for the TF Ranger to recover the last trapped body.

On the northern objective at 0528 hours, Meyerowich reported that he and the forces at his location had extracted the last body from the MH-60L, had set explosive charges to destroy the aircraft, and had consolidated all personnel for movement back to the release point on National Street. At about that same time, Whetstone arrived at the Pakistani Stadium. At 0537 hours, Meyerowich departed the northern crash site. David directed that overflow personnel ride on the top of the APCs (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004). Approximately fifteen TF Ranger personnel began would become known as the “Mogadishu Mile,” at the release point on National Street, since all of the APCs were fully loaded. Fearing friendly forces would leave them behind, these personnel literally ran beside the vehicles.

When the TF Ranger JOC received a report that there was still TF Ranger personnel dismounted, David ordered all movement stopped until the vehicles picked up the personnel. Once all personnel were with vehicles, the movement resumed. At 0632 hours, David reported that all QRF and TF Ranger forces had closed on the Pakistani stadium.<sup>29</sup>

## C. ANALYSIS

### 1. Relative Superiority

Most regard the plight of TF Ranger as more of a political failure than as a military or tactical failure. While the task force did not accomplish their mission of

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<sup>29</sup> By 0810 hours, TF Ranger aircraft began shuttling personnel from Pakistani stadium to the airfield. By 0916 hours, TF Ranger had accounted for all personnel (TF Ranger still listed six personnel from crash site #2 were as MIA).

capturing Aidid, they knew before deployment that it probably only had a fifty percent chance of success if HUMINT was accurate. Without HUMINT, military planners accepted that they had less than a twenty percent chance of success.<sup>30</sup> It is still debatable as to whether or not the civilians in the chain of command were aware of this point, but Downing and Garrison both made sure that Powell understood this fact. As the CJCS, it would be Powell's responsibility to convey this to the administration and DoD leadership. Still, TF Ranger seemingly offered policy-makers the only viable military option for accomplishing the mission. Regardless, with those odds, it is easy to see that TF Ranger was unlikely to succeed in its mission. Even the skill of the finest soldiers in the U.S. Army would not be enough to tip the scales in TF Ranger's favor.

Since the mission resulted in a strategic failure, regardless of the tactical victory, the reality is that the result of the events during that fifteen-hour engagement have negatively affected, and continues to impact, U.S. foreign policies. While the task force clearly succeeded in their mission of capturing the 24 Aidid supporters on 3-4 October 1993, TF Ranger could not conclude its mission could until it had extracted all members of the task force. The application of conventional heavy forces succeeded in doing what is arguably the most daunting tenet of RS in that, "if relative superiority is lost, it is difficult to regain." While the introduction of the conventional heavy force added to TF Ranger's total numbers, they were still a numerically inferior force compared to their adversaries. In this case, the introduction of additional forces gave TF Ranger the ability to apply the principles of security and surprise through firepower, as previously discussed. Additionally, the presence of APCs provided TF Ranger an opportunity to apply the principle of speed. The combination of these principles allowed TF Ranger to regain RS, and ultimately complete its recovery mission. The resulting tactical victory, in terms of the numbers of dead and wounded,<sup>31</sup> was only made possible by the valor,

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<sup>30</sup> This assessment of probabilities of mission success (capturing Aidid) in relation to HUMINT was confirmed by MG (Ret) Garrison during the question and answer luncheon in the Del Monte Room in Herrmann Hall, at the Naval Postgraduate School on May 28, 2003.

<sup>31</sup> Final numbers showed that TF Ranger had suffered only 16 KIA and 84 WIA, which included the five soldiers initially listed as MIA/POW (Faust, 1999, p. 41; Marquis, 1997, p. 253). "The SNA was on the edge of defeat. It knew it had been beaten and it had taken over a thousand killed or wounded" (Faust, p. 59).

professionalism, and extraordinary dedication exhibited by the men who fought that day, which contributed to their regaining the RS Recovery Force lost for more than ten hours.

In the hostile and reactive environment of Mogadishu, the foundation of TF Ranger's operations was speed, surprise and violence of action. Success was dependent on reacting with the "launch of a direct action force ... in 25 minutes or less" (Faust, 1999, p. 29), and getting off the target as quickly as possible. TF Ranger was "normally on the target for just a matter of minutes before they began exfiltration" (Akers & Singleton, 2000, p. 6), which did not allow the Somalis time to react to the assault force in a cohesive manner. On the 3-4 October mission, a series of unanticipated events resulted in the assault force spending too much time engaged with the Somalis, sacrificing the principle of speed. This effectively allowed the window of opportunity to close, and resulted in a loss of RS Recovery Force. While the window of opportunity and RS Recovery Force disappeared in the snowballing effect of losing the initiative, the door to the zone of potential misfortune began to open widely, and engulfed the task force. As is the case with most special operations missions, small and lightly-armed forces are able to gain speed, and are generally unable to sustain action against a *conventional* enemy for long periods of time—the fact that the Somalis were not a conventional military force made regaining RS Recovery Force more likely. With more relative strength, TF David brought the ability to extend the duration of the battle, and necessarily expanded the number of goals that the recovery force could achieve.

Analyzing TF Ranger's 3-4 October 1993 raid and subsequent recovery operation, in light of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that TF Ranger's difficulties directly correlated with its failure to maintain RS Recovery Force. TF Ranger's combined and cumulative failures to correctly apply the six principles of special operations during all phases of the operation at the tactical level resulted in a state of affairs where the intervention of conventional heavy forces was required to overcome the situation. While the task force eventually succeeded, a more conscious application of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model might have resulted in a more quickly completed and decisive victory, accomplished with relatively few U.S. casualties. Figure 9 shows a RS Recovery Force graph for the 3-4 October 1993 raid.




Figure 9. Authors' RS Recovery Force Graph for TF Ranger's Raid on 3-4 October 1993

Analyzing the RS Isolated Personnel for those who survived the initial impact of the crashes, according to the authors' SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that the survival of those isolated personnel directly correlated with their ability to maintain RS Isolated Personnel. The IP's combined and cumulative successes or failures in applying the applicable IP-specific principles determined the level of success of their survival and recovery. In the case of the northern crash site, Smith and Busch achieved RS Isolated Personnel when they gained a decisive advantage over the Somalis, not by virtually disappearing into the urban landscape, but by removing themselves from the urban landscape in an MH-6. Figure 10 depicts this advantage as the vertical rise in the probability of mission completion. From the point where they achieved RS Isolated Personnel, they sustained it by a combination of quickly mounting the aircraft, and by the arrival of additional friendly forces to secure the area. The figure also depicts this sustainment of RS Isolated Personnel as the gradual increase in the probability of mission completion, which is the point where their destiny was no longer in their own hands.




Figure 10. Authors' RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> Graph for the Super 61 crash site

In the case of the southern crash site, the six IP never achieved RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>. They were never able to gain a decisive advantage over the Somalis because their injuries prevented them from attempting to disappear into the urban landscape. Figure 11 depicts this RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> graph. Their injuries also prevented them from taking advantage of their one recovery opportunity when they were unable to move to the MH-6 only 100 meters from their location. The probability of a successful recovery under the circumstances was always low, and gradually decreased, as attacking Somalis killed the snipers (depicted by the gradual increase in the area of vulnerability). Capture is the ultimate loss of RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> and is a recovery mission failure in this scenario; other-than military means eventually affected Durant's release.




Figure 11. Authors' RS Isolated Personnel Graph for the Super 64 crash site

## 2. Principles Necessary for the Overt Recovery Force's Successful Operations

### a. *Simplicity*

Once TF Ranger's mission changed from a raid to one of PR, the significance of the principle of simplicity could not be more apparent. As the principle on which all of the others rest, simplicity is the most crucial principle with which to comply. In the case of TF Ranger, while operating as a recovery force for those in the two downed MH-60's, the task force had violated all three elements of simplicity critical to success: limiting the number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation.

TF Ranger did initially limit the number of tactical objectives to only the raid site, but the number of objectives grew because of circumstances beyond the task force's control. The vital or limited objective of capturing the twenty-four Aidid supporters on 3 October 1993 focused the task forces' training and preparation for that mission, and was sufficiently limited in scope to satisfy the principle of simplicity. When those captured departed for the airfield, the mission was complete with the exception of the extraction of the remaining task force personnel. Once the first MH-60L was shot

down, TF Ranger began to hastily implement rehearsed contingency plans for an immediate (or emergency) self-recovery, the simplicity of the operation began to slip away as the task force assumed another tactical objective. With the downing of the second MH-60L, TF Ranger quickly realized that yet another tactical objective had been added to the list, and wrestled with the knowledge that it had no contingency plan or dedicated CSAR forces for more than one downed aircraft. TF Ranger's simple plan had now grown to a level that was unmanageable without outside intervention—it was the task force's lack of quality intelligence about the enemy situation near the Olympic Hotel, and not the target-specific intelligence, that compounded this fact.

In order to circumvent or remove obstacles that would otherwise compromise, surprise and/or complicate the rapid execution of the mission, TF Ranger would have been better served to use innovation in order to simplify the plan during the planning phase of the operation. While usually associated with technology, the application of unorthodox tactics can also result in innovation. For the purposes of TF Ranger's recovery mission, the successful application of new technology or innovative tactics would have been to assist the assault elements in reaching the two crash sites, and then to quickly and effectively eliminate the enemy in order to recover those at the crash sites. Since the task force was already committed to the engagement when the first MH-60L crashed, there was little that TF Ranger could do to bring any significant amount of innovation to the fight. The task force was relegated to fighting in a street-by-street brawl, reminiscent of highly conventional military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)—it was too late to start thinking about innovative methods of recovering those at the crash sites once the bullets were already flying. Technical intelligence collection would be TF Ranger's greatest hope for innovation. The routine of TF Ranger's operations ultimately resulted in an exploitable advantage for the Somalis, largely due to TF Ranger's failure to use unorthodox tactics or innovation and superior technical systems to any marked advantage.

***b. Security***

Due to the nature of special operations, tight security is necessary to prevent the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage through foreknowledge of the timing and/or means of insertion of an impending attack. Nevertheless, not knowing the

time or method of an attack did not prevent Aidid from preparing for an assault. TF Ranger's failed security efforts resulted in the Somalis preparing a surprise of their own, and subsequently preempting the attack and effectively reducing the speed on target, both of which resulted in dramatically reducing the possibility of achieving or maintaining RS Recovery Force. TF Ranger ignored the previous warning signs that told it what defenses the enemy was preparing.

Once again, the clan culture of the Somalis made successful mission preparation with regard to security more difficult, but no less important, for TF Ranger's mission accomplishment. The Somalis that fought for Aidid placed much less value on human life, and had no moral aversion to placing noncombatants in harm's way. Unorthodox, or guerrilla, tactics initially gave Aidid an advantage in overcoming TF Ranger's use of the principle of security to achieve RS Recovery Force. The stereotypical urban guerrilla will usually have the advantage over forces solely applying scripted, non-innovative, and non-asymmetrical tactics and techniques.

*c. Repetition*

During the preparation phase of the operation, repetition is indispensable for success, especially since success is largely dependent on minimal exposure time to overwhelming enemy forces. Counterterrorist [CT] units like TF Ranger perform high risk standard mission profiles as a matter of routine, but the PR situation TF Ranger quickly found itself dealing with was anything but routine. Routine had honed individual and unit tactical skills to the point where quick reactions to threats were more instinct than critical thought, but the new threat was incongruent with the standard scenarios for which the unit had been practicing. While TF Ranger did conduct one full-dress rehearsal of a single downed aircraft during the execution of a raid, this rehearsal did not unmask all of the weakness of that contingency plan, nor did it address multiple aircraft losses. Compounded by a general intelligence failure in applying the principle of simplicity, TF Ranger had not prepared for, nor did it desire, a fifteen-hour street battle against an entire city of Aidid's supporters. More importantly, it had not adequately planned for or rehearsed PR operations for task force personnel who would potentially become isolated in the urban areas of downtown Mogadishu. In those circumstances, individual initiative and leadership would have to carry the day.

The failure of both TF Ranger and the QRF to conduct full-dress rehearsals with the UN contingents eventually used to rescue TF Ranger greatly contributed to difficulties with extraction. Garrison never anticipated and “never thought of a contingency plan for backups of equipment like tanks and APCs” (Warner-Levin Report, 1995, p. 33), all of which were readily available from coalition forces under UNOSOM II, and ultimately proved to be invaluable in the extraction of pinned-down personnel on 4 October 1993.

*d. Surprise*

Any force that repetitively uses the same operational techniques will eventually cause the enemy to adopt strategies that will counter that technique. This significant counterintelligence failure makes it very difficult to achieve tactical surprise.

In the postmortem of the October 3 battle, it transpired that Aidid’s militia divided Mogadishu into eighteen sectors, each with a tactical commander...Colonel Harif Hassan Giemale, the commander of the Somali force that engaged Task Force Ranger on October 3, had attended a Soviet military academy in Odessa for three years. His subordinate, Colonel Ali Aden, summed up his commander’s perspective on U.S. tactics: ‘If you use one tactic once, you should not use it a third time. And the Americans had already done basically the same thing six times’ (Stevenson, 1995, pp. 93-94).

Since special operations forces such as TF Ranger do not generally have the luxury of attacking the enemy when or where he is unprepared, they must typically attack in spite of enemy preparations. TF Ranger would only achieve surprise by catching the enemy off guard by using deception, timing, and taking advantage of the Somalis’ vulnerabilities. Since Aidid had his followers watching the airfield both day and night, the word rapidly spread through the city when TF Ranger launched a mission. On 3 October 1993, Aidid’s followers immediately knew that aircraft had taken off and were heading to the downtown area—the task force had already lost the element of tactical and doctrinal surprise. Having seen virtually the same mission six times before, the Somalis were ready to take advantage of the scripted scenario about to unfold before them in their center of gravity.

In terms of the principle of surprise, the raid of 3-4 October 1993 was an obvious failure. TF Ranger failed to (1) delay the enemy’s reaction or divert the enemy’s

attention, (2) attack where the enemy was weakest (compared to other defenses, the *Bakara* Market was probably Aidid's strongest location), or (3) attack at a time that was most beneficial. On the other hand, if the goal was capturing Aidid, the task force really did not have the opportunity to attack at weak points or at optimal times—time-sensitive intelligence drove the operation. Therefore, TF Ranger could actually only expect to delay or divert the Somalis' reaction. Other than the unsuccessful signature or “profile flights” used to protect actual mission launches, nothing was done to deceive the Somalis or delay their reaction to an actual operation; little was done to exploit the principle of surprise. The U.S.'s reliance on technical advantages results in a bias suggesting that less technologically advanced adversaries can be easily surprised. However, the Somalis overcame their lack of technical means of providing early detection of attacks through their use of human spotters. Additionally, with much fewer means to protect themselves, the Somalis should have been much more vulnerable to exploitation through the U.S. military's technology and equipment dominance, but they made do with what they had available.

*e. Speed*

Within Aidid's center of gravity, the *Bakara* market, any delay by TF Ranger expands the area of vulnerability and decreases the probability of achieving RS Recovery Force. Because the Somalis were in a defensive position, they only had to counter the attack, and their ability to react was a constant. This ability of the Somalis to react made it even more critical for TF Ranger to move as quickly as possible regardless of the Somali reaction; speed could contribute to gaining RS Recovery Force if the task force moved with such swiftness that the Somalis' reaction was not an overriding factor.

Once TF Ranger's mission changed from a raid to a PR, the ability to execute rapidly was lost. Since TF Ranger could not affect the extraction of all TF Ranger forces at the same time that vehicles extracted the twenty-four captured Aidid supporters, the task force remained under hostile conditions for the next fourteen hours. One of the Ranger squads secured the northern crash site within four minutes of the shoot down, and within eight minutes, fifteen CSAR personnel further reinforced the position. Recovery forces rescued all personnel from the northern crash site, and extracted with the main body the following morning. In contrast, though only 800 meters from the northern

crash site, except for the two snipers, no friendly forces reached the southern crash site until ten and a half hours after the shoot down. The speed at which recovery forces were able to reach the crash site was the critical factor in determining whether a recovery was successful or unsuccessful.

If there was any principle that should have been much easier to accomplish in Somalia, it should have been the execution principle of speed. The Somalis relied on informal networks that made it difficult to quickly react with an organized force. In addition, with much less reliance on technology to communicate, the informal networks that dominated Mogadishu were typically not quick enough to react to TF Ranger's quickly planned and executed missions (normally completed in less than thirty minutes). Had Somalis not shot down the Black Hawks on 3 October, TF Ranger would have successfully completed its mission in thirty-one minutes from the time of insertion. Unfortunately for TF Ranger, gaining RS Recovery Force required proper integration of all six principles. The monopoly of speed that TF Ranger possessed was not enough to overcome the effects of the other interdependent and mutually supportive principles. Only by reducing uncertainties, thorough contingency planning and minimizing U.S. vulnerabilities, can the benefits of monopolizing this principle be attained, regardless of the enemy's actions.

*f. Purpose*

All members of TF Ranger had an acute understanding of the prime objective of their new personnel recovery mission in spite of the emerging obstacles or opportunities presented by the Somalis. Even during the heat of battle, every individual soldier understood the primary objective of recovering their comrades, and demonstrated immeasurable personal commitment to achieving that end. At the tactical level, there was little that the Somalis could have done to negatively impact TF Ranger's sense of purpose—though they did a superb job at influencing the will of the politicians and public at home in the U.S.

After Somalis shot down the first of the MH-60Ls, the mission of TF Ranger changed from one of capturing Aidid's supporters (who were already in custody) to one of safeguarding and recovering American casualties. The actions of TF Ranger's soldiers were automatic, and required no prompting. The loyalty and extreme sacrifice

they displayed could clearly only be characterized as “knowing no limitations,” especially from the Somali perspective. The clearly defined purpose of TF Ranger’s “new” mission ensured that even in the fog of battle, and no matter what else happened, the individual soldiers understood their primary objective, and would die before failing to accomplish that mission. They believed in the purpose summed up in the U.S. Army Ranger Creed, especially the last two stanzas—they would fight to the last man to ensure that no one was left behind.<sup>32</sup>

### **3. Principles Necessary for the Isolated Personnel’s Success**

#### *a. Communication*

In both of these situations involving immediate or emergency self-recovery, communication was not as critical as in situations where the location of the IP or incident is not visually observed by forces that can affect recovery. Since the object of the principle of communication is for the IP to convey a location to the recovery forces, in both of these cases, visual observance of the crashes by recovery forces replaced the need for communication—and was sufficient to affect recovery. In either event, the significant lesson is that the quicker that ample recovery forces can be inserted, the higher the probability of successful recovery. Moreover, any type of recovery is better than a MIA status. Though there were only two of four IP still alive at the northern site, TF Ranger forces were not going to leave until they had recovered all bodies; the Americans would leave no one behind. Communication is typically a two-way process critical to successful recovery, but it also works when the recovery party is only receiving a location—there is not always a requirement for the IP to receive a response.

At the crash site of Super 61, the insertion of recovery forces came only after first knowing the exact location of the IP, and visual recognition had served as positive identification. As discussed earlier, at crash site #2, the only survival radio activated belonged to Durant; Shughart used it to contact Lechner. The Somalis were in control of that radio shortly after that transmission. Typically a SOF recovery force will

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<sup>32</sup> Fifth Stanza of the U.S. Army Ranger Creed: “Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am a better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never allow a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy, and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.” Sixth Stanza: “Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor” (as cited in Faust, 1999, p. iii).

not launch a recovery mission without first knowing the location of the evader, but in this instance, the task force knew the last known location, and had to be sure that no bodies or survivors remained at the site.

*b. Adaptability*

If a critical principle for the survival and evasion of IP is adaptability, then the two separate crews of Super 61 and Super 64 were at a distinct disadvantage. At the northern crash site, the two pilots died upon impact. A MH-6 successfully extracted the two snipers within eleven minutes of the crash, so there was never really an opportunity to assume the chameleon-like quality of being able to blend in with the environment. Since there was no opportunity to hide in plain sight of the Somalis, the northern crash site does not offer clear evidence that an inability to adapt almost immediately will likely result in capture. Likewise, the IP of Super 64 never had the opportunity to slip into the patterns of normalcy that one can only achieve with knowledge gained from area, cultural, and linguistic familiarization. Clearly, given the situation in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, this would have been difficult at best, since the only pattern of normalcy was total chaos. In a situation where the civilian population is an active and hostile participant in the fighting, temporarily adopting the customs and idiosyncrasies of the locals to not appear out of place would be almost impossible. Under such circumstances, especially during daylight hours, it would better serve an IP to assume the chameleon-like quality by hiding quickly without the knowledge or observation on the adversary.

At the southern crash site, all four members of Super 64's crew had survived the initial impact of the crash, though all were seriously injured (Durant, 2003). Of the six isolated personnel at the crash site, only Gordon and Shughart had a chance at applying the principle of adaptability. Given the enemy situation and the quandary of the TF Ranger ground recovery forces, the insertion of the snipers was conducted as a last hope to defend the crash site; they were not going to evade from that location and leave the crew at the mercy of the Somalis. With the seriousness of the injuries that the four crew members sustained, there was no chance of them moving from that location without significant assistance from more ground or CSAR forces, or the MEDEVAC MH-60L piloted by CW3 Stan Wood and CW3 Gary Fuller. These were not likely options given the circumstances—the unfortunate inability to adapt to their environment sealed the fate

of the six IP at the southern crash site. In contrast to the situation at the northern crash site, with no prospect of hiding in plain sight of the Somalis, the southern crash site offers some support to the idea that an inability to adapt almost immediately will likely result in capture. Nevertheless, as with Super 61, injuries prevented the IP of Super 64 from having the opportunity to slip into the patterns of normalcy only achieved with knowledge gained from area, cultural, and linguistic familiarization.

*c. Exploitation*

Similar to the principle of adaptability, the two separate crews of Super 61 and Super 64 were at a distinct disadvantage when it came to applying the principle of exploitation. With the two pilots killed on impact at the northern crash site, only the two wounded snipers had an opportunity to put time and space between themselves and the Somalis. The two snipers successfully benefited from exploiting the capabilities of the MH-6, which was the only available asset able to land in the narrow alley in which they had crashed. In this instance, the unpredictable action of landing a helicopter in the alley provided the necessary bold and audacious shock value that was sufficient to gain an advantage in time and space against the hesitant Somalis. No other application of exploitation was necessary, as friendly forces numbering in the nineties quickly consolidated at the site.

At the southern crash site, the four seriously injured members of Super 64's crew had virtually no opening to put time and space between themselves and the Somalis that were quickly closing in on their position. Given that TF Ranger inserted the snipers as a last hope to defend the crash site while recovery forces fought to reach the site, and the seriousness of the crews' injuries, there were few chances to apply the principle of exploitation given their limited resources. The best opportunity for possible exploitation came shortly after Shughart and Gordon removed Durant from the helicopter wreckage. In contrast to the situation at the northern crash site, the injured and immobile IP were unable to take advantage of the nearby MH-6, and would not see another prospect for gaining an advantage through bold and audacious behavior. The southern crash site offers some substantiation for the claim that an inability to quickly gain or exploit some type of significant advantage in time and space over ones adversary will

likely result in capture. Only with the introduction of more forces would the six isolated personnel have had a chance at exploiting an opportunity against the mob of Somalis closing in on their position.

*d. The Gonzales Principle*

It is only when an evader is placed in a situation requiring self-preservation that the Gonzales principle can become a tool for survival, since it is something that is developed, enhanced, and optimized during times of peace through realistic training and an institutional devotion to improving human capital. Honed critical thinking skills and the acquired proficiency to survive and evade were critical to the survival of those who survived the initial impact and Somali gun fire. At the northern crash site, Smith's ability to think critically under duress resulted in quickly assessing and appraising the crisis, evaluating alternatives, and deciding on the most appropriate solution. Possessing a way out of his current predicament, Smith seized the opportunity at hand, and quickly got himself and the injured Busch to the MH-6 in order to affect their recovery. Smith's rapid crisis decision-making aptitude was the result of many maturing events such as high-risk live-fire full-dress rehearsals during hundreds of hours of realistic and focused training in peacetime. Smith's "street-smarts" resulted in the successful recovery of the two snipers, even though Busch did not survive the flight. Under the circumstances, Smith would probably have survived long enough for recovery forces to reach the crash site (since the area would soon be saturated with more than ninety TF Ranger personnel), but Busch's only chance for survival was to quickly get medical attention at the 46<sup>th</sup> Combat Support Hospital. Smith's sense of duty towards surviving gave Busch that opportunity, and it is a testament to his unit's institutional mentality of ensuring sufficient opportunities are available for such education and training.

As it pertained to the southern crash site, applying the Gonzales principle was the significant contributing factor to Durant's survival. Since the attacking Somalis killed all five of the other IP defending their location, only Durant would have the opportunity to apply the Gonzales principle to affect his survival. Once Durant realized that he was probably the last man alive, the reality of eventual capture started sinking in. Facing a certain and horrible death, he instinctively reasoned that his survival depended

on acting passively in order to survive the critical first five minutes of capture. He placed his empty weapon across his chest, placed his open hands on top of it, and assumed a non-threatening posture while the mob of enraged civilians and militia surged toward him to unleash their vengeful fury. Properly and rapidly executed crisis decision-making skills, and critical teaching points instinctively recalled from his high-risk of capture (HRC) survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training arguably saved his life that day. For the moment at least, Somalis would spare Durant the fate of his fellow comrades. Durant received exceptional training that was mandatory in the 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), as well as the unique training imparted as an enlisted member in the 7<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne). Had Durant not had the opportunity to conduct such institutionalized education and training he might not have had the skills necessary to survive the day.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> There is an uncorroborated account in CPT James Lechner's monograph, which offered another version of why the Somali mob did not kill Durant. Lechner stated that Durant "was only saved by the timely intervention of the son of Osman Atto, who happened to be at the scene, and wanted a live prisoner in the hopes of trading for his father" (1994, p. 24). Atto was allegedly Aidid's principle lieutenant and the SNA's chief financier when TF Ranger captured him on 21 September 1993 during the conduct of a daylight "aerial ambush" of his convoy (Faust, 1999, p. 48; Rysewyk, 1994, Annex C).

## V. THE LOST PLATOON

### A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

This chapter is a detailed case study of an overt, direct action (DA)-type personnel recovery (PR) mission conducted by Task Force (TF) 2-14. The operation was the Tiger Company's recovery of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) "Lost Platoon" in Mogadishu, Somalia on 4 October 1993. The Quick Reaction Company (QRC) had extensively trained in Mogadishu for this very scenario; it had been in Somalia for weeks, and had trained specifically for the "rescue" of engaged, distressed, or trapped United Nations Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) forces. As a matter of routine, TF 2-14 augmented the QRC's task organization with medical specialists instead of just the more commonly assigned mortar and anti-tank squads—specifically for sustaining the lives that TF 2-14 would rescue.

This case begins with some of the background and historical context before beginning the detailed case study. Following the case study is an analysis of relative superiority (RS) for both the IP ( $RS_{Isolated\ Personnel}$ ) and the recovery force ( $RS_{Recovery\ Forces}$ ), in the context of the SOF-specific overt urban PR model. The authors will follow this analysis with an evaluation of how each of the overt recovery force's six principles, and the four IP-specific recovery principles affected the respective participant's level of RS.

While part of the recovery force led by forces from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division during the "Battle of the Black Sea," the majority of 2LT Mark A. B. Hollis' 2nd Platoon, traveling in the back of two Malaysian Condor armored personnel carriers (APCs), became isolated from the main body of the recovery force at the outset of the battle to break through to TF Ranger. Originally dispatched as part of the 70-vehicle convoy attempting to recover TF Ranger personnel pinned down in two different parts of the city, the "Lost Platoon" inadvertently became another isolated force that would need recovering prior to the withdrawal to Pakistani Stadium. This case study examines the actions of the UN QRF force starting from their link-up with armored forces at the New Port, with particular attention given to the details of the Lost Platoon's recovery. The

authors discussed major events before consolidation at the New Port in Chapter IV. Unless the authors cite otherwise cited, or state the time as an approximation, they derived all times from a compilation of official timelines from both the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and TF Ranger.<sup>34</sup>

#### **B. DETAILED CASE STUDY**

At around 2052 hours, LTC Bill David directed elements of TF 2-14 and the second ground reaction force (GRF-2) to move to the New Port. The column began movement with CPT Michael Whetstone's company and elements of TF Ranger in the lead, followed by CPT Drew Meyerowich's company. Upon arrival at New Port, the units conducted final pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and issued more ammunition. At 2100 hours, BG Greg Gile gave COL Larry Casper a change of mission—to effect link-up with the Rangers at the northern crash site first (site #1, where MH-60L, callsign Super 61 crashed), then, if the tactical situation permitted, to proceed to the southern crash site to rescue survivors or recover bodies. From about 2100-2130, Casper and his battle staff flew to the New Port to continue planning the operation, and to conduct initial coordination with the Malaysian Mechanized Battalion (MALBATT) and Pakistani Armor Company. By 2130 hours, David had linked-up at the New Port with all assets under his control, including the Malaysian and Pakistani forces. When David arrived, all forces had arrayed themselves administratively, and were neither task organized for combat, nor marshaled in proper order of movement. After fleshing out the plan, David briefed the QRF Liaison Officer (LNO) to the Pakistanis, 1LT Ben Mathews, and the QRF LNO to the Malaysians, 1LT John Breen, on what he expected (personal interview, BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19-20, 2003; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 9, 2004).

David's initial plan was simple—Pakistani tanks would lead the convoy of Malaysian German-built Condor APCs carrying TF 2-14 soldiers. As Combat Team Alpha, TF 2-14's Company A would attack to break through to TF Ranger at the northern

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<sup>34</sup> 1) QRF official timeline (version 1, narrative with COL Casper's signature block) attached as Appendix F to CPT Lee Rysewek's 1994 monograph, "Experiences of Executive Officer from Bravo Company, 3d Battalion, 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment and Task Force Ranger during the Battle of the Black Sea on 3-4 October 1993, in Mogadishu Somalia;" 2) TF Ranger official timeline attached as Appendix D to CPT Lee Rysewek's 1994 monograph; 3) QRF official timeline (version 2, narrative with no signature block), from the personal files of BG (Ret.) Bill David; and 4) QRF official timeline (version 3, by time, not narrative), also from the personal files of BG (Ret.) Bill David.

crash site in APCs assigned to MALBATT's Company B. Combat Team Bravo, the TF 2-14 Tactical Command Post (TAC CP) and TF Ranger attachments, would remain at Release Point Yankee approximately 1200 meters past Pakistani Strongpoint 207 on National Street. As Combat Team Charlie, TF 2-14's Company C, in APCs assigned to MALBATT's Company A, would pass through the release point, and attack to break through to the southern crash site. TF 2-14's Company B, would stage at the New Port to serve as the task force reserve. The attacking elements were to move as far as possible while mounted, dismounting only when reaching the assigned objectives (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003; Zakaria, 2000, p. 28).

When Meyerowich returned from his mission briefing from David, 2LT Hollis, the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon Leader (2LT Damon Wright), and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon Leader (2LT Curtis Crum), were all waiting at the commander's HMMWV. Meyerowich briefed everyone on their unit's task and purpose, but there remained some confusion as to the actual route to the objective. The platoon leaders had enough information to begin loading the vehicles, and assumed more details would follow, especially concerning the route. After loading the vehicles, 2LT Hollis went back to Meyerowich in order to get more information concerning the exact route. Meyerowich told him not to worry about the route, because the Malaysian drivers knew the route to the objective. Satisfied that his commander had the situation under control, 2LT Hollis returned to and loaded his APC. He positioned himself directly behind the Malaysian driver, with his Radio-Telephone Operator (RTO) seated next to the side door, which offered a small view port. From this position, 2LT Hollis had limited observation of what was to the front and one side of his APC (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

At 2256 hours, Casper reported problems with the Pakistanis and the order of movement. With their better knowledge of the area, the Pakistani-driven M-48 tanks were supposed to lead the column the entire way to the Rangers. The Pakistanis no longer wanted to lead without NVGs since they would have to use their white lights to navigate, which would make them easy targets for the Somalis. This forced David to change his plan—the Malaysians would now lead with two APCs, with the Pakistanis immediately following. Just before departing the New Port, the plan changed again, whereby the Pakistanis agreed to lead the convoy along the secured UN route as far as

their first strongpoint along the route, Strongpoint 69. Turning west on National Street, the Malaysian-driven Condors were to take the lead. CPT Meyerowich had not briefed 2LT Hollis on any of these changes to the originally briefed plan, and 2LT Hollis was still under the impression that the Pakistanis were leading the entire route (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

Somewhere between 2310 and 2324 hours, TF David departed the New Port en route to the two crash sites. Gore continued to coordinate the direct fire air support, and deconflict air space between TF Ranger and TF 2-25 helicopters. TF 2-25's SWT guided and covered the convoy's movement up to Strongpoint 207, and then handed-off responsibilities to TF Ranger. About one kilometer outside of the New Port, the Pakistani tanks encountered a roadblock,<sup>35</sup> and the Pakistani commander refused to go through fearing Somalis had mined it. 1LT Mathews fired a magazine of 5.56mm ammunition into the roadblock, and told the commander to go through. The Pakistanis reluctantly complied. The convoy continued east to Checkpoint 77, and then turned north to Checkpoint 69. At Checkpoint 69, the Pakistani brigade commander informed the battalion commander that he could no longer lead the column because they did not have NVGs. Two of the three Malaysian APCs containing 2LT Hollis' personnel then unknowingly assumed the lead of the convoy<sup>36</sup> (Casper, 2001, p. 69).

As the lead APC went 200 meters west down National Street to Strongpoint 207, the beginning of *Habr Gidr* territory manned by a UNOSOM M113 APC and a sandbagged position, all hell broke loose. The Somalis began firing huge quantities of small arms and RPGs at the convoy. The Somalis had once again initiated a deliberate ambush using extremely heavy rocket, mortar, and automatic weapons fire. David's subordinate leaders, clearly understanding the gravity of the situation and their commander's intent, immediately returned fire and continued to slowly advance down National Street's gauntlet of destruction. For roughly three hours, TF David fought a vicious battle until they reached their respective release points, and finally broke through

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<sup>35</sup> Debris scattered across Via Roma from the USMC HMMWV that had struck a mine that morning.

<sup>36</sup> Garrison wanted the QRF to take a more direct route using Tanzania Street from the New Port. Montgomery denied this request, and finally approved the route along Via Roma to the east, to Via *Londra*, then turning north at Checkpoint 77, going north on Via *Jen Daaud* through Pakistani Checkpoint 69, and finally turning west on National Street passing Pakistani Strongpoint 207 (Casper, 2001, p. 54).

to their objectives. 2LT Hollis heard numerous explosions outside his APC, and felt the shrapnel hitting the vehicle. With Somali fires still heavy, by 2350 hours the TAC CP had reached the holding area and release point about 1200 meters past Strongpoint 207 on National Street (Hollis, 1998, p. 29).

The lead Malaysian drivers reacted to the increased fire by erratically jerking the vehicle forward in an almost convulsive motion. This violently threw around all of the U.S. passengers in the back of the APC. The limited land navigation that 2LT Hollis had been able to maintain up until that point in time then became next to impossible, because every time he tried to look out the small port, he would be thrown in a different direction. Suddenly, and without warning, the APC increased its speed, and began to scale curbs and other obstacles in the road, which again threw the U.S. passengers around the back of the vehicle. The Malaysians' Platoon Commander, LT Zunaidi bin Hassan, had ordered the two APCs to move through the "kill zone" established by the Somali ambush. Unknown to 2LT Hollis at the time, both he and SGT Hollis' APCs were breaking contact with the rest of the column.<sup>37</sup> Hassan, unable to pass the tanks that were blocking the narrow road, and unable to see the lead APCs, got on the radio and told them to turn towards the objective (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003; Zakaria, 2000, pp. 33-34).

Fortunately for the convoy, Meyerowich's HMMWV placement as the third vehicle in the convoy was arguably the only thing that prevented the other Malaysian drivers from following the lead of the two runaway APCs. Meyerowich knew the APCs had broken contact, but decided to continue on to his objective (Ferry, 1994, p. 28). This unfortunate reaction by the Malaysian drivers effectively separated the two lead APCs from the remainder of the convoy. 2LT Hollis could not accurately maintain his bearing while bouncing around in the back of the APC, and coupled with the explosions outside, communications with his commander were virtually impossible. Totally disoriented, and still unaware that they were now on their own, 2LT Hollis and his lead squad would not link up with their company until the next morning. Plagued by confusion and a language barrier, the two APCs continued west on National Street, then went south instead of north

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<sup>37</sup> For a more detailed account of the Lost Platoon, see "Platoon Under Fire: Mogadishu, October 1993," by Captain Mark A. B. Hollis, *Infantry Magazine*, January-April 1998 edition.

after receiving heavy fire from the vicinity of the Olympic hotel at 2359 hours. They continued moving south instead of north, probably attempting to return to the New Port facility (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

The vehicles proceeded south roughly one kilometer beyond the southern crash site, when they entered a Somali ambush at approximately 0005 hours, near the Italian Compound, or Villa Italia. RPG fire first impacted the lead vehicle directly into the driver's compartment, mortally wounding the Malaysian driver. At approximately 0007 hours, Somalis also disabled the second APC with an RPG round placed into the engine compartment, on the right-hand side of the vehicle front. 2LT Hollis recalled that the blast felt as though someone had lifted the vehicle up and balanced it on a pedestal. The APC seemed to teeter back and forth, the smell of an explosion filled the compartment, and a high-pitched ringing sound filled the ears of the APC's occupants. With their APCs disabled near the old presidential palace, 2LT Hollis would soon discover that the damage also resulted in the Malaysians losing radio contact with their company headquarters (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

SGT Hollis, from inside his lead vehicle, immediately called 2LT Hollis requesting guidance. At approximately 0011 hours, 2LT Hollis instructed him to assist in establishing security upon dismounting the APCs. As 2LT Hollis opened the hatch and exited his APC, he observed the lengthy, inclined road down which he just had traveled. With no other vehicles behind him, it was then that he finally realized the gravity of his situation—his platoon was isolated on a hostile battlefield. Instinctively, he turned to his RTO, SPC Keller, and said the legendary infantry leader's phrase "Follow me." He moved to a building east of the vehicle, and occupied some low ground that existed on the south side of the building. Still not wanting to accept the fact that he was isolated, 2LT Hollis contacted SGT Hollis and told him to stay in his security position. He then told SGT Hollis that he would take his group back up the inclined road to the north in an attempt to reestablish contact with friendly forces. Keller's persistent attempts to contact the company's RTO were unsuccessful, probably because the low ground and buildings blocked their line-of-sight transmissions (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

At approximately 0015 hours, 2LT Hollis led his platoon headquarters group and engineer team north. After passing only two buildings, small-arms fire originating from the direction of travel began to intensify. With the enemy fires intensifying the farther away he moved from SGT Hollis' position, and with the fear of Somalis potentially dividing his forces, 2LT Hollis decided to return to SGT Hollis's position. Keller continued to have no success at reaching any friendly forces over the radio. At approximately 0020 hours, 2LT Hollis led his element back to the initial ambush position, and reestablished local security. Upon his return, the Malaysians from the trail APC finally decided to exit the vehicles and join the Americans in their security positions (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

Desiring to improve his unit's level of security, 2LT Hollis then turned to the engineer squad leader, SSG Maxwell, and while pointing to a wall, asked if he could make a hole in the wall surrounding an adjacent cluster of houses. Upon Maxwell's affirmation, 2LT Hollis contacted SGT Hollis, telling him of his plan to produce a hole in the compound, in order to establish security positions within the more protected compound. At approximately 0030 hours, the charge's blast did more than make a hole in the wall—it completely blew the wall over, as well as a small building on the other side of the wall. 2LT Hollis jumped up, sprinted across the street, and entered the compound while firing into the house. With no fire returned, he then called for SGT Hollis to move his squad into the compound in order to establish a more defensible perimeter in the courtyard. 2LT Hollis later discovered that two adults and several children inhabited the house, but since the Somalis had positioned themselves in the back room of the house in a non-threatening manner, the Americans left them alone (Hollis, 1998, pp. 30-31; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

On National Street, Somalis ambushed the Pakistani tanks with machine guns and 7-10 RPG rounds, which were back in the lead since the two Malaysians took the wrong turn. The tanks stopped to return fire, and it took several minutes for Mathews to get the column moving again. The Pakistanis passed the road leading to the crash site, and secured the far west end of National Street. At 0050 hours, Whetstone reported he was now 300-500 meters past Checkpoint 207. At 0056 hours, a TF Ranger OH-58D, callsign King 57, reported that there was no friendly activity observed in the vicinity of

the southern crash site.<sup>38</sup> At 0103 hours, David gave Whetstone the order to depart the release point and move towards the southern objective after linking up with his guide OH-58D and after passing the vehicles parked to his front (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 11, 2004).

Back at the “Lost Platoon” at roughly 0130 hours, 2LT Hollis returned to Keller, only to discover that his RTO had still made no progress in contacting any friendly forces. Out of pure frustration, 2LT Hollis removed the AN/PRC-77 radio from the rucksack, and disconnected the devices used for secure communications. He then frantically transmitted unsecure, or “in the clear.” His voice was “several octaves above normal...[with] speech so fast and his voice so high that he was barely audible” (Casper, 2001, p. 74). The first voice 2LT Hollis heard was that of David, who told the platoon leader “Keep doing what you’re doing. You’re alive, and I will work on getting you out.” After being told “to hold the course, remain steady, and keep pushing forward,” 2LT Hollis briefly paused, then responded with a natural, calm voice, “Roger, Dragon 06, everything is under control” (p. 74; Hollis, 1998, p. 31).<sup>39</sup>

David directed 2LT Hollis to contact Whetstone on Company C’s assigned radio frequency. At about 0145 hours, 2LT Hollis and Whetstone first made contact on the radio, but suppressing the Somalis who had just disabled two of his APCs had Whetstone occupied. Shortly after initially contacting friendly forces, CPL Parent, the Alpha Team Leader, informed 2LT Hollis that he heard screams of pain coming from the lead APC. When the Malaysians exited their vehicle earlier, they had left one of their wounded comrades in the APC, probably mistaking him for dead. 2LT Hollis directed Parent to go back to the APC and recover the wounded man. Parent, courageously dashed into the kill zone, retrieved the mortally wounded soldier, and then attended to his wounds. Shortly after Parent’s daring rescue, an AH-1F Cobra helicopter flew over the platoon at about

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<sup>38</sup> Shortly after TF Ranger’s arrival, TF Raven chopped the Fort Hood-based OH-58Ds to TF Ranger. The OH-58D’s unique mast-mounted optics and FLIR could be “down-linked” directly to TF Ranger’s JOC (personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004).

<sup>39</sup> Hollis would later write of this communication with his seemingly calm battalion commander, whose voice was filled with confidence and strength as he instructed the young officer while speaking with an absence of emotion, “The leader must transmit all radio traffic in a calm voice. Leaders trying to gain information will not understand jumbled transmissions, [therefore] the transmitter must speak slowly and clearly. My Commander, LTC David, spoke clearly and effectively on the radio. His transmissions inspired confidence and were even great calming influences” (Hollis, 1998, p. 33; Casper, 2001, p. 74).

0200 hours, while 2LT Hollis was requesting a “status” from Whetstone (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

By 0155 hours, Meyerowich reported linking-up with the Rangers at the northern crash site. Whetstone reported that he was 100 meters from the southern objective [100 meters away from Super 64] at 0158 hours. Casper directed David to have his units move to the Pakistani camp in the soccer stadium upon their withdrawal. At 0228 hours, Whetstone reported being on the southern objective, at the crash site. At this time, all elements had reached their objectives. Whetstone then had to fight his way to the actual crash site while dismounted. Company C with TF Ranger attachments went on to search the wreckage and the areas surrounding the southern crash site, and found nothing but multiple blood trails headed in several different directions as they called out the names of the isolated TF Ranger personnel. By approximately 0245 hours, Company C had recovered all remaining sensitive items from the aircraft, and placed “thermite” grenades to destroy what remained of the helicopter (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 9 and 11, 2004). At 0244 hours, Meyerowich had requested more APCs to transport the additional 90+ TF Ranger personnel, and advised that if not provided, the overflow personnel would walk to Pakistani Stadium.

While returning back to the APCs in order to begin the process of consolidation, reorganization, and establishing a better defensive position, Whetstone had the idea of using star clusters to locate the “Lost Platoon.” In order to determine a general distance from his current location, Whetstone directed the platoon leader to fire a red star cluster signaling device (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004). At approximately 0250 hours, 2LT Hollis fired the star cluster, unintentionally illuminating some of Whetstone’s 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon near the southern objective. This illumination inadvertently silhouetted the soldiers, and resulted in the Somalis increasing their fires on the newly identified defensive positions (Scott Hilliard, personal telephone interview, 5 April 2004). Whetstone then fired a green star cluster at approximately 0255 hours, and the two agreed that no more than 1,000 meters separated them. Whetstone then informed 2LT Hollis that he should remain in place, and that he would work on moving his company toward 2LT Hollis’ platoon (Hollis, 1998, p. 31; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

Meanwhile, at 0307 hours, Casper reported to Gile at the JOC, that the Terminator element, minus one platoon, was still on the northern objective and had recovered all killed (KIA) and wounded (WIA) except the trapped pilot. Casper also informed Gile that David had instructed the Terminator element not to leave the site until they had recovered the last body, and that the Tiger element at the southern objective had no contact with any TF Ranger elements. At approximately 0300 hours, Whetstone directed 2LT Hollis to move north and attempt to link-up with Whetstone's lead platoon, which would attempt to move south. 2LT Hollis immediately summoned SGT Hollis and Maxwell, and from 0300-0315 hours, they formulated a plan to move north. The final plan was for Maxwell's engineers to lead, followed by 2LT Hollis and his M-60 machinegun team, the Malaysians, and finally SGT Hollis' squad. Concurrently, Whetstone directed that one squad from LT James K. Haynes' 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon, the closest unit to 2LT Hollis, be sent out as a recon element to determine if there was an alternate route to reach the isolated platoon. Upon his return, SSG Tewes' reported that there was only one route to 2LT Hollis, and that if the company attempted to move along that route dismounted, that there would be a high number of casualties given the intense concentration of Somalis between their two locations. Around 0315 hours, Whetstone asked the Malaysian Company A Commander, Major Ab Aziz bin Ab Latiff, to "borrow" a couple of his APCs to affect the recovery of 2LT Hollis's platoon. After Aziz had asked for permission, which his battalion commander denied, he informed Whetstone that he was sorry, but that he was not authorized to offer any assistance (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

Shortly after that, at approximately 0325 hours, 2LT Hollis contacted Meyerowich to inform him that he was beginning his movement north. Whetstone had explained to 2LT Hollis that he was having trouble moving south, and that the enemy resistance between the two units was too great for his dismounted company to move

through without sustaining significant casualties.<sup>40</sup> David reported to the QRF TOC at 0337 hours, that Somalis had hit three or possibly four APCs, and that one or more was still burning. Soon after the Lost Platoon began its movement north, the engineers moved past the garage where 2LT Hollis had moved to immediately following the ambush. 2LT Hollis positioned himself on the corner of the garage facing north. The Malaysians moved past 2LT Hollis' position, moving closer to the engineers, when all of a sudden a Somali stepped out from an alley, and unloaded his weapon into the lead element at approximately 0340 hours. SGT Hollis eventually killed the Somali, but not before the Somali shot SGT Cornell Houston in the chest, PFC Xiong Ly in the back, and Maxwell in the knee. Now 2LT Hollis had two casualties who were "litter priority," two casualties who were "litter urgent," and eight casualties who were "walking wounded" (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

As 2LT Hollis had to be thinking things could not get any worse, they did. At about 0348 hours, another Somali started engaging the platoon from across an open lot to the north. 2LT Hollis desperately needed help. Yelling to his RTO, 2LT Hollis directed Keller to contact Whetstone and inform him of the platoon's status, and to request immediate transportation out. Keller made the call at about 0355 hours, and was informed at 0400 hours that the Malaysians were in route, and that TF Ranger "Little Birds" were on station to support the link-up. Aziz had finally grown tired of listening to his battalion commander telling them to stay put, while his fellow Malaysians were seriously wounded at 2LT Hollis' location. Just as Whetstone had his entire company ready to move dismounted towards 2LT Hollis' platoon, fully recognizing that he would certainly sustain numerous casualties along the 1,000-meter gauntlet of Somali fires to his south, Aziz pointed to Whetstone, signaling to him that he wanted Whetstone to keep his unit in place. Aziz then disobeyed a direct order from his battalion commander as he ordered his Number 3 Platoon leader, 2LT Muhammad Juraimy bin Aripin, to prepare to

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<sup>40</sup> Given the heavy volume of fires along the road 2LT Hollis' APCs had initially traveled, CPT Whetstone assumed that 2LT Hollis would understand that he was to move north using an alternate route. Not understanding what CPT Whetstone intended, 2LT Hollis opted to use the known and most expedient route to CPT Whetstone's position (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; personal communication, MAJ Mark Hollis, April 19, 2004). Arguably, this was also the most dangerous route given the consistent levels of Somali activity throughout the night.

move his APCs to 2LT Hollis' position.<sup>41</sup> Aziz pointed at Whetstone, and then into the night sky, indicating that he wanted Whetstone to have aircraft provide covering fires during his movement. While synchronizing the recovery of 2LT Hollis' platoon, Whetstone had already requested and coordinated AH-6 support from King 56 and King 57 (two of the orbiting OH-58Ds attached to TF Ranger). This would augment the AH-1F "mini-gun" fires that he had been requesting since arriving at the southern objective (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

Whetstone directed 2LT Hollis to use the M-203's parachute flares to mark the buildings of known enemy locations surrounding the extraction point. Shouting over to SGT Hollis, 2LT Hollis asked him if he could mark the building with a flare. Getting an affirmative reply from SGT Hollis, 2LT Hollis directed his RTO to inform the pilots that he was marking the building with an M-203 flare. SGT Hollis shot the flare at approximately 0405 hours, but hit the wrong building. The AH-6 made one pass, and destroyed the marked building with its mini-guns and rockets. 2LT Hollis then had his RTO inform the pilots that he would now mark the building with 5.56mm tracer rounds. Standing up from behind the stoop, 2LT Hollis emptied an entire magazine of tracers into the building at approximately 0410 hours. The AH-6 approached perpendicular to the platoon's location, fired the 7.62mm "gatling gun," then the 2.75-inch rockets, and the building disappeared (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

As Juraimy's Condors began moving south towards 2LT Hollis' platoon at about 0410 hours, Whetstone called in eight to ten more AH-6 and AH-1F mini-gun and rocket runs to keep the route cleared for the APCs. Without the 20-30 minutes of aerial fire-support, the recovery APCs would likely have met the same fate as the two APCs already destroyed at 2LT Hollis' location; the sheer volume of Somali fires between the two units

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<sup>41</sup> There is some discrepancy as to the number of APCs that Juraimy led to Hollis' position. From personal interviews, both MAJ Hollis and LTC Whetstone recall that it was two APCs. Casper (2001) and the MALBATT accounts both recall that it was three APCs. LTC Whetstone conceded "In the heat of the mess at the time, getting the company back in defensive mode, I [guess I could have] missed a vehicle" (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, May 4, 2004).

was highly lethal for most of the night. Before they departed, Whetstone had told Aziz to go to the chemical lights, or “chemlights,” which 2LT Hollis would emplace to mark the pick-up location. SGT Hollis had marked the road with green chemlights by 0420 hours, and both 2LT Hollis and SGT Hollis had prepared the highly concentrated (HC) smoke grenades. The plan was to ignite the HC smoke grenades once the APCs had moved to their position and turned around, allowing the cloud of thick smoke to sufficiently build so as to cover their movement before advancing toward the vehicles (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, pp. 32-33; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

Juraimy’s Condors arrived at the chemlight extraction point just before 0430 hours. The language became a problem once more, because 2LT Hollis had planned on the drivers turning their APCs around before he was to enter the vehicles. 2LT Hollis was concerned that the vehicles would attempt to continue moving south, back into the ambush site, thinking that that route was the quickest way back to the New Port. After having little luck at getting the vehicles to turn around, one of the Malaysians who had been with the platoon all night finally understood what 2LT Hollis wanted and started yelling in Malaysian to the drivers, who faced the vehicles north at about 0435 hours (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003). While this occurred, the TF 2-14 TOC reported at 0431 hours, for QRF HQ to be prepared to receive for 40-50 wounded soldiers.

After the “Lost Platoon” quickly mounted the vehicles during the daring recovery with APCs, Whetstone finally physically linked-up with the 2LT Hollis at the southern crash site between 0445 and 0450 hours. Whetstone immediately began the process of ensuring 100 percent accountability while loading the remaining vehicles for withdraw. At about 0515 hours, Whetstone began his planned withdrawal to Strongpoint 207, but the Malaysians had other ideas, as they began receiving conflicting instructions from their chain of command en route to Strongpoint 207. At 0524 hours, MAJ Craig Nixon, the TF Ranger LNO collocated with David, reported that the Malaysian APCs returning from the southern objective were out of Whetstone’s control as they passed Strongpoint 207 heading for the Pakistani Stadium. David’s planned withdrawal had all elements

linking up at Strongpoint 207 in order to perform an orderly and covered withdrawal. In the back of the APC, Whetstone knew what the plan was, but was not able to control the drivers. When he strongly suggested to his driver to stop, the Malaysian pointed to his earpiece, as if to suggest that he was only following the orders he was receiving over his radio net. At that point, it was already too late—there was no turning the APCs around before they reached the stadium (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 9, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003). Whetstone and 2LT Hollis' Lost Platoon arrived at the Pakistani Stadium at 0530 hours.

## C. ANALYSIS

### 1. Relative Superiority

Analyzing Whetstone's recovery of the "Lost Platoon," in accordance with the SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that the QRC's successes directly correlate with its ability to quickly gain and maintain RS throughout the battle. The RS diagram shown in Figure 12 graphically represents how the vastly outnumbered QRC entered the engagement already having RS<sub>Recovery Force</sub> because of the overwhelming organic and supporting firepower at their disposal, relative freedom of movement and protection provided by the APCs, and their access to an OH-58 "guide" to assist in navigation. The QRC also reaped the benefits of security and surprise by not allowing the Somalis to preempt the attack, and by taking advantage of the Somalis' vulnerabilities, through the application of overwhelming organic and supporting firepower at its disposal. After completing his primary mission of locating and searching the southern crash site, Whetstone was then able to focus on his new recovery mission while he waited on Terminator Company to recover the last body at the northern objective. The Tiger Company never lost its RS<sub>Recovery Force</sub> once at the crash site, because it applied the principles of surprise, repetition, and purpose by quickly establishing fire superiority and then setting up a defensible position. Once Aziz committed his APCs, recovery forces executed the simple plan quickly, and with overwhelming coordinated aviation fire-support, to gain security over the numerically

superior Somalis. Moreover, since recovery forces executed the plan with surprise, speed, and purpose, the recovery forces overcame the lack of specific rehearsals for the operation.




Figure 12. Authors' RS Recovery Force Graph for the "Tiger" Company, 3-4 October 1993

Analyzing the RS Isolated Personnel of the "Lost Platoon," in accordance with the SOF-specific overt urban PR model, the authors argue that the cumulative survival and recovery of the platoon facilitated its ability to gain and maintain RS Isolated Personnel primarily by capitalizing on the principles of adaptability and exploitation. Adhering to these principles allowed the platoon to gain protection and concealment when it secured and occupied the courtyard. As is shown in the attainment, sustainment, and subsequent loss of RS Isolated Personnel in Figure 13, only when the platoon moved in the open did it violate the principle of adaptability and lose RS Isolated Personnel by placing itself at the mercy of its committed Somali pursuers.




Figure 13. Authors' RS Isolated Personnel Graph for the Lost Platoon, 3-4 October 1993

In the end, the platoon was finally able to gain a decisive advantage over the Somalis, not by disappearing into the urban landscape, but by removing themselves from the urban landscape via an APC extraction. Only the armored vehicles and accompanying aviation fire-support allowed the platoon to gain a decisive advantage over the Somalis, because the number of wounded effectively removed the possibility of the platoon disappearing into the urban landscape. Had the APCs and AH-6s not shown up to support when they did, the platoon's failure to apply the principle of adaptability resulting in a loss of RS Isolated Personnel, coupled with its ratio of wounded to capable fighters, would likely have resulted in many more casualties and possibly its total elimination by the determined Somalis. Fortunately, the platoon "disappeared" and achieved RS Isolated Personnel at the same time—when it boarded the two APCs. Figure 13 depicts the final stage of the recovery as the vertical rise in the probability of mission completion—which crossed the RS line only at the point of mission completion. Mission completion is determined at the point where the platoon was no longer responsible for its own welfare, when it successfully boarded the APCs.

## **2. Principles Necessary for the Overt Recovery Force's Successful Operations**

### ***a. Simplicity***

From the standpoint of limiting the number of tactical objectives to only those that are vital, the mission given to Whetstone could have been anything but simple. Whetstone's primary objective was to break through to the southern crash site, secure the area, search for survivors or remains, recover any sensitive items, and finally destroy the aircraft. And while this was being accomplished, Whetstone was responsible for coordinating air support from two aviation task forces, communicating in sign language to his Malaysian counterpart, stabilizing his wounded, and establishing a hasty defensive position while the Terminator element worked on recovering the pilot still pinned in his aircraft. Fortunately, much of this was already completed or in motion by the time David informed Whetstone that there was an isolated platoon near him. Thus, when given the order to recover the lost platoon, Whetstone had only one tactical objective.

Whetstone had no good intelligence or information on the location of the Lost Platoon. He used an innovative tactic of firing star clusters in order to determine the rough location and distance from his current position at the southern crash site. Once Whetstone assessed the threat in moving dismounted to 2LT Hollis' location, he realized that his best chance for a successful recovery lay with using the APCs. While APCs were not organic assets in his light infantry company, Whetstone quickly realized that only armored "technology," coupled with surprise from the lethal and precise aviation mini-gun suppression, would allow him to break through the heavy Somali defenses arrayed between their two positions. Whetstone's use of coalition partners and dominant aviation assets eliminated obstacles that would have otherwise compromised and complicated the rapid execution of the mission.

### ***b. Security***

It would be a fair assumption to believe that the Somalis thought that a recovery force would use the "main" road that the APCs did eventually use to conduct the recovery and extraction. It was not the impending mission that Whetstone needed to conceal, but the timing and method of insertion for his recovery forces. The Somalis had no prior knowledge of the time or method of attack that Whetstone would use—they were

merely prepared and waiting. In the end, the lack of knowledge about the timing or method of the rescue attempt precluded the Somalis from preparing another vehicular ambush, preempting the attack, or reducing the speed of the APCs at the extraction point. The use of the AH-6 “Little Birds,” in particular, dramatically increased the probability of the success of the insertion method, and ensured the ability of the rescue force to maintain their RS Recovery Force by taking away the Somalis’ ability to react to the recovery attempt.

*c. Repetition*

In the case of the IP evading capture in the urban environment, extensive mission-specific rehearsals are impractical given the desire to affect recovery prior to capture. The QRC’s routine and standard operation procedures (SOPs) served as the essential rehearsals necessary for successful PR missions. As was the case in the UH-60 recovery mission of 25 September 1993, the preparation phase for this operation was in Whetstone’s unit training plan. The QRC conducted no specific or “full-dress” rehearsals before deploying into the “Black Sea.” This was a “standard mission profile” for a properly trained QRC, though the conditions under which the QRC conducted the mission could not have been any worse. The QRC’s SOPs had reinforced the routine nature of its quick-reaction operations. Whetstone’s company was still at a high-level of readiness and training, especially the individual skills necessary for surviving the urban battlefield of Mogadishu. If one could consider the 25 September mission a rehearsal for the “Battle of the Black Sea,” then everything Whetstone was doing throughout the evening and early morning of 3-4 October had already been rehearsed, only eight days prior. Lessons learned on 25 September, implemented by Whetstone to refine his company’s SOPs, as well as his tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for urban combat and recovery operations, proved their value during this battle.

*d. Surprise*

As McRaven defined it, special operations seek to gain surprise through deception, timing, and taking advantage of the enemy’s vulnerabilities. The main tactic that caught the Somalis off guard was the amount of suppressive fires that the AH-6 “Little Bird” brought to the fight as the recovery forces moved to the Lost Platoon’s location. The Somalis were certain that the recovery force would have to move to 2LT

Hollis' physical location, so Whetstone, once again, was not afforded the luxury of attacking the Somalis where they were unprepared. As he had done on 25 September, Whetstone did not attempt to deceive the Somalis in order to gain a slight advantage, nor did he attempt to throw the Somalis off as to the timing of the attack. Once again, he exploited the Somalis' vulnerabilities to AH-6's mini-guns. The poorly constructed buildings used by the Somali fighters to form a gauntlet of lead between the two units provided little protection from the accurate and lethal aerial firepower that Whetstone synchronized with the APC employment. This weakness of the Somali defensive preparations, taken advantage of only days earlier in a similar situation, offered an exploitable weakness that the recovery force used to achieve its surprise. Since the main effort for the recovery was elsewhere in the city, and compounded by the fact that helicopters had rarely over flown their location up until that point, the recovery forces used the principle of surprise through the use of concentrated and overwhelming aerial suppression from the nimble AH-6s.

*e. Speed*

Somalis in the “Black Sea” area only wanted to counter the QRF’s attack to break through to the two crash sites. Knowing this well beforehand, the QRF moved as quickly as possible and without regard to the enemy’s reaction, except in the cases where UNOSOM forces refused to quickly move through roadblocks for fear of mines. TF David gained and maintained RS Recovery Force despite the Somalis’ best efforts, primarily because the attacking forces moved with sufficient speed to their respective objectives, such that the Somalis’ reaction was not an overriding factor. As is the case with most special operations missions, speed is gained by using small and lightly-armed forces, which are generally unable to sustain action against a *conventional* enemy for long periods of time—the fact that the Somalis were not a conventional military force made achieving RS Recovery Force that much easier. This was not the case with TF David; with more relative strength came the ability to sacrifice some speed on the objective in order to extend the duration of the battle, and accept the number of goals that they had to achieve.

As for the principle of speed with regard to Whetstone’s specific mission to recover the Lost Platoon, it is more similar to a special operation, in that it involved

direct and immediate contact with the Somalis, and minutes and seconds could have determined the difference between success and failure. In the very specific case of 2LT Hollis' recovery, Whetstone's forces quickly achieved RS Recovery Force, and the APCs completed the actual recovery mission in well under thirty minutes. With only two APCs, the recovery force gained speed using a small, lightly armed force. Without the assistance of the aviation firepower to suppress the Somali firing positions along the gauntlet, the APCs would have been unable to sustain action for any significant amount of time. This less than robust strength greatly restricted the goals that recovery forces could have accomplished, and resulted in limiting the duration of the sustainable combat.

*f. Purpose*

David, upon informing Whetstone that he would need to recover the “Lost Platoon” emphasized the point that the QRF would leave behind no American. In the initial stages of planning the recovery, while Aziz’ higher headquarters still denied him permission to assist, Whetstone formed a plan in which he would maneuver roughly half of his company down to 2LT Hollis’ location. Right before Aziz said he would conduct the rescue, those QRC soldiers preparing to attempt the rescue stood up, and looked down the gauntlet of relentless tracer and RPG fires. Even though Whetstone knew that he would take casualties, everyone understood that the QRF would leave no American behind. More than twelve hours after their first combat in that battle, and without concern for their own personal safety, the company’s willingness to put it all on the line for their fellow “Golden Dragons” clearly demonstrated a sense of personal dedication that knew no limits.

**3. Principles Necessary for the Isolated Personnel’s Success**

*a. Communication*

Initially 2LT Hollis had no communication with anyone, though his commanders knew that he was isolated somewhere on the battlefield. After he finally radioed David, by transmitting in the clear, 2LT Hollis was finally able to make his status and general location known. With no knowledge of where the “Lost Platoon” had finally ended up, the QRF would never have launched a recovery force given the hostile environment. The use of a star cluster to convey 2LT Hollis’ general location and distance from the recovery force greatly facilitated his recovery. 2LT Hollis also

significantly assisted his recovery when he marked enemy locations for the AH-6's with M-203 parachute flares, and by marking the extraction point with chemlights. Without these communication aids, the AH-6 could not have engaged the most dangerous Somalis, and the Malaysians would not have been as secure in their mission without knowing how the extraction point was marked.

*b. Adaptability*

2LT Hollis was able to blend in with his environment only so far with the number of isolated personnel under his control. 2LT Hollis inadvertently took advantage of the best camouflage available by hiding in plain sight in the courtyard, while occupying a defensible position. This was an extremely limited use of adaptability, as defined for this thesis. While moving out of plain sight did remove the easy targets for the Somalis, many of their pursuers still knew where the platoon had relocated. On both occasions that the platoon attempted to move dismounted, they violated the principle of adaptability, and subsequently lost RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>, resulting in drawing huge volumes of Somali fires. In the final move north, failure to follow this principle resulted in three serious injuries. Moving north via a different route might have resulted in a different outcome. Had the AH-6's and recovery forces not arrived as soon as they did after 2LT Hollis' unit took those three serious injuries, the failure to apply this principle would have likely resulted in severe limitations to the platoon's ability to react and defend itself against the Somalis.

*c. Exploitation*

Given the number of casualties that 2LT Hollis' platoon had sustained, there were limits to what they could exploit. The most significant advantage that the platoon leader gained was by taking advantage of his engineers, who blew a hole in the wall so that the platoon could move out of the direct line of Somali fire. While both opportunistic and resourceful of 2LT Hollis, it did not put time and space between his unit and the Somalis in pursuit. What it did do was allow the platoon to "disappear" from plain sight. Evidence that this was successful at fooling many of the Somalis as to their actual location, was demonstrated by the actions of the Somalis during most of the morning, who continued focusing on the APCs instead of the courtyard:

Their favorite action was to stand off and lob RPG's at the compound. I counted no less than ten RPG impacts within a one minute period, and this kept up throughout the night. ... [but] the vehicles were still the favorite targets for the gunners. The sound from my vehicle was like a mad popcorn machine (Hollis, 1998, p. 32).

Under the circumstances, the shock value of the bold and audacious behavior demonstrated by the attempt to move north while dismounted did not succeed in gaining an advantage in time and space against the Somalis. These Somalis were not hesitant or uncommitted adversaries, but they erroneously believed that they had the upper hand on the isolated platoon—even though they were unable and unsuccessful in harming the platoon once in the courtyard. 2LT Hollis would have been wise to use some type of tactical deception to divert attention away from his dismounted movement, but even that would probably not have worked given the constraints. The optimal exploitation under the circumstances and given the injuries to his soldiers would have been for 2LT Hollis to either refuse to move his platoon dismounted, and to wait for recovery forces to arrive, or to move north along another route.

*d. The Gonzales Principle*

2LT Hollis, as a new officer and leader, had only begun to learn his job when he deployed to Somalia. Before this, 2LT Hollis had little exposure to realistic peacetime training. This greatly reduced his pool of resources of exploitable human capital that had been developed, enhanced, or optimized. However, 2LT Hollis did capitalize on the limited training that he had experienced, as he recounted:

I did not conduct the train-up with 2<sup>d</sup> Platoon; I only refined and continued the training once we deployed. For me, Ranger school was the best, most realistic training for combat. I graduated from the Ranger course, went on leave for two weeks, and then arrived at the battalion. Ranger training gave me the ability to look beyond my physical and mental exhaustion and make the tough decisions (Hollis, 1998, pp. 33-34).

The ability to quickly assess and appraise a crisis, evaluate alternatives, and decide on an appropriate solution only gets better with rehearsals and training. Rapid crisis decision-making executed poorly, such as risking movement or contact at the wrong place or time, can mean the difference between evading and escaping. The decision to attempt the move north without the aid of aviation fire-support platforms, or

without the protection of armored vehicles, placed the platoon in an extremely vulnerable position. There was no imminent threat requiring the platoon to move to the north given the lack of effective Somali fires they received while in the courtyard. Another option available to 2LT Hollis would have been to advise Whetstone that moving dismounted with casualties was not a supportable course of action given the enemy situation.

The second element of the Gonzales principle, employing the acquired proficiency to survive and evade, was extremely limited due to 2LT Hollis' newness to the military. After the experience, 2LT Hollis realized the importance of becoming the "smart evader," and the necessity of taking advantage of all training opportunities before combat. He wished he had taken more advantage of the opportunities given to him during the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC):

Doctrine states that we should train as we fight and fight as we train. I remember going through the Infantry Officer Basic Course and learning about the Bradley fighting vehicle, thinking to myself, "Why is this important? I am going to be a 'light' fighter." But the concepts taught about maneuver with mechanized forces *were* important, and I should have paid closer attention to them. ...The location from which I chose to command and control our vehicles' movement was unsatisfactory. I learned that I should avoid any location where my field of view is limited. If I had taken the assistant driver's position instead, I would have known immediately when my element broke contact with the rest of the company (Hollis, 1998, p. 33).

Whetstone also believes that newness was a factor but stated that "[Hollis] and I have evolved. Our institutional knowledge is a key factor in survival or recovery operations." Whetstone thinks that the sum total of his experiences contributed to his survival and allowed him to pass on valuable lessons learned. He stated that it would have been harder for 2LT Hollis to think through the numerous variables than it was for him. If he were the IP, Whetstone alleged that he would have evaded through the shantytown where he could have better controlled the outcome. "It would have been longer but we would have made it" (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, May 21, 2004).

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## VI. MODELING NONCONVENTIONAL ASSISTED RECOVERY

### A. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY

As illustrated in Figure 25 (Appendix A), nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) is an operation uniquely created for high threat scenarios when conventional methods are infeasible to affect personnel recovery. The urban environment is not only an area of high threat, but also becoming an area with a higher probability of isolated personnel events. Urban environments contain the preponderance of targets for strategic air assets, have the highest population concentrations for peacekeeping operations, and fall upon key lines of communication. Recovery forces in this environment must be able to gain and maintain RS <sub>Recovery Force</sub> to have a chance at being effective against the increased number of adversaries.

While McRaven's theory and model for special operations is more appropriate for direct action (DA) scenarios, this chapter will show how to implicitly apply it to NAR, a sub-mission of unconventional warfare. In his conclusion McRaven states,

The best approach, of course, is to enter the engagement with relative superiority . . . This reduces the possible area of vulnerability because half of what constitutes [the] area of vulnerability—that is the will of the enemy—is not present (p. 382).

Figure 14 is an example of McRaven's model that illustrates when forces attain RS before engagement. The following paragraphs explain how this model can apply to NAR operations.

McRaven uses stealth as a potential example of how to attain RS before entering an engagement. NAR operations are clandestine by nature, and depend on the presence of Special Forces or indigenous surrogates that comprise a recovery mechanism (RM) network. By establishing this network before the onset of hostilities, or at the very minimum before an isolated personnel event, the RM enters the graph well above the line of RS. The earlier the network is established and operating in the area of interest, the higher above the RS line it enters the graph.




Figure 14. Example of Entering the Engagement with RS. (From McRaven, 1996, p. 383).

Once an isolated personnel event occurs, the progress of the graph along the x-axis will differ from the way that McRaven's does concerning time. The primary reason for this is that the basis for McRaven's model is DA missions where time is a critical factor. NAR missions, a subset of unconventional warfare missions, by their nature are protracted. The principle of speed is still important, but generally only during the phase where linkup of the evader and the RM occurs; this is particularly crucial in urban situations. Following that particular phase, speed may not only be unnecessary, but dangerous. McRaven noted that his RS graph is not a quantitative mission analysis. He always expressed the timeline across the horizontal axis quantitatively, though, in his case studies. Since it would be impossible to quantify a NAR model in terms of hours, days, weeks, or even months, this model will illustrate RS with respect to NAR specified tasks rather than actual time. The numbers across the bottom of the graph are arbitrary and simply show ordinal progression as illustrated in Figure 15.




Figure 15. Authors' model for RS Recovery Mechanism

## B. PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING RELATIVE SUPERIORITY FOR THE RECOVERY MECHANISM

As discussed earlier, McRaven lists six principles required to gain RS. Just as in the case of the RS graph, this study modifies these principles in two ways in order to apply them to the unconventional aspects of NAR operations. First, the structure illustrating the integration of the principles is different. Unlike DA operations that precariously balance themselves on the apex of simplicity, NAR operations sit on a base of long-term vision. Due to the risks of sponsoring such clandestine operations, this vision originates at the strategic level of decision-making. Vision supports the operational base of a simple and reliable command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) infrastructure that, in turn, support the tactical apex of four principles that support each other in the execution of NAR operations. Note that the model progresses from the strategic and operational foundations of the program (vision and C4I) to the tactical execution of an operation (trust, security, flexibility, and access). Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the NAR model.




Figure 16. NAR-specific principles necessary to achieve RS Recovery Mechanism (side view).




Figure 17. NAR-specific principles necessary to achieve RS Recovery Mechanism (top view).

This model derives many of its principles from various U.S. and foreign military doctrinal sources. Vision and trust, however, are not comparable to typical military principles of warfare. Case study research and interviews with contemporary planners for NAR operations during recent conflicts helped derive the principles that the following paragraphs define in application to the model. In addition, this study further references RS, with regard to NAR operations, as RS Recovery Mechanism and RS Isolated Personnel in order to prevent confusion.

## C. DEFINITIONS OF RECOVERY MECHANISM PRINCIPLES

### 1. Vision

Vision is essential to establish an effective and enduring NAR program. Maintaining vision is important to participants at all levels of operations, from decision makers to operational executors. This vision is the building block of a NAR program and forms the base of this model. Two critical aspects of vision include long-term conceptualization and innovative thinking.

Long-term conceptualization is critical due to the clandestine and protracted nature of NAR operations. First, preparing the battlespace in advance of combat operations is crucial. Since predicting actual combat operations well in advance is difficult at best, a continuous global presence of NAR RMs in high-risk areas is the optimal strategy. Secondly, early presence and consistent commitment of resources will facilitate the formation of a sound and appropriately protracted strategy for NAR operations.

Extending the vision from immediate combat operations to sustained maintenance and improvement of NAR infrastructure will be crucial to its success. Some may argue that existing intelligence networks perform the same basic functions as a NAR mechanism, and therefore, a dedicated NAR network is an unnecessary and costly venture. While this argument may seem reasonable for a peacetime scenario, since domestic priorities typically dominate the demand for resources, history illustrates how the demand for intelligence sources in a crisis surpasses their availability. Therefore, if the military continues to claim that personnel recovery is one of its highest priorities, it should consider a dedicated NAR infrastructure in those areas deemed as high risk. Early preparation of NAR infrastructure in any particular theater will provide for integration

and coordination that are more efficient in establishing RMs and networks. This is partly because increased interaction with RM personnel would lead to stronger, more prudently developed trust bonds within the RM. This increased trust allows for more timely and efficient execution during combat operations.<sup>42</sup> The actual time involved in creating an effective RM will vary based on environment, existing formal and informal relations with the area, and amount of resources available.

Employing people who possess strong innovative capabilities is also important to implementing a long-term strategy. Leaders who cannot break existing paradigms cannot hope to effectively combat an adversary who understands the benefits of employing innovative and asymmetric strategies. This is evident throughout history and the evaluation of the conventional ways of thinking that initially derailed recovery operations during World War II (WWII) will illustrate the point.

By breaking conventional paradigms with innovative thinking, leadership can realize improved methods and better allocation of resources. Increased use of indigenous surrogates can lead to a more efficient use of U.S. resources and ease the burden of the current operations tempo. Visionaries in the personnel recovery arena may need to develop unique approaches in order to maximize the benefits of these sources while maintaining security against counterintelligence operations. Innovation can also create better continuity in NAR corporate knowledge. Currently, there is a generation gap in NAR knowledge (personal interview, Ron McNeal, November 13, 2003). Since the previous paradigm has been in place for so long, there has been little or no effort to further develop NAR education in either doctrine or the professional military education system. Innovative thinkers will provide the catalyst for providing NAR doctrinal training to the education systems and extend the corporate knowledge farther into the future.

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<sup>42</sup> A summarized concept of efficiency with trust is: “When knowledge is received from a trusted source, the receiver is less likely to verify the knowledge for accuracy and is more inclined to accept the knowledge at face value. This allows the receiver to immediately act on the knowledge and use it to generate additional knowledge. In this way, the receiver uses the trustworthiness of the source as a proxy for the quality and veracity of the knowledge conveyed.” McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, “Trust as an Organizing Principle,” *Organization Science* 14 (1), Jan-Feb 2003, pp. 91-103.

## **2. Simplicity (C4I)**

Simplicity is a common principle in warfare, but this thesis limits its consideration to the aspect of C4I. This is because a blanket statement of simplicity would not necessarily fit NAR operations. The links within a RM may in fact be quite complicated to ensure meeting redundancy and security. The concept of simplicity applied to C4I, however, provides a general framework that enhances the ability of an RM to operate efficiently and effectively.

Centralized control and decentralized execution contributes to the concept of simplicity of C4I. Enhancement of this simplicity occurs even more when only two levels of hierarchy between the command and the operators exist. The section on flexibility provides a more detailed discussion of decentralized execution. In order to ensure a unity of effort and effective use of resources, a centralized agency with oversight responsibilities for deconfliction and the development of coordinated operational objectives is necessary. Directors of each RM should report only to this one organization for direction, oversight, and support. In turn, each member of the RM should also report to only one RM director. This command and control structure is also important to facilitate unity of effort by keeping the number of objectives for NAR forces as simple and limited as possible in order to increase the chances that they will achieve their operational objectives.

Communications and computers add to the concept of simplicity because they help reduce the complexity of compiling and analyzing data necessary for reacting to an isolated personnel event. Their structure, however, must also maximize the concept of simplicity as much as the operational environment permits. Communications equipment provided to the RMs must be easy to operate and conceal. In addition, interagency communications and computer equipment should operate under the same, or at least compatible, technological capabilities. These systems should also have inherent redundancies in the event of failure so that there is no need to develop alternate means to convey information in the middle of combat operations. Finally, the language applied to these systems must be universal for the RM. Due to complications of translation, using RM personnel without English language skills or RM directors without theater language skills violates this principle.

Of all the C4I tools available to NAR operations, intelligence is of paramount importance. Intelligence forms the core of all NAR operations. Intelligence is vital to determining the location of isolated personnel, the disposition of enemy troops, the health of RM networks, and the availability of resources (friendly and enemy). In short, intelligence provides the “ground truth” to every player in the NAR infrastructure.

Two important factors for facilitating intelligence operations in support of NAR include limiting objectives and interagency cooperation. Limiting objectives refers to tasking NAR intelligence resources primarily for gathering and analysis for NAR operations. NAR resources provide additional intelligence collection capabilities that other defense and federal agencies may try to task for purposes other than NAR. While extraordinary situations may justify such actions, routine operations do not. This does not mean, however, that intelligence gathered in the course of NAR activities should not be shared with agencies which have vested interests affected by such information. While NAR planners must protect the sources and methods of derived information to the utmost, the information itself should be available to other agencies. This spirit of cooperation is critical in the development of inter-departmental networking that allows the cross flow of both information and resources. High operations tempo, limited intelligence resources, and overlapping areas of interest make this cooperation necessary for effective operations. Through effective memoranda of agreement, fusion cells, and other cooperative efforts, the intelligence backbone of NAR operations can be strong and effective.

### **3. Trust**

The issue of trust is essential in establishing a clandestine network, but requires a delicate balance with the principle of security. The literature on escape networks of World War II uses the word trust extensively to describe the relationship between members of the RM networks. Without the existence of some level of trust within the RM, operations could not hope to succeed.

Trust requirements for NAR networks begin with recruitment. The members of these clandestine organizations must keep their activities secret and they face constant risk of discovery as shown in the WWII case studies. There is a great risk, therefore, in opening the organization to unknown personnel. This risk is necessary, though, in order

to establish a network that is capable of performing the NAR mission. Milward and Raab (2002) note that, “risk enforces recruitment along the lines of trust” (p. 21). This generally means that clandestine organizations limit their recruitment to familiar individuals they know very well and with whom they feel a strong sense of trust. While this limits the amount of capable personnel a network may have, it helps ensure security.

Trust is also essential for NAR operations in order to react to an isolated personnel event in an expedient manner. As stated earlier, speed may be important for the phase where the RM has to contact the isolated personnel before the enemy. McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer (2003) observe:

When knowledge is received from a trusted source, the receiver is less likely to verify the knowledge for accuracy and is more inclined to accept the knowledge at face value. This allows the receiver to immediately act on the knowledge and use it to generate additional knowledge (p. 91).

This obviously can create a dangerous security risk if NAR personnel misplace trust, which is why NAR operators must verify trust cautiously. Therefore, “trust is not a naïve faith, where people take for granted the reliability, competence, and integrity of their counterpart based on a decision made in the distant past” (McEvily, et al., 2003, p. 99). This statement illustrates that even trusted sources must be continuously tested and vetted to warrant continued trust.

Finally, RM personnel should grant trust proportionately to the other agent’s position in the network. Clandestine networks will generally have a core and a periphery. The core has a dense network of connections and influences the direction for the overall network. Outside the core is the periphery, containing varying levels of connections depending on the way the network is organized (Williams, 1998, p. 155). High levels of trust are essential in the network core and only those with undisputable credentials should ever be permitted direct access to the core. As one moves out from the core, the level of trust will correspondingly decrease. Members of the periphery either have not been a part of the network long enough to have gained high levels of trust, or simply do not require such levels to contribute to the network. Erickson (1981) supports this concept when she states, “strong ties are always preferred as the building blocks of secret societies, but the kind of tie used actually varies. Relatively weak ties may be used if the

degree of risk is relatively low” (p. 195). Therefore, the degree of risk to the RM, coupled with the need for effective operations will determine the level of trust granted throughout the infrastructure.

#### **4. Security**

Security is a principle used in McRaven’s theory and model of special operations and this study applies it to NAR in a similar manner. The operational environment in the area of operations will dictate the level of security required. In some cases, it may be acceptable for the adversary to know of the existence of a network, but not the details. In other cases, the RM may need to completely conceal its existence. In addition, while some methods of operation may require careful safeguarding, other methods may be expendable. For example, the gains of exposing a particular method (moving a larger number of IP) may be so great that they outweigh the compromise of that method (the use of a tunnel system). Typically, however, the safety and continued operation of the RM will outweigh extraordinary risks for a single IP event.

Some individual factors that contribute to the security of NAR operations include invisibility, cellular network development, and source development. Invisibility is not limited to just effective camouflage techniques. More often for NAR mechanisms, this invisibility simply means going about unnoticed. Third country national (TCN) laborers whose presence is barely recognized, or alternatively, members of the community who can surreptitiously provide support in the daily routine of their duties can achieve invisibility. The idea is that their network activities are invisible. Maintaining a normalized routine can facilitate this invisibility. Identifying and vetting personnel such as these can help establish an indiscernible NAR network.

Distributed, cellular networks can be very effective in preserving the integrity of the entire mechanism in the event of a partial compromise. Using assets dedicated only to NAR operations also enhances security, as they are not exposing their presence in the pursuit of other objectives. Finally, properly training and equipping recruited surrogates for their roles within the RM increase their abilities to operate without detection, thus increasing security for the entire organization.

## **5. Flexibility**

Flexibility is necessary to react to the very dynamic environment encountered by NAR forces in the urban environment. Flexibility gives RMs the ability to conduct operations across multiple environments and areas of interest. Three factors that ensure flexibility are decentralized execution, anonymity, and redundancy.

Decentralized execution allows for better efficiency and speed of action by those implementing the NAR plan. By allowing forward operators the authority to activate their mechanisms and sources, the overall infrastructure can be more flexible to constantly changing conditions and react to an isolated personnel event in a timely manner.

Anonymity is similar to invisibility in that the RM personnel can adapt to various levels of scrutiny regarding their activities. The Iraq case study will exemplify this concept. If an RM agent can move about an area of interest with some level of anonymity, he or she can adapt his or her credentials and cover stories better to continue to perform their required activities.

Creating redundancy in the NAR infrastructure is another effective method for improving flexibility. One method of course would be to create networks with multiple links between nodes. Scale free networks such as this require caution, since such a scale-free network is very vulnerable to coordinated attacks.<sup>43</sup> Redundant communications, transportation, and housing methods can also greatly increase the flexibility of a NAR RM to changing plans.

## **6. Access**

This concept refers to the requirement of NAR networks for information and resources. This can apply to personnel in the NAR administrative section as well as those in the operational arena. The stove-piped security requirements inherently limit NAR infrastructure. Exploiting the human capital of indigenous sources can create security dilemmas. Therefore, NAR networks should have multiple avenues of access available to

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<sup>43</sup> The concepts of network development and their implications for redundancy and security are vast and beyond the scope of this thesis. It is important, however, to identify the importance of proper network analysis in the consideration of flexibility and security. For a comprehensive compilation of information on network organization, visit <http://www.orgnet.com>.

exploit. When feasible, using the administrative mechanism of the NAR infrastructure itself is most secure, if it has the capability to deliver the RM's requirements.

Due to the inherent bureaucracy of the interagency process, made more complicated by the security requirements of NAR, informal methods of access are typically required to operate effectively. The personality of individuals running NAR functions largely drives the development of informal ties in the administrative arena. In order to gain access to information and resources from other governmental agencies where parochialism is present, informal networks can bridge the gap between individuals within the organizations. This work-around provides a majority of the access for many interagency cooperative efforts.

Within the operational realm, access is easier to identify and apply. NAR networks may require access to certain physical areas, various resources (transportation, medical, and communications), key community personnel, and intelligence. The key factor in developing this network is to ensure that the mechanism has a capable, varied and distributed capability. For instance, a reputable man in a community may have access to key personnel and information, but is extremely restricted in his ability to move about unnoticed. On the other hand, a TCN laborer can anonymously move about from place to place without raising suspicion, but would have difficulty securing communications and medical resources.

#### **D. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY AND ISOLATED PERSONNEL**

Figure 18 shows the relationship of NAR principles and the four IP-specific principles of communication, adaptability, exploitation, and the Gonzales principle. The pyramid illustrates the complete NAR model and functions just as it does when used as a stand-alone model—except that the tactical peak rests on the IP-specific principles. The pyramid's strategic and operational base balances the survival and freedom of the IP and steadies the tactical apex of the RM principles. If any one of these IP-specific principles is lacking, then the evader's successful recovery could be in jeopardy—the principles are necessary but not sufficient. In the case where the mission is not going well for the recovery force, the pyramid could shift, causing one of the balls that represent the evader's principles to collapse under the shifting pyramid and jeopardizing a successful recovery.

The NAR-specific urban PR model graphically represents the idea that SOF DA recovery forces succeed in achieving situational superiority, in spite of their numerical inferiority, when two things occur:

- 1) The NAR RM is able to gain RS <sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> with a visionary plan, with a simplified C4I structure, while implementing security, access, trust, and flexibility.
- 2) The IP with a composed warrior mindset (from applying Gonzales principle) is able to gain RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> through exploiting opportunities in order to adapt to the urban environment long enough to make contact with friendly forces to assist in their own recovery.




Figure 18. Authors' NAR urban PR model.

#### E. METHODOLOGY

Four historical cases will illustrate the concept of RS <sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> in NAR and its six corresponding principles of vision, simplicity of C4I, security, trust, access, and adaptation. These principles provide NAR forces with RS <sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>, which is

critical to successful NAR operations. The absence of these principles, through ignorance, neglect, or environmental constraints resulted in some degree of failure. Within the context of NAR, these principles helped achieve RS Recovery Mechanism in accordance with the model.

This thesis hypothesizes that RS Recovery Mechanism is necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successful NAR operations. It is not sufficient because RS Recovery Mechanism only gains an advantage over the enemy's will. The isolated person, local populace, or other external factors will also influence the outcome of operations. With regard to the enemy, though, losing RS Recovery Mechanism will most likely result in mission failure. While luck may provide a few examples counter to this hypothesis, NAR planners should not consider luck a viable planning principle. Achieving RS Recovery Mechanism requires the adherence to the six principles listed above. While a lapse in one or more principles does not necessarily result in a total loss of RS Recovery Mechanism, it will generally result in reduced effectiveness. These principles are closely related and the reader should consider them independently. For instance, if a NAR plan focuses primarily on security, it will be difficult to develop adaptation, access, and purpose, and hence, successful recoveries. In addition, if visionary leaders, who foster innovative thinking, are not involved in the development NAR operations, it will be impossible to continue to capitalize on the other principles leading to successful NAR execution.

The hypothesis, simply stated, is that RS Recovery Mechanism and RS Isolated Personnel are necessary conditions for successful NAR operations. In turn, the six principles for NAR RMs are required in order to attain the RS Recovery Mechanism, while the four IP principles are required for RS Isolated Personnel. Since the case studies focus primarily on the life cycle of an RM, the remaining chapters will not discuss the IP principles in detail, the chapters will broadly consider these principles based on the detailed analysis of the previous chapters. To begin, this section will apply the principles against a case study from World War II. Next, in order to illustrate the timelessness of the hypothesis, the authors analyze two contemporary NAR-related case studies. The authors chose these cases because of the availability of open source data and applicability to the analysis.

## VII. WORLD WAR II CASE STUDY

### A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

The example selected for this case study is from the French theater of operations during World War II (WWII). The authors chose this particular theater for the following reasons: the extensiveness of Allied-created escape lines, the abundance of open-source data relating to these lines, and the relatively high population density of French territory. While many operations occurred in the Balkan, Asian, North African, and other European theaters, they did not provide the abundance of data available as those in France and contained differing conditions that would not have met the method of difference.

First, a background narrative will describe how the organizations that created the escape lines developed and structured themselves. Next, an analysis of the Pat O’Leary escape line follows with a discussion of the RS of the recovery mechanism (RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>). Following this is an analysis of the six nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) principles attributing to RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>. The authors chose this particular escape line because of the high variance of RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> during its lifespan. The Pat O’Leary line maintained RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> for over two years before completely collapsing after Gestapo infiltration.

### B. BACKGROUND: INTERWAR PERIOD

Before Great Britain’s entry into WWII, the British Chiefs of Staff took an interest in the concept of irregular warfare. They tasked J. C. F. Holland, future founder of the commandos and Special Operations Executive (SOE), to head the new Military Intelligence Research (MI R) division. Holland brought a former colleague from his cadet days, MAJ Colin Gubbins, to assist him.

Both were original thinkers, who kept their originality within the bounds of common sense and practicability. Both foresaw that there might be hundreds of thousands of prisoners in the next war, each of whom might be turned into a small thorn in the enemy’s side; and that there might well be hundreds or thousands of evaders as well, loose in the enemy’s rear areas and in need of guidance (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 32).<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> More details regarding the formation of the SOE, and these men’s backgrounds is available in *SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946* by Michael Foot (1984).

Holland formed a new organization in order to deal with the impending problems that would accompany such numbers of distressed soldiers. This organization, under the War Office and staffed with liaison officers from the Air Force and Navy, was headed up by Major N. R. Crockatt. Holland made this choice because he needed “a strong man without bias . . . who could display the energy and drive of a leader as he controlled and co-ordinated [sic] the team of experts working under him” (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 33). Crockatt’s organization assumed the named MI 9, the evasion and escape department of British Military Intelligence. Crockatt was well aware of the difficulties of interagency cooperation, particularly with services operating under such secrecy. He perceived these difficulties as “a dense fog of security, in which the germs of inter-secret-service jealousy breed fast” (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 40); therefore, he worked diligently to create and maintain rapport with his fellow intelligence services.

Crockatt initially chose six uniquely qualified officers to join him. These officers had all seen active service in World War I and Crockatt selected them for their reliability and restraint; tradecraft traits that would ensure the security and success of Britain’s new efforts to support isolated personnel (IP). These officers were shrewd, and understood how to work around bureaucratic hurdles. One officer, Clayton Hutton, in his efforts to appropriate necessary funds ran into some trouble with some government ministries and the Board of Trade. He was careful, though, not to cross so many lines as to jeopardize the existence of MI 9 (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 36-39).

In May 1940, Germany swept across the Low Countries and France in a massive offensive. The British Expeditionary Forces (BEFs) in France managed to repulse an assault by the German Sixth Army, but remaining German tank divisions raced to the French coast in attempts to cut off ports for retreat. The swift movement of the German Army thwarted an organized retreat. Despite the fact that the Dunkirk evacuation moved hundreds of thousands of troops from the beaches of France, several thousand British troops remained isolated throughout the country (Murphy, 1987, pp. 25-37).

In the summer of 1940, the number of evaders from the British Army was far greater than the number of prisoners. This came as quite a surprise to the members of the War Department. The previous paradigm of trench warfare, static fronts, and limited

airpower employment typically resulted in far more prisoners of war than evaders. The majority of soldiers, therefore, became prisoners of war almost immediately following their isolation during WWI. This caused MI 9 to focus their efforts on training their domestic forces to deal with internment and develop their infrastructure to cope with prisoner support. The same paradigm also resulted in the BEF being unprepared to cope with evasion situations. The British decision makers undoubtedly did not foresee the confusion that ensued from the German *blitzkrieg* attack leaving thousands of troops unable to evacuate as forces retreated to the coast. This occurred despite the German's previous demonstrations of such capabilities in Poland and Belgium. These new challenges required innovative approaches for successful personnel recovery efforts to occur. MI 9 realized that it erred in concentrating solely on the prisoner scenario and began to increase its efforts to support evaders.

This is an instance of how ready Crockatt was to change his mind, when there was clear evidence that he had made a mistake. Flexibility of this kind was not a leading characteristic among most of his army contemporaries, yet from it much of MI 9's effectiveness rose (Foot & Langley, 1979, p. 68).

From these foundations, the evasion networks of occupied France, began their legendary work in returning allied soldiers to friendly control.

### C. PAT O'LEARY LINE

#### 1. Background

Unfortunately, British leadership made scant effort to prepare the BEF for escape or evasion contingencies before the German blitzkrieg attack across France. MI 6, the British special intelligence service, offered its assistance in setting up an escape line from Marseilles to Spain.<sup>45</sup> Donald Darling, who once lived in France and spoke French and Spanish fluently, headed this endeavor under the cover of British Vice consul in charge of repatriation at Lisbon (Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 66-73).

Darling then became aware of a captain named Ian Garrow from the Fifty-first Highland Division, a British territorial unit. Garrow became isolated from his division

<sup>45</sup> MI 6's motives for this move are speculative. At this point, SOE had encroached on MI 6's long-term monopoly of clandestine activities behind enemy lines and some believed that leaders at MI 6 wanted to ensure that MI 9 did not encroach upon their mission. Regardless, Crockatt had little choice since he lacked the immediate resources to deal with the problem. For more discussion on the intelligence rivalries during these formative years, see Michael Foot's book, *SOE* (1984).

and began evading with hopes of rejoining his division in England. He began to take notice, however, of the large number of British troops wandering the streets of Marseilles without any resources to affect their own escape. Garrow began to think that assisting in the evacuation of his fellow servicemen would better serve the cause (Ottis, 2001, p. 76).

Garrow initially received no assistance from MI 9 because there was no communications yet established between MI 9 and occupied France. Garrow, therefore, made use of his access to the American consul, many aristocratic expatriates, and various local friends in support of his efforts.<sup>46</sup> Finally, establishing contact with Garrow, Darling became his link to MI 9 and British financial support (Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 66-73). The financial requirements surpassed that which Garrow could receive through the inefficient courier lines, but he was able to overcome that through his access to Louis Nouveau. Nouveau, a French entrepreneur, himself had a number of contacts and resources and was eager to assist the allies against the Nazi occupation.

A short time later, Garrow recruited a man named Patrick Albert O'Leary. O'Leary was a pseudonym for Albert Marie Edmond Guerisse, a Belgian doctor who initially left France with his cavalry regiment during the Dunkirk evacuation. He then joined the British Navy and came under enemy arrest during a rescue mission off the coast of southern France. O'Leary managed to escape and sought out Garrow, whom he heard about during his imprisonment. Personally impressed by O'Leary's reputation and charm, Garrow requested and received authorization from MI 9, through Darling, for O'Leary to become an agent for the line<sup>47</sup> (Ottis, 2001, pp. 85-86).

In October 1941, French police arrested Garrow. Two officers had convinced Garrow of their sympathies to his efforts in their attempts to infiltrate the line. When Garrow began to trust them, he compromised himself enough for the arrest. A military tribunal in Lyon sentenced him to twenty years of hard labor. Garrow was shrewd

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<sup>46</sup> The American consul was ordered to cease any support for the evasion and escape of British forces after the June 1940 British attack of the French fleet at Mers el Kebir. While maintaining its diplomatic veneer of compliance, however, various individuals within the consular offices continued to provide Garrow with forms and stamps for false papers (Ottis, 2001, p. 78).

<sup>47</sup> While Garrow had a great amount of latitude in running the escape line, he was a man of duty. Since O'Leary was still a member of the Royal Navy, Garrow wanted to ensure that O'Leary was officially released from that position. This type of respectful rapport that Garrow maintained while independently working clandestine operations can be one of the reasons MI 9 was able to overcome the frictions typical of interagency cooperation.

enough, though, not to expose the other cells within his network. The escape line was able to continue operations under the new leadership of Pat O'Leary (Murphy, 1987, p. 141).

Shortly after Garrow's arrest, O'Leary confronted one of the line's core agents, Harold Cole, for embezzling funds for his own use. Cole escaped through a bathroom window and German counterintelligence later picked him up in December of 1941. Cole cooperated with the *Abwehr* interrogators without much encouragement. His deposition resulted in thirty typewritten pages that named scores of agents and effectively decimated the northern portion of the O'Leary line (Murphy, 1987, pp. 144-169).

Despite this setback, O'Leary continued to move six hundred people along the line over the next year. During this period, he initiated the repair of the northern lines while still moving the increasing number of evaders out of France. His lone wireless radio operator also deserted the line to be with his wife. The Gestapo then arrested his next radio operator. Facing increasing demands, and decreasing assets, the line had to recruit assets quickly and without the assistance of intelligence vetting from London (Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 77-78).

Noveau was O'Leary's primary coordinator for the Pas de Calais, Brittany, and Normandy branches of the line and in December of 1942, he recruited Roger LeNeveu into the line. LeNeveu was previously a member of the French Foreign Legion for three years; and he came highly recommended by other branches of the resistance. Rather quickly, Noveau introduced LeNeveu to his leading agents. For the next two months, LeNeveu transported several groups of evaders along the line. In January, though, he arrived in Toulouse without his evader. LeNeveu claimed that the Germans had arrested them both, but he had escaped. Noveau elected not to interrogate him personally since another agent was satisfied with LeNeveu's explanation (Ottis, 2001, p. 112).

In February of 1943, Noveau was to meet with LeNeveu in Paris to receive five airmen for transport to Toulouse. LeNeveu was able to push through the line of waiting passengers at the train station and obtain the required passes just in time to prevent canceling the operation. Noveau boarded the train with the five airmen and two other guides and waved goodbye to LeNeveu for the last time. A short distance down the line,

the Gestapo arrested Noveau and his companions and then escorted them to Gestapo headquarters (Ottis, 2001, pp. 112-114). This marked the end for the O’Leary line.

LeNeveu later asked for an appointment with O’Leary so he could pass information about Noveau’s arrest. Minor agents such as LeNeveu did not typically have access to the administrative or organizational members of the line, but O’Leary wanted to know what happened to one of his core agents, thus he agreed to the meeting. The two met at a café in Toulouse on 2 March 1943. When asked if he knew who was responsible for the betrayals, LeNeveu replied that he indeed did. At that time, the Germans arrested O’Leary and LeNeveu. O’Leary realized later that LeNeveu was the traitor, but it was far too late to stop the inevitable. The O’Leary line was dead<sup>48</sup> (Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 140-141).

## **2. Analysis—Relative Superiority of the Recovery Mechanism**

In this section, the authors evaluate the operations of the O’Leary line as a whole with respect to RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>. The analysis begins when Ian Garrow actively begins forming an escape network within occupied France and ends with Pat O’Leary’s arrest. The timeline in Figure 19 does not suggest any recommendations for the tempo of NAR operations, but only to show the time of the events as they occurred. The authors consider RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> satisfied as long as Garrow was able to conduct NAR-related tasks and maintain the integrity of the network. While varying challenges may have stalled or temporarily halted actual movement of IP from occupied France, the RM maintained RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>. Because of the protracted nature of NAR operations, the model considers the viability of the line to survive and operate essential for RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>. The actual exfiltration of IP from a theater of operations is then a factor of RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> along with RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> in addition to other environmental factors that work against the model.

The RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> graph in Figure 19 shows that the O’Leary line was able to gain a significant advantage over the enemy by beginning operations from behind the

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<sup>48</sup> Some sources cite that the O’Leary line continued to function, on a reduced scale, until the liberation of France in 1944. Francoise Dissard was attributed with regrouping the survivors of the line at her residence in Toulouse and the continued support of Allied evaders. While these events indicate the courage and tenacity of the individuals from the O’Leary line, they do not support the continuance of the preexisting network. Online access to further discussion on Dissard’s contributions after April 1943 can be found at: <http://www.conscript-heroes.com>, or <http://www.christopherlong.co.uk/pub.rafses.html>.




Figure 19. Authors' RS Recovery Mechanism Graph for the O'Leary line

German lines in occupied France. Using his own ingenuity, and contacts in Marseilles, Garrow began evacuation operations for Allied evaders. Once he established contact with Donald Darling, his financial and intelligence support increased, giving his mechanism and even more decisive edge against the Germans. His arrest exposed portions of the network, but Pat O'Leary's leadership allowed the RM to maintain RS Recovery Mechanism. This suggests that a large network, properly organized for security, is not necessarily more vulnerable than a smaller network. The network continued to operate effectively until the Abwehr arrested Cole. This inflicted severe damage to the network, although it continued to operate just above the RS line. Then, the loss of their only radio operator caused an intelligence gap that slowly eroded the network's capability and security.

The decisive point that finally brought the O'Leary line below the RS Recovery Mechanism frontier was the recruitment of LeNeveu. Although the line continued to operate for two more months, his presence in the line eroded any remaining RS Recovery Mechanism

the network possessed. Eventually, LeNeveu had collected enough information to compromise the entire line, once this occurred the German's began to eliminate and arrest members of the network. Noveau's arrest marked the decisive event that placed the network below the RS line. At this point, LeNeveu had collected enough intelligence to bring down the rest of the network and assisted the Germans in dismantling it. The line continued to function for a short time, but there was no hope for the continued survival of the network or regaining RS Recovery Mechanism. The arrest of Pat O'Leary categorically ended operations for the O'Leary line.

It might appear to some that the line did not have RS Recovery Mechanism because the German's were apparently aware of their operations. The Germans, however, could not confidently act to bring the entire line down until more intelligence was gathered, allowing the line to continue conducting NAR operations. The infiltration may indicate the beginning of the decline of RS Recovery Mechanism, but should not suggest a lack of it. Just because the enemy knows or suspects the presence of an escape line, it does not give them the ability to stop it.

### **3. Analysis of NAR Principles for the O'Leary Line**

#### **a. Vision**

Military policymakers obviously realized the danger posed by Germany as WWII approached. Their interest in irregular warfare resulted in the selection of very qualified and innovative officers to deal with the uniquely unconventional aspects associated with this type of warfare. Despite their ability to identify the problems that might occur with IP, the paradigms developed from the policymakers' experiences in World War I encumbered their vision. The focus on prisoner over evader issues and poor training of the BEF illustrate this point.

Although strategic vision was lacking, the vision of operators in the tactical environment still allowed recovery forces to achieve RS Recovery Mechanism early in the war. Ian Garrow, walking the streets of Marseilles, envisioned the successful evacuation of those soldiers roaming throughout the cities and countryside of France and successfully implemented an effective operation. Garrow, though, had one distinct advantage from the leadership in England; he was already in the operational area and could formulate a more coherent plan revolving around his resources and knowledge of

the enemy situation. He most likely did not foresee the events leading to his escape line any more than the strategic planners in Britain did, but once they occurred the vision was more apparent to him than those across the channel.

*b. Simplicity (C4I)<sup>49</sup>*

Considering the context of their time, the O’Leary line fulfilled this principle fairly well. Their command structure was as simplified as could be allowed with the limited means of communications available. The technological limitations of the period drove the requirement for O’Leary to report to Darling, who in turn reported to Crockatt, who was the final approving authority for operations in France. This was still relatively simple in terms of a command structure, and resulted in moderately decentralized control. O’Leary and Darling typically had autonomy to make their own decisions and sought guidance only on those actions with profound implications such as releasing O’Leary from his Royal Navy commitment, or dealing with traitors in the line.

Having only one radio operator was an obvious limitation for the O’Leary line. Radio sets of the time, however, were rather cumbersome and easy to intercept. In France, maintaining communications with Allied support was “a very precise business, and the air was alive with such communications and every second counted” (Long, 1985, p. 150). Coupled with the high volume of traffic, was the organization’s fear of compromise. Garrow’s first wireless operator withdrew his support stating, “you know, it’s extremely dangerous doing transmitting like this . . . if they can hear us, then so can the Gestapo with their detecting devices” (Feriere, as cited in Long, 1985, p. 152). The shortfall of communications within this principle was most likely beyond the capabilities of anyone to overcome at that time, but definitely affected the line’s ability to perform and survive.

Unfortunately, intelligence and communications are closely linked portions of this principle. For the most part during this period, the personnel within the RM had a better situational awareness of the ground situation than those in the intelligence offices. One key role that the intelligence section could have played,

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<sup>49</sup> While the term C4I was not yet in use during WWII, we feel the term can be universally applied. All aspects of C4I were present during this period, although not recognized in this relationship. While one can argue that computers did not exist during the time period of this case study, coding machines used for secure communications meet the criteria and the term, therefore, still applies.

however, was in vetting potential agents and evaders. As the case study points out, MI 9 did everything possible to ensure that their relationship with the other MI departments was amicable. As Foot and Langley (1979) point out:

There has never been any sign that MI 9 behaved in any way that MI 5 disapproved, and the older department gave the younger every possible help in checking the bona fides of occasional suspects (p. 41).

Thus, while the intelligence was difficult to disseminate, MI 9 ensured that every possible avenue was available for its efforts.

Overall, the line marginally followed the principle of simplicity of C4I. Arguably, MI 9 successfully satisfied this principle more than any other agency in the War Office during the same period relative to the resources available. MI9's ability to continue extensive clandestine activities, despite resource and budgetary constraints not realized by both conventional and more prestigious intelligence agencies, illustrates their ability to enforce this principle. This was most likely one of the primary reasons that the O'Leary line was able to obtain RS Recovery Mechanism during the early portion of the war.

*c. Trust*

On at least two occasions, the O'Leary line seriously compromised the principle of trust, as described in chapter 5. The first time was with Harold Cole:

Its [the O'Leary line's] great strength came from the fact that the people who formed its guiding core all knew, liked and trusted each other . ... The enormous advantages of this inner cohesion were offset by a countervailing, catastrophic snag: one of them was no good (Foot & Langley, 1979, pp. 75-76).

The violation of this principle occurred when Garrow disregarded the concerns of at least two of his inner core of trusted members who expressed concerns regarding Cole's trustworthiness. One of those members was Pat O'Leary, who later exposed Cole's indiscretions. Garrow should have immediately addressed this problem in his core trust element, particularly since it was not just one voice of concern. The blind trust of an agent improperly vetted created severe damage to the organization.

The other instance involved LeNeveu's infiltration of the network. The violation of the trust principle occurred shortly after his recruitment. Noveau almost immediately brought LeNeveu into the line's core trust group. Noveau relied on second-hand

testimony on LeNeveu's character in formulating his level of trust. Noveau should have kept LeNeveu at the periphery of the network until the RM could properly vet and test him over a period to establish his trustworthiness.

***d. Security***

The founders of the O'Leary line developed it fairly well in terms of security. They organized the network in a cellular fashion such that the compromise of one portion of the RM did not jeopardize the operations of the rest of the mechanism. The continued survival of the network despite the numerous arrests of its members illustrated the benefits of this organization. The line also did an effective job in rendering its activities essentially invisible to local security apparatuses through normalized daily routines.

The first violation of security in this case study occurred with Cole. The reason the *Abwehr* picked up Cole was his flagrant violation of security. As one evader noted:

Cole had no qualms about speaking his poor French around the Germans and insisted that the evaders mingle with the Germans in public, rather than engaging in the more passive and less risky approach of keeping to themselves (Ottis, 2001, p. 91).

The *Abwehr* identified Cole as a resistance agent long before taking him into custody, but his actions were so grandiose that they delayed his arrest to ensure he was not working as a double agent for another branch of the German police. While this behavior had short-term benefits for Cole, it did not give him enduring safety (Murphy, 1987, pp. 149-150).

O'Leary also violated this principle when he met with LeNeveu personally to hear what had happened to Noveau. The network did not allow minor agents to meet with the organizational core of the network. This procedure was in place to protect the most vulnerable part of the network from those less reliable portions. While the original line was arguably unable to regain RS Recovery Mechanism from this point, O'Leary could have remained free along with his other key members if he had adhered to procedure.

***e. Access***

Of all the principles considered in the NAR-specific model, the RM most effectively applied the principle of access, both strategically and tactically. The network

had nearly permeated the entire theater of operations; their access to various intelligence, finance, and transportation sources made this possible. These provisional sources also possessed redundant capabilities, ensuring continued access in the event of a temporary loss from any one source. Rail lines, vehicles, ships, bicycles, and walking guides provided the basis for transportation. More importantly, Allied governments and local entrepreneurs provided large amounts of money to secure such transportation.

The primary shortfall in the network's access was, again, communications. This problem, however, did not violate the principle of access. Despite the handicap associated with poor communications, the network still maintained access throughout its existence through couriers, letters, and coded broadcasts over the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC's) programs.

Strategically, the leadership in MI 9 fostered close, cooperative relationships with its Allied counterparts in the intelligence community. This greatly assisted tactical access as illustrated by MI 6's assistance in sending Darling to Lisbon to set up the initial coordination for evasion networks from occupied France. MI 9's careful relationships with other government agencies also ensured that the lines were able to access the necessary monetary support from England.

#### *f. Flexibility*

The O'Leary line adapted quite well to evolving situations in Europe. Its ability to work across the multiple environments of the cities, farms, and mountainous terrain illustrates a very adaptable network. The line itself gained flexibility through the sum of the innovations by its individuals. It all began, of course, with Ian Garrow who was able to begin the network without any administrative support. He was able to compensate when individual contacts were no longer able to support the network and operate in occupied France with only a very limited knowledge of French.

The hallmark of the RM personnel's flexibility was their continued ability to move hundreds of allied airmen following the decimation of the northern sector of their RM. The network was able to shift resources to other sectors while attempting to rebuild the network in the north. Another fact worth noting was that they were able to do this for over one year with only sporadic wireless communications, relying primarily on

non-technical communications by courier. With the line somewhat handicapped, O’Leary came up with the idea of mass evacuations off the French Mediterranean coast. The HMS Tarana was one of the ships employed for this task; it disguised itself as a fishing trawler sailing under false Moroccan or Spanish colors to pass German patrols (Brooks, 1996, p. 558). O’Leary was able to move approximately one hundred evaders on three operations dedicated to his line.<sup>50</sup>

#### D. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISOLATED PERSONNEL

This chapter focused on the RS Recovery Mechanism because an analysis of the lifespan of the line is more illustrative of the model’s applicability than a single IP event. The requirement to achieve and sustain RS Isolated Personnel applies in a similar manner as in overt recoveries. The IP principles for NAR situations do not differ from those participating in overt recoveries. Adaptability will remain the single most critical factor for RS Isolated Personnel. In WWII, due to their familiarity with European customs, the British adapted easier than Americans did. However, similar physical characteristics, combined with clever concepts of appearing deaf or deranged to avoid the language barrier, allowed many American IP to overcome their unfamiliarity (Murphy, 1987, pp. 44, 71).

The primary difference between overt and clandestine recoveries concerns communication. In many cases, the survivor initiates overt recoveries by radio contact with the RF or other friendly element. In WWII, most PR communications occurred through face-to-face interactions between RM and IP. While radio technologies may allow today’s NAR forces to have radios, the survival radios of U.S. armed forces are typically unencrypted and easy to triangulate. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect today’s NAR recoveries to utilize similar non-technical means of communication between RM and IP similar to those implemented in WWII.

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<sup>50</sup> The details on the exact number of missions and personnel evacuated are contradictory, but all sources support the statement above. Ottis’ research gathered data that supported anywhere from three to five evacuations; she went with five in her publication. Brooks’ account was chosen due to the amount of detail in his book including many of the Captains’ logs. He only attributes three evacuations as tasked to the O’Leary line, but there are two others to the same area that are listed in support of the Secret Intelligence Service. O’Leary most likely used his contacts to move a portion of his own people on his counterpart’s missions. The summary of the O’Leary line’s evacuations is conveniently listed in Brooks’ Appendix E (pp. 669-689).

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## VIII. CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDIES

### A. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

The examples selected for these case studies are from the Korean War and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The authors selected these cases for the following reasons: to show the timelessness of the proposed principles and the availability of open-source data for personnel recovery (PR) operations in these conflicts. The Korean War offers extensive data from recently declassified reports and documents. While the more relevant nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) cases that occurred in OIF are still highly classified, the case selected represents NAR-like characteristics to compare with the model. In the OIF case, RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> was not applicable since the IP was actually in enemy control. While this does not fit the definition of NAR, the applicability of this recent NAR-like scenario is similar enough to warrant analysis using the NAR model. While there are inherent limitations of using such a case, the relevance of such a recent occurrence warrants its analysis.

The analysis considers the Korean War in its entirety and the analysis shows that the recovery mechanism (RM) created in this period generally never achieved RS <sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>. OIF, on the other hand, is limited to a single IP event during the conflict. As discussed, this limitation is due to the lack of open-source data on these current personnel recovery events. The “RM” established for this single recovery analysis maintained RS <sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> throughout the mission.

The analysis will begin by providing a background description of how the military dismantled the personnel recovery agencies following the end of hostilities in World War II and then, subsequently reorganized them when needed in Korea. This discussion will set the stage for the shortfalls in vision that led to the problems with NAR in Korea. Then a discussion will follow of how efforts to clandestinely move personnel continued in the early years of the Cold War. These discussions will lead to an introduction to the Korean War. The study will then assess the RS <sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub> formulated to assist isolated personnel (IP) in that theater; following this is an analysis of the six NAR

principles that comprise RS Recovery Mechanism. Contrasting with these results will be an evaluation of RS Recovery Mechanism during a NAR-like case from OIF, again followed by an evaluation of the associated principles.

## B. BACKGROUND: POST WORLD WAR II

Almost immediately after the end of WWII, America disbanded MIS-X, its agency for personnel recovery. In addition, they destroyed all records and documents, with only a few obscure references from other organizations surviving (Shoemaker, 1990, pp. 200-205). This decision would come back to haunt the Americans only a few years later when attempts to conduct PR operations were made during the Korean War.

A short-lived relative to NAR operations did emerge immediately after World War II in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. During this period, many Soviet soldiers and diplomats were approaching American and British personnel with the desire to defect; “but diplomats in London and Washington regarded defectors as an unwelcome embarrassment and wished to return them to their home country, regardless of their fate” (Aldrich, 2002, p.96). Some U.S. personnel in the counter-intelligence corps (CIC), however, saw these defectors as valuable sources of information.

Once the CIC had garnered all possible information from the Soviet defectors, they had to decide what to do with them. In order to maintain their supply of good intelligence, the CIC could not allow the Soviets to capture the defectors and make examples of them. They also could not find safe haven for the defectors within Europe due to the intensive activities of the Soviet security service as well as the negative reactions of European leaders towards assisting defectors. Therefore, MAJ James Milano created a “Rat Line” for these defectors that ferried them to locations in South America. Milano was the commander of the 7769<sup>th</sup> Military Intelligence Service (MIS) in Austria and in charge of the CIC (Milano & Brogan, 1995, pp. 43-49). Milano successfully performed these activities without the knowledge or approval of the political leadership back in the U.S for almost five years. In July 1950, Milano’s tour in Austria ended and he closed the Rat Line. Milano’s successor reopened the line six months later for a final client, Klaus Barbie. It was not until 1983 that the existence of the line was exposed. It was not until 1983 that the investigations exposed the existence of the line. This occurred

when the Bolivian government discovered and deported Barbie, who was a Nazi war criminal; his escape to Bolivia was soon associated with the Rat Line. The subsequent Ryan Report found:

The use of the Rat Line for informants and defectors raises troubling questions of ethical and legal conduct . . . By concealing information from United States agencies, and by possibly violating lawful regulations on travel, currency, and documentation, the Army did not act responsibly . . . There is an important distinction between lawfully establishing a covert escape route and covertly taking advantage of a secretive and unauthorized scheme (as cited in Milano & Brogan, 1985, p. 208).<sup>51</sup>

Due to the U.S. military's wanton destruction of documents on clandestine personnel recovery operations and the reorganization of intelligence agencies following World War II, there is little wonder America was ill prepared to enter the Korean War with an effective personnel recovery program.

### C. THE KOREAN WAR

#### 1. Background

The overwhelming military capability of North Korea, combined with their inability to undermine the South Korean government through guerrilla action, led to the North's assault across the thirty-eighth parallel on June 25, 1950. The North Koreans drove the South Korean forces to the southern edge of the peninsula where the South stalled the effort at an area known as the Pusan perimeter. This South Koreans held this defensive perimeter, despite the North Korean attempts to finish them, until General MacArthur arrived in September to stage an assault on Inchon Harbor and cut off the North's extended supply lines leading to Pusan. This allowed the troops defending Pusan to counterattack toward the North and drive the Communist aggressors back to the demarcation line (Haas, 2000, pp. 4-5).

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<sup>51</sup> The authors considered the case of CIC's Rat Line for in-depth analysis in this thesis, but later discarded the case. Since Milano's first hand account in his book is practically the only surviving data on the line, and it was written thirty-five years after the event, the data could not be considered reliable for detailed analysis. The discussion was included to illustrate, what we feel, is the foundation of the reason the U.S. military's inability to form effective NAR mechanisms following World War II. The Central Intelligence Agency knew of the Rat Line's existence since 1951, when it took over operations from the CIC in Austria. This possibly attributed to an attitude that the military could not responsibly form and supervise such operations. The public outcry in 1983 over the operation only reinforced that preconception.

MacArthur, overwhelmed with confidence, ordered his forces to continue across the 38th parallel in pursuit of the retreating North Korean Army.<sup>52</sup> This move led to the intervention of the Chinese military, which drove MacArthur's forces back to the demarcation line. The remainder of the war represented a fluid stalemate between Communist and UN forces near the demarcation line. The war continued until July 27, 1953, when both parties signed an armistice.

Some critics attribute MacArthur's decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel to an over-confident and arrogant personality. Some argue that his attitude had a strong effect on other military leaders. Lebow (1981) states:

MacArthur's need to be surrounded by sycophants extracted a heavy price. His well-publicized belief that China would not intervene in Korea had already seriously hampered intelligence activities on that peninsula. Now, it prevented his field commanders from exercising proper caution (p. 160).

This influence may contribute to an understanding of why an ill-conceived and ineffective personnel recovery program emerged during the Korean War.

The first NAR operations began in September 1950 when the Commander of Fifth Air Force, General Partridge, requested them.<sup>53</sup> The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) then recruited and trained two hundred Korean troops to support NAR operations behind enemy lines. Forty-five days later, the CIA considered these personnel, broken into four-man teams, ready to infiltrate for operations. The agency cancelled the infiltration just before execution and then terminated the entire NAR program.

Both of these actions were taken in the headquarters euphoria that followed the UN successes in North Korea, successes that seemed certain to fulfill MacArthur's 24 November pledge to 'have the troops home by Christmas' (Haas, 2000, p. 197).

Chinese intervention, however, created the requirements for this program once again. Remnants of the old teams were speedily reconstituted and filled out with new recruits.

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<sup>52</sup> Although this paper focuses on the leadership and personnel of the U.S. military, the forces involved were actually a combined United Nations (UN) force. The forces that pressed across the thirty-eighth parallel, commanded by MacArthur, consisted of American, British, and Australian soldiers.

<sup>53</sup> The term NAR did not yet exist during this period. This program was actually described as "covert escape and evasion (E&E) program," but this concept meets the existing definition for NAR.

By December 5, 1950, the CIA reported that a number of these teams were operational near Pyongyang, the North Korean capital city.

By March 1951, the CIA discontinued the infiltration of these four man teams dedicated to NAR operations. These teams were ill equipped, lacked intelligence, and had no reception parties for their infiltration. While Hass (2000) states that the CIA attributed a number of rescues to these teams, there is no corroborating information to that fact and all but one of the teams were either lost or pulled out when compromised (p. 198). The role of NAR then went to “general resistance warfare groups” as a collateral mission. Within ten months, these groups successfully performed fifteen confirmed rescues. However, some have attributed the successful PR missions carried out by these groups to luck rather than effective operations. One reason for this is that CCRAK [Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea] teams operating in these USAF-designated safe havens were not issued a radio receiver that could pick up distress calls from standard issue USAF survival radios!” (Haas, 1997, p. 64).

These groups of partisans fared somewhat better than the initial four-man teams airdropped into North Korea. This was largely because they were operating from isolated islands off the coast of North Korea and continually protected by friendly naval and air forces. While they did project many missions toward the North Korean mainland, the partisans performed the in relatively close proximity to the coast. Even these missions became more difficult as the front began to stabilize near the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel in October 1952 and the North Koreans were able to concentrate their efforts on rear area security and coastal defense (Malcom, 1996, pp. 37, 138). While operating offshore ensured their security and ability to operate, it did not lead to a highly successful NAR program. Luck, was a primary reason for success in a majority of the actual rescues. Another major factor causing the land based partisan operations to fail was that, “to stand any chance of pickup or even evasion, they [the pilots] had to get at least as far as the offshore islands where U.S. partisan forces . . . operated” (Haas, 1997, p. 63). This negates the purpose of a NAR program, which is to create these capabilities where the threat level makes overt forms of PR infeasible.

The command relationship for NAR operations was confusing and replete with interagency parochialism. Beginning in July of 1951, the CIA formed a number of partisan forces under the guise of the Joint Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK). These groups were primarily responsible for all CIA-directed unconventional warfare (UW) operations in theater. The Far East Command (FEC) founded the CCRAK in November 1951 and gave them the sole authority to conduct unconventional operations in the area. In theory, JACK now fell under the control of the CCRAK; but in practice JACK was expected, but never required, to coordinate any CIA operations with its CCRAK. In fact, CCRAK and JACK took offices at opposite ends of Seoul and a long period of bitterness ensued. This relationship is one that severely constrained the ability to properly employ and coordinate UW activities in the theater.

In January 1952, the CIA attempted to resume airdrops of personnel to establish cache sites for NAR operations. These groups of personnel, called “special action teams,” conducted intelligence collection and sabotage raids against North Korea. These units again met with disaster; many became double agents for the North, while the remainder were killed, captured, or simply disappeared. The CIA supplied many of these teams with communications equipment that received, but could not transmit signals. Resupply operations for these teams were conducted by prearranged time and location; therefore, it was impossible to know whether the supplies were lost, captured, or in the hands of the teams (Haas, 2000, pp. 88-90). Some attribute the quick compromise of the dropped agents to ignorance of the North Korean social system. Planners assumed that a Korean should easily be able to blend in anywhere within the peninsula. This was grossly incorrect because the North Koreans had instituted an aggressive campaign against infiltrators right down to the village level. Strangers or newcomers were immediately considered suspects and local authorities notified. People in the neighborhood only accepted outsiders without question if they personally knew them (Malcom, 1996, pp. 131-137).

Discouraged by the lack of results, Far East Air Force (FEAF) moved to take over NAR operations in May 1952. The CIA, already irritated at its subordination to CCRAK for unconventional operations, attempted to head off the move. They argued that if the FEAF had the resources to head such an operation, they should make those resources

available to the JACK, which the CIA claimed had authority for NAR operations as delegated by CCRAK. FEAF conceded and JACK maintained control of NAR operations throughout the remainder of the war. The CIA was concerned, however, that JACK was not meeting the requirements for NAR operations because they were conducting predominantly overt sea and coastal rescues from their islands of operation off the North Korean coast (Haas, 2000, pp. 194-200). While these rescues occurred in enemy territory, the partisans primarily conducted them by using indigenous fishing vessels and UN patrol boats. While still ensuring that isolated personnel did not fall into enemy hands, these groups did not meet the CIA's desire to establish an effective NAR network on the North Korean mainland.

After the armistice of 1953, the CIA conducted an intense evaluation of NAR operations. Their goal was to create a viable, secure network in those areas of North Korea where the enemy shot down a majority of aircraft. Their hope was that if hostilities resumed, they would have already established an effective network to conduct NAR operations. The CIA's North Asia Command, however, realized that the only way to conduct such operations would be through a "truly joint effort by all the military services and the CIA, a joint effort that was never developed" (Haas, 2000, p. 200). The CIA subsequently terminated the NAR program in September 1954.

A 1973 historical review stated that, "no airman or POW was known to have been assisted by CIA-sponsored clandestine mechanisms." The review also quoted the Korea Branch Chief at CIA headquarters who, in a 1954 report, stated that "E&E operations as conducted by the CIA in Korea were not only ineffective but probably morally reprehensible in that the number of lives lost and the amount of time and treasure expended was enormously disproportionate to attainments therefrom [sic]"<sup>54</sup> (as cited in Burns, 2000).

## **2. Analysis—Relative Superiority of the Recovery Mechanism**

RS Recovery Mechanism is achieved when NAR forces enter the area of operations controlled by the enemy with the freedom of movement to conduct operations to include:

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<sup>54</sup> Evanhoe's description of these results contradicts those cited by Haas and Burns from the CIA historical review. Evanhoe (1995) attributes three assisted recoveries of prisoners of war and "a number" of airmen to the NAR networks (p. 91). He does not provide a source for his data; therefore, the authors accept as factual for the purposes of this thesis, all data cited from the CIA's internal review.

recruitment, network coordination, as well as contact, authentication, support, movement, and exfiltration of IP. This section will divide the assessment of RS Recovery Mechanism into the airdrop NAR operations of the CIA and the land-based partisan NAR operations.

As indicated by the comments of the CIA's historical report, none of the NAR assets dropped by the CIA contributed to the rescue of IP during the period of the Korean War. It is also evident that these teams did not achieve RS Recovery Mechanism at any point in their attempts to create a viable NAR network. Based on the limited data available on the individual actions of the teams inserted into North Korea due to communications gaps, the conjecture is that they did not actually attain sufficient RS Recovery Mechanism. Figure 20 illustrates this point. The graphic illustration remains below the RS line is because North Korean and Chinese forces were actively searching for agents from the South. Compounding this was fact that the CIA dropped the agents into areas where they the locals quickly identified them as strangers because there was no reception apparatus in place. The steep decline to a zero percent probability of mission success is because the North Koreans captured, killed, or compromised each team of agents who were attempting to form NAR networks. The data collected also appears to support the supposition that these agents were unable to operate for any length of time within North Korea to establish networks. The depiction does not indicate any quantitative time as there were numerous such drops and no data on how long any individual team was able to operate. The intent, rather, is to illustrate the relative inability for these agents to successfully operate for any appreciable length of time when they did not enter enemy territory with RS Recovery Mechanism.

The land-based partisan groups entered the graph at the PV with RS established (see Figure 21). This is because they were able to establish themselves on remote islands off the North Korean coast that had local sympathizers and support of friendly naval and air power. While their actual presence was not necessarily clandestine, their intentions and operations enjoyed increased security. They maintained a fairly steady state of RS Recovery Mechanism until October 1952 when North Korean forces were able to concentrate more efforts against partisan actions; although the ability of the partisans to operate freely from their islands to the mainland never dropped below ninety-percent (Haas, 2000, p. 30).




Figure 20. Authors' RS Recovery Mechanism Graph for Airdrop NAR Operations




Figure 21. Authors' RS Recovery Mechanism Graph for Partisan NAR Operations

While this is a good example of an RM exploiting the principle to maintain RS Recovery Mechanism, it also validates this thesis' claim that RS Recovery Mechanism is necessary, but

not always sufficient, for successful NAR operations. The inability of these units to create viable networks in those areas where events were high emphasizes this point. The timeline represented is quantitative for the entire length of partisan operations and does not reflect any individual team's mission.

### **3. Analysis of the NAR Principles for the Korean War**

#### **a. Vision**

Unfortunately for the U.S., the shortsightedness of strategic policy-makers and military leaders led to a nonexistent PR capability at the onset of the Korean War. The disbanding and destruction of all facets of NAR infrastructure exemplifies the lack of vision by the strategic leadership of this period. This was due, at least in part, to an over-reliance on the U.S.'s newly acquired nuclear arsenal and strategy of massive retaliation. This inability to understand the concept of limited war, coupled with the political administration's ignorance of the region's impending crisis, meant that it did not consider establishing any type of NAR architecture in the period leading up to the Korean War.

This lack of vision was probably the most crucial factor for the lack of RS Recovery Mechanism for the airborne infiltration teams. Since nobody considered the need for such a network, there were no operational preparations made within the North Korean area of operations. This led to the complete lack of any contacts, resources, and intelligence that would have facilitated network development within the area. While the land-based partisan groups were able to achieve RS Recovery Mechanism despite the lack of vision, they did not work far into the regions of North Korean control.

#### **b. Simplicity (C4I)**

Neither the Partisans nor the infiltrators effectively fulfilled the principle of simplicity of command and control during the war. Interagency rivalries, coupled with competition for resources created a confusing, inefficient, and inadequate command relationship for NAR operations. CCRAK, JACK, FEF, FEAF, and the CIA constantly struggled for control of the program, which inhibited creation of a robust NAR program. The formation of CCRAK complicated the structure of the command and control relationships because it added another coordinating and reporting agency for field commanders, thereby reducing the simplicity of the chain of command.

Simplicity of communications was also violated, and grossly so for the air-dropped infiltrators. These personnel were typically unable to transmit their status or requirements to their support bases in the South. It is unknown whether these teams even received any incoming transmissions from higher, for the same reasons. With the land-based partisans, communication with their support elements was sufficient to allow them to establish and retain RS Recovery Mechanism, but the lack of proper equipment did reduce their effectiveness in conducting NAR operations when IP events occurred.

Intelligence in support of NAR operations was also quite poor during this period. Rivalries between Defense and Agency personnel in part explain this. One officer stated, “every service was intent on running its own intelligence network” and “the differences filtered down and the result was we all worked independently” (as cited in Aldrich, 2001, p.281). As the war progressed, policy-makers placed less emphasis on intelligence for ground forces and most resources went toward aerial intelligence for the bombing campaign. The lack of interagency cooperation resulted in poorly coordinated collection and dissemination of critical intelligence. While the concept of airdropping “locals” was arguably the fundamental reason for the lack of RS Recovery Mechanism with regard to that operation, poor intelligence did contribute to the inadequate performance of the land-based partisans.

Overall, NAR participants violated the principle of simplicity of C4I the war. The resulting failure of the airborne infiltrators was a clear indication of the impact this violation had on RS Recovery Mechanism. Adherence to NAR principles did not necessarily contribute to the successful maintenance of RS Recovery Mechanism by the land-based partisans. Rather, other external influences, such as defensive support and communications with support elements, contributed to the maintenance RS Recovery Mechanism, although the performance of effective NAR activities still suffered.

### *c. Trust*

The concept of trust, as defined by this thesis, is difficult to evaluate with regard to tactical operations in this case study. Detailed reports of the infiltration agents’ attempts to construct NAR networks are unavailable. The presence of the repressive North Korean regime, however, created an operational environment for NAR very low in trust. It is obvious from the case study that these conditions made it extremely unlikely

that the formation of a NAR network in such an environment, without solid intelligence and reception resources, would be successful. While it is possible that agents naively misplaced trust when recruiting agents for the network, it is equally likely that locals simply identified the agents as newcomers, and subsequently interrogated them. The partisan groups, though, had more success in working with local populations. This was primarily due to their better intelligence support and a greater density of sympathetic people along the coast (Schuetta, 1964, pp. 145-151).

Operational placement of trust, on the other hand, did suffer from some deficiencies. In the haste to quickly train and replace agents for infiltration, the NAR administration would reintegrate agents returning from the North into teams without intensive interrogation. This led to the use of false information and mission sabotage by many agents who the Communist North turned to their side. In one incident on 19 February 1952, a double agent onboard a C-46 transport conducting an infiltration mission, tossed a grenade into the cabin as he jumped from the aircraft. The aircraft and six personnel were lost due to the attack (Evanhoe, 1995, pp. 143-144).

#### ***d. Security***

There are no clear indications that NAR participants grossly violated this principle during their operations. While there are reports of individual compromises, none of these was significant enough to compromise the entire partisan NAR infrastructure. One example of how RMs properly applied security occurred when the North Koreans ambushed a rescue attempt that a partisan group had coordinated. The rescue force had followed all authentication procedures and the information was accurate, but the partisan group had recently defected to the Communists. Suspecting this might be the case; CCRAK immediately put this group on the “suspect” list and then sent a follow-on mission to determine that team’s status (Evanhoe, 1995, p. 141). This careful application of security prevented further ambushes and misinformation that could have jeopardized the rest of the effort.

Strategically, proper use of coded messages, compartmentalized access to source information, and strong counterintelligence measures helped ensure security. Shortfalls in the RS Recovery Mechanism and effectiveness of NAR operations, therefore, did result not from a lack of security, but from the violation of the other NAR principles.

*e. Access*

The infiltration teams had virtually no access to the information or resources required for their missions. The CIA sent most teams into regions that they were not familiar with and received wholly inadequate briefings before deployment. Once on the ground behind enemy lines, these agents lacked reception committees, equipment, and contacts in order to survive, much less establish an effective NAR infrastructure. This lack of access is clearly a factor in these teams' inability to achieve or maintain RS Recovery Mechanism.

The partisan groups, on the other hand had excellent access to both information and resources. As indicated, these units had the benefit of naval and air assets, communications gear, and timely intelligence. This allowed them to achieve and maintain RS Recovery Mechanism throughout the war. The lack of proper tactical communications equipment and limited access to only coastal recruits, however, did limit their effectiveness in the successful recovery of many IP and the development of a large-scale NAR network.

*f. Flexibility*

The tactical flexibility of the infiltration teams is also difficult to assess due to the lack of data regarding their operations in North Korean. The results of this case study, though, seem to point to the fact that the recruiting and training did not create NAR agents that were capable of adapting to the hostile environment they were entering. Many of these recruited agents were not volunteers, and represented those personnel considered expendable by regular Korean Army units. The partisan units, though, seemed to exhibit adequate flexibility in conducting their operations. The partisans exhibited this by continuing to conduct successful mainland operations when the tactical environment had changed in a disadvantageous manner.

The strategic planners and decision-makers for NAR operations seemed to have significant problems with adapting to the hurdles that appeared in creating a viable network. While the North Koreans were killing, capturing, or turning numerous infiltrators, and the partisans were unable to establish an extensive network, the

administrators seemed to freeze. Most plans simply proceeded along the same avenue of approach and when revised courses of action were established, they generally represented a cosmetic change to plans already used.

## **D. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM**

### **1. Background**

In August 1990, Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait after just over twelve hours of military operations. The U.S. responded as part of a multinational military force with the intent of liberating Kuwait. A coalition offensive drove the Iraqi military out of Kuwait by March of 1991. During the conflict twenty-four aircrew members that the North Koreans shot down survived. Of those personnel, friendly forces recovered only five. The Iraqis captured the rest. Of the five recovered, traditional combat search and rescue (CSAR) methods recovered two,<sup>55</sup> ground forces recovered another two when they overran the IP positions, and naval forces recovered one from the Gulf. Of the nineteen captured, fourteen were captured immediately after the shoot-down, and five evaded for periods ranging from three to forty-eight hours (Veda, 1997, pp. 28-29). Vice Admiral Mayer, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command states that a total of sixty-three personnel became isolated during the conflict with twenty-five becoming prisoners of war. He also states that the military attempted seven rescues, with only three being successful (Kennedy, 2001).

This conflict, known as DESERT STORM, was the first major regional conflict for the U.S. since Vietnam and the largest military operation since World War II (Adams, 2001, pp. 231-232). While the Korean War and Vietnam created a renewed emphasis on PR operations, conventional approaches toward PR still prevailed among the top leaders who gained their experience during the Cold War. Consequently, establishing an effective NAR program was not a priority consideration for military leaders during Operation DESERT STORM. GEN Norman Schwarzkopf did not trust the capabilities of Special Operations (SO) forces and issued strict order that no such forces would cross into Iraq. In his opinion, “they would only get into trouble and he might have to ‘divert forces from the real war to and [sic] bail them out’ (p. 233). Another reason for the lack

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<sup>55</sup> The term traditional was used over conventional because special operations forces flew the missions. Several reasons are cited for this including Air Force Special Operations aircraft capabilities to penetrate enemy radar threats and inadequate conventional CSAR assets and resources (Ansor, 2000).

of successful NAR cases is that the CIA suffered massive cuts to its program for clandestine operations. Douglas Waller (2003) writes:

By 1990 the SOG had practically been disbanded, the victim of domestic and international outrage over the agency's lethal meddling in other countries. Congressional and CIA budget cutters slashed money for the clandestine force, believing that billiondollar [sic] spy satellites collected intelligence more efficiently and without embarrassing the U.S. (p. 21).

It appears then, that the Agency believed that sophisticated electronic gathering equipment offered lower risk; and although numerous sources point to CIA involvement with the Kurdish opposition, there is no supporting evidence that the agency exploited these relationships for PR.

Following Desert Storm, the U.S. recognized that, although the numbers of IP were drastically lower than previous conflicts, the proportionate number of successful PR operations was still unacceptable. During the period following DESERT STORM and operations in Mogadishu, the U.S. began a concerted effort to revitalize its PR program. One of the first steps was to formulate a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the CIA and the Department of Defense (DOD) for PR. This MOA was not limited to intelligence sharing, but encompassed the full spectrum of PR operations.<sup>56</sup> This MOA is reviewed triennially to ensure that continued development of interagency cooperation (DPMO, 1999). The next step was the implementation of the Missing Persons Act in 1996. This act consolidated the many functions and oversight of personnel accounting functions and PR under one office. The Defense Reform Initiative #29 then created the first truly joint agent for all PR concerns. The initiative named the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency as the executive agent under the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Most recently, in 2001, The Defense Intelligence Agency created an analytic cell dedicated to PR support. They established the cell in response to poor interagency coordination and dissemination of intelligence to Commanders and operators in the field (Book, 2002).

The capture and recovery of Army Private Jessica Lynch provided one test of the revitalized PR mechanism. Her group became isolated from its convoy on the rapid march to Baghdad on 23 March 2003. After coming under heavy attack in the city of An-

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<sup>56</sup> The details of this agreement are classified SECRET, but may be obtained on SIPRNET at <http://peacock.policy.osd.pentagon.smil.mil:8080/dpmo/pr/moa/ciadod.htm>.

Nasiriyah, the Iraqis captured seven members of the company, including the seriously wounded Lynch. Lynch remained at the hospital due to her injuries, while the Iraqis moved the other six prisoners to a secure location (Attack on the 507<sup>th</sup> Maintenance Company, 2003).

Mohammed Odeh Al-Rehaief was an Iraqi lawyer from the city of An-Nasiriyah who opportunely discovered Lynch at Saddam Hospital, where his wife worked as a nurse. Although not recruited to be part of a NAR network<sup>57</sup> his actions as a surrogate who assisted in her recovery presents a case that can apply to this thesis' model.

On 27 March, Rehaief was becoming concerned for his wife's safety and accompanied her to the hospital to coordinate a leave of absence. While there, he became curious about a patient on the second floor who the staff rumored to be a very important governmental official. His inquiries with his contacts in the hospital revealed that it was an American female soldier. Rehaief waited for an opportunity to enter the room after the two guards for Lynch's room conducted their shift change. One guard left the area and the other subsequently fell asleep. Rehaief entered the room and carefully peered through the window of the room where the Iraqis were holding Lynch. He saw her lying on a hospital bed while two Iraqi men interrogated her. Watching the interrogator beat Lynch, Rehaief decided that he must somehow get her out of there before she died from improper care or even the interrogations (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 33-38).

That same day, he set out on foot to reach the Marines who had encircled his city and report Lynch's location to them. This was a dangerous move. Pockets of *Fedayeen* resistance groups were scattered throughout the city and killing suspected traitors on sight. The leader of an Iraqi platoon interrogated Rehaief as he passed their position. Rehaief's cover story was that he had to get to his house in the town of Zenawiya to get medicine and money for his daughter. Major Ayoub was the man in charge of this platoon, and he threatened to shoot Rehaief if he did not turn back. Rehaief then turned

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<sup>57</sup> On 15 April, CNN reported that Rehaief was a trusted asset recruited, paid, trained and employed by the CIA. However, there is no confirmatory documentation available to support this claim. The thesis therefore will simulate a NAR infrastructure with Rehaief and his contacts as the network; the organizers and administrators are comprised of the U.S. military members who tasked Rehaief following his initial contact (CNN American Morning (2003); Starr (2003)).

back until out of sight of that platoon and circled around them, continuing to move eastwards toward the American lines. Here he ran into a full company of Iraqi soldiers, the last obstacle between him and the Americans. The Major in charge of this group was Major Talib, and he told Rehaief to turn around as well. Rehaief told Talib that he was Ayoub's nephew and needed his help. That story, combined with Rehaief's ring and watch bought him passage through the lines (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 139-144).

When Rehaief reached the Marines, they treated him rather harshly. The Marines had been subject to many suicide attacks by Iraqis coming from An-Nasiriyah. Therefore, American counter-intelligence agents, using Kuwaiti translators, aggressively interrogated Rehaief upon his arrival. One of the Americans, Staff Sergeant Corey, actually spoke Arabic, but used the translator in a ruse to verify the validity of Rehaief's statements. After several hours of various interrogation techniques, Corey was satisfied that Rehaief was a trusted source; but they needed more information before they could initiate Lynch's recovery. Rehaief had to go back to An-Nasiriyah and gather more detailed information on the hospital, Lynch's condition, and Iraqi security. Corey instructed Rehaief not to write anything down, and he was to get his family out of the area to one of several Marine camps as enemy disposition allowed. They also arranged signals in the form of clothing Rehaief would wear and a password to produce when encountering Marine troops to ensure his safety. At 0730 on 28 March, Rehaief began the dangerous journey back into An-Nasiriyah (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 145-155).

After getting back into the city, Rehaief discovered that the Fedayeen were aware of his activities and were searching for him. They had already looted his house, but his family was safely at a relative's house due to the efforts of a local Mullah, who the *Fedayeen* subsequently executed for his actions. He linked up with his family at his father's house and began to devise the plan to gather the required information. He recruited his brother, Hassan, and his wife for the trip to the hospital. His brother, a police Captain, was able to use his credentials to pass through the numerous Iraqi checkpoints established throughout the city. His wife would attempt to access the room where the Iraqis were holding Lynch and collect the details on her identity and condition. Rehaief would map out the hospital floor plans and enemy troop dispositions. He planned this operation to occur that evening, when he assumed security would be less

stringent. Unfortunately, the Iraqis increased security at night and there was no way to access the floor where Lynch's room was. Rehaief collected as much data as he could, using features of his hand to track the numbers of military personnel and vehicles as well as finding a helicopter landing area. Fighting in the city was becoming more intense and Rehaief was concerned for his family's safety, so he took them out of the city to a Marine camp that evening. The authentication system Corey prepared Rehaief with worked and he left his family safely in American hands before venturing into the city one last time (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 159-173).

Corey had arranged for bombing to cease over Victory Bridge, the main route to the closest Marine camp, between 1300 and 1330 on 29 March, the next afternoon. That was Rehaief's window to cross to the Marine positions once his mission was complete; Corey directed that, under no circumstances, should Rehaief attempt another contact after dark. Corey considered it blind luck that Rehaief made it to the Marine camp with his family alive that night, and could not risk losing his source to such folly. Rehaief returned to the hospital. He was able to walk each floor of the hospital and gain access to the roof to make sure it was not booby-trapped. He also determined, in his best estimate, that the roof could support a helicopter. His sister-in-law was a doctor there and she used her contacts within the hospital to produce some paperwork that authorized an electrocardiogram for Rehaief (EKG); the only EKG machine in the hospital was in Lynch's room. Once inside, they were able to confirm Lynch's name and her condition. It was nearly 1400 when he was preparing to leave the hospital when one of the guards recognized Rehaief. A chase ensued, that took Rehaief over Victory Bridge in the middle of a bombing campaign. The bombing caused him to crash his vehicle, moderately injuring Rehaief, but also killing his pursuers. On the far side of the bridge, the Jerusalem Brigade detained Rehaief as a suspected deserter. He once again managed to escape after overpowering the guards (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 172-193).

By the time Rehaief made it to the American lines, it was already dark. Rehaief knew that time was of the essence, and elected to chance contact. He happened to be wearing white shorts under his trousers that he borrowed from his father. He then stripped down to them, showing he had no bombs, and stepped out toward the Americans when the firing had died down and successfully made contact. Once behind American

lines again, U.S. forces thoroughly debriefed Rehaief, who provided critical information to the rescue forces, including the fact that a Japanese company built the hospital. The Marines were later able to download the building's blueprints from the Internet. In the late hours of 1 April, Special Forces soldiers conducted a raid of Saddam Hospital and based on the information provided by Rehaief successfully recovered Lynch (Al-Rehaief, 2003, pp. 194-203).

## 2. Analysis—Relative Superiority of the Recovery Mechanism

The analysis of Lynch's rescue begins with Rehaief's decision to assist in Lynch's recovery. Unlike the previous cases, where the PV occurred with the insertion of RM personnel, this case represents a shift in the mindset of an indigenous person already established in the enemy's territory. The timeline in the RS Recovery Mechanism graph in Figure 22 represents the time from Rehaief's decision until the successful rescue of Lynch. Rehaief enters the graph with a high level of RS Recovery Mechanism due to several factors.




Figure 22. Authors' RS Recovery Mechanism Graph for the Lynch Rescue.

First, he unilaterally made the decision to assist in the Lynch recovery, discussing the matter with no one else, which gave him good security at the outset. Second, he had terrific access to the hospital and its personnel. Third, his background as a lawyer and his knowledge of local customs allowed him a significant measure of flexibility in dealing with enemy security. Finally, the enemy will could not counter the sympathetic determination of a locally respected individual with the vision to make a difference.

Rehaief could not maintain or improve upon his RS Recovery Mechanism because of the speed in which he had to conduct his operations. Knowing that time was critical, he traveled immediately to contact friendly forces. His exposure to the numerous Iraqi and American threats during this journey showed a rapid decline in his level of RS Recovery Mechanism. This decline illustrates the loss of security through exposure and loss of access since he moved out on his own. While Rehaief never lost RS Recovery Mechanism, his advantage was slipping. Once he linked with the Americans, providing critical intelligence, he developed some semblance of a NAR network. He now had additional resources and support available, but only temporarily.

When Rehaief had to return to the city, RS Recovery Mechanism again declined rapidly, almost past the RS line. Without access to the resources of the Marines, or any other contact, and complete compromise of security, the *Fedayeen* nearly captured him. His ability to adapt in order to move to an area of trust allowed him to hold on to any remaining RS Recovery Mechanism. After reaching his trusted family in their safe house, and having access to their resources, RS Recovery Mechanism again began to rise. This allowed Rehaief to return to the hospital and gather the necessary information to complete the mission. His compromise at the hospital, however, was probably the most critical loss of RS Recovery Mechanism to come. His resourcefulness, however, allowed him to regain contact with the Marines, passing the information that allowed them to reach the highest point of RS Recovery Mechanism achieved in the operation.

As time went on until the rescue, information rapidly became dated. There was no more communications with trusted sources within the hospital, and no chance of successfully infiltrating Rehaief again. The graph, therefore, represents a steady decline in RS Recovery Mechanism as the RM became increasingly more ignorant of the condition of

Lynch and the situation at Saddam hospital. The decline, however, was not significant enough to fall below the RS line, which is a strong determinant of mission success. Although time had passed, the planning occurred with sufficient priority to successfully execute a successful recovery.

While this case does not represent a true NAR scenario and the recovery used relatively conventional means, it does provide a contemporary framework for the application of the principles proposed by this thesis. It also highlights another consideration concerning NAR as a recovery tool. While NAR is a mechanism designed for high-threat environments unsuitable for overt recovery methods, it may also be a powerful tool for the location and identification of personnel for other means of recovery. These *NAR-facilitated* scenarios may illustrate new doctrinal approaches to the clandestine methods of recovery.

### **3. Analysis of the NAR Principles for OIF**

#### **a. Vision**

The Lynch case does not itself support the principle of vision for RS Recovery Mechanism. However, the multiple efforts described to create a strong PR capability over the past decade indicate that there is some visionary leadership in this endeavor. The high security with regard to contemporary NAR operations makes a detailed discussion of how this vision has affected OIF impossible. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) planner, Ms. Julia Coco, stated that there were eleven successful recoveries of IP during OIF due to the established NAR infrastructure (personal communication, November 13, 2003). This conflict was also the first where there was one hundred percent accountability of U.S. personnel after hostilities ceased. NAR operations contributed significantly to this success (Baumgartner, 2003). These indicators point to the application of solid vision in the formulation of PR plans for OIF.

#### **b. Simplicity (C4I)**

Command and Control was very simple for this operation. According to Rehaief's first hand account, Corey was the only contact to whom he reported and from whom he took orders. Rehaief, then, represented the chief of operations within the city of An-Nasiriyah. Although all of his witting contacts were family, Rehaief controlled the

execution of all collection and movements during this operation. Corey knew that Rehaief was more knowledgeable about the situation within the city, and therefore, allowed him to work autonomously.

Rehaief did not use any technological communication methods during the operation, but he applied the principle as much as possible under the constraints of the operational environment. Security in the city was so strict that providing Rehaief with communication technology risked compromising the mission. Rehaief had already once been summarily tortured after local authorities discovered he had a television satellite dish. (Rehaief, 2003, pp. 123-129). Using visual identification and face-to-face communication, while dangerous, was probably the lowest risk method they could employ.

The “network” directly used computers to achieve success for the first time in these case studies. The simple use of the Internet to collect data on building specifications, as well as using computer programs to draw out the detailed maps that Rehaief and his wife had memorized, directly contributed to the success of the recovery mission. This use of computers to simplify intelligence analysis helped consolidate information for the recovery force to ensure Lynch’s successful recovery.

The “network” also employed intelligence effectively in this case. While the U.S. has displayed a tendency to move away from the use of human sources in favor of electronic collection, this did not happen with Lynch’s recovery. The Marines knew that Rehaief’s information was far superior to any signals or visual intelligence they could collect with their equipment. Their recognition of the value of his simple methods of counting enemy forces and drawing mental maps created the most reliable intelligence on which to act.

### *c. Trust*

Trust was the most difficult principle to apply in this environment but the “network” applied it very well to the recovery of Lynch. Trust was obviously required if this mission were to be successful. The Marines had to trust Rehaief, who in turn, had to trust his contacts. Without trust between each of these players, the mission could not have succeeded.

The players also applied this trust judiciously. The Marines ensured they properly vetted Rehaief's information before accepting the operation and sending him back into the city. Likewise, Rehaief had to limit his trust to the one group his culture taught him he could always count on, his family. While he had many friends in his neighborhood, he illustrated his concern with trust when he said, "there was too much money on my head to trust them [people from his neighborhood]" (Rehaief, 2003, p.175).

*d. Security*

While the Rehaief applied security as rigorously as possible, the criticality of time forced some actions that nearly doomed the mission. This was most evident in the two instances Rehaief nearly lost RS Recovery Mechanism. In each case, his daylight movement through Iraqi occupied positions compromised his intentions. The strength he exhibited with regard to the principles of flexibility, access, and trust explains why he did not completely lose RS Recovery Mechanism at these moments.

The Marines, while having to send Rehaief back to the city, did take security very seriously. If the Iraqis discovered Rehaief's collaborative efforts, they would have immediately executed him. The Marines, therefore, would not give Rehaief transportation back toward the city or provide him with any gear that could identify his contact with them. They also gave him procedures for future contact with friendly forces, to ensure he was not accidentally mistaken for a saboteur. The mission entailed high risk by its nature and, given the time available, security was a difficult principle to perfectly apply.

*e. Access*

Along with trust, the "network" applied access very well in this case. Rehaief's access to key personnel in the hospital and the city was a key factor for the success of this mission. Had his wife not worked there, he might never have discovered Lynch. His brother's credentials allowed him access through the checkpoints and his sister-in-law's status as a doctor prevented the amputation surgery and gave him final access to Lynch.

Establishing the connections with the Marines also was crucial to the successful execution of Lynch's recovery. Rehaief lacked the resources to get Lynch out of the hospital himself. Even if he had such abilities, he most likely would not have been

able to deliver Lynch to friendly control himself.<sup>58</sup> He needed access to the resources and trust of American forces, which he attained through face-to-face contact. The combination of access to indigenous contacts, American support, and ground-truth information was important to the maintenance of Rehaief's RS Recovery Mechanism.

*f. Flexibility*

The ability to adapt to constantly evolving threat situations was perhaps the most crucial principle that allowed Rehaief to maintain RS Recovery Mechanism during the course of events in this case. Rehaief's ability to continue planning operations at his father's house, after the *Fedayeen* discovered his intentions, illustrates this flexibility. His ability to continue intelligence gathering when the Iraqis tightened security at the hospital, and later regaining access, also highlight this ability. Perhaps the event most indicative of flexibility was when Rehaief missed his window to cross Victory Bridge. By overpowering his guards, and devising alternate means to contact the Marines after dark, he was able to maintain RS Recovery Mechanism just above the line.

Rehaief's anonymity with Iraqi military forces allowed him to adapt his cover stories with evolving situations. Illustrating this was the incident where he adjusted his story in order to get past the Iraqi military forces that confronted him. Later, when he was unable to find a means into Lynch's room, he contrived the story of a heart condition to ensure completion of the final portion of the mission. This ability to adapt, integrated with the other principles, allowed Rehaief to preserve RS Recovery Mechanism until mission completion.

**E. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISOLATED PERSONNEL**

This chapter again focused on the RS Recovery Mechanism because, in the case of Korea, an analysis of the lifespan of the line provides a more comprehensive analysis than a single IP event. In the Lynch case, RS Isolated Personnel was not applicable since she was actually in enemy control. The advantages of acquiring and maintaining RS Isolated Personnel is still important for NAR and the principles that lead to it do not differ from overt

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<sup>58</sup> Dr. Harith al-Houssona, who attended Lynch at the hospital, claims to have taken Lynch from the hospital for a transfer to Baghdad. En route, however, he told the ambulance driver to take her to the nearest U.S. Marine camp. When they approached the camp, the Marines, who suicide bombers had previously targeted with similar tactics, fired at the ambulance. Houssona then took Lynch back to Saddam Hospital in An-Nasiriyah (Withers, 2003). While Rehaief's account does not corroborate this account, it does highlight how his access to the Marines was important.

recoveries. Adaptability is timeless and remains a critical principle for RS Isolated Personnel. In Korea, the ability for American IP to blend in with the environment would have been highly dependent on camouflage and hiding techniques since the ability to overtly blend with the different cultural aspects of Asian people would have been nearly impossible. Similar limitations applied to those in the Middle Eastern environment of Iraq.

The contemporary case studies also highlight shortfalls in communication. During the Korean conflict, allied forces tried to use electronic means to support Partisan NAR, but were unsuccessful because of equipment incompatibility. Similarly, in OIF, resource constraints left a majority of the soldiers in Lynch's company without personal radio equipment. While these shortfalls may not apply for direct communications with RM, it is important to ensure prompt notification of an IP event to RM directors who can then activate the NAR network in a timely manner.

Due to the lack of information from either theater with regard to details on individual NAR recoveries, the authors cannot offer an analysis of the Gonzales principle or the principle of exploitation in these case studies. There is no reason to conclude, however, that these principles would be any less applicable for an IP attempting contact with NAR forces than for those contacting overt recovery forces.

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## IX. CONCLUSIONS

### A. SOF IN OVERT URBAN PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

The development of the model for overt PR operations began by accepting McRaven's model and theory of special operations. This model, in and of itself, was not precise enough for the purposes of PR, however. McRaven's cases typically dealt with an objective that SOF needed to destroy or capture. The PR model, however, brings in another variable not accounted for in McRaven's analysis, the evader. Unlike an inanimate target, or a hostage under enemy control, an evader can significantly affect operational conditions for both the recovery force and the enemy. The recovery force must now concern itself not only with enemy actions and intent, but also with the considerations and actions of the isolated personnel (IP).

This thesis hypothesizes that a recovery force is able to gain relative superiority (RS<sub>Recovery Forces</sub>) over their adversary by creating a simple plan, concealing critical details from the enemy, rehearsing in detail, and executing with speed, surprise, and purpose. Furthermore, IP can gain a similar level of RS (RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>) by immediately adapting to their environment, communicating their situation to the recovery force, exploiting the opportunities and resources of their environment, and employing the Gonzales principle. Relative superiority is different for the RF and the IP but combine to contribute to the shared goal of successfully recovering the IP.

With regard to the overt recovery force, the three case studies provide added validity for McRaven's principles of special operations. The cases chosen also illustrate how those participating in personnel recovery must accept it as another facet of warfare, and not just an altruistic pursuit. Some people debate the cost-effectiveness and rationality of risking many lives to save only one or a few others. Even more debate the logic of risking lives to recover those who are already dead. This cost-benefit argument is irrelevant given the fact that the U.S. military will continue to aggressively pursue full-spectrum PR despite the "bottom line accounting" figures. If the U.S. sacrifices more lives during PR missions than it saves, questions may arise regarding the means and methods, but the effort will most likely continue. The events in Mogadishu in 1993

highlight a new domestic environment where even allowing deceased soldiers to fall into enemy hands can have wide-ranging political and strategic implications. Therefore, since the U.S. will continue to conduct such operations, regardless of the costs, they must conduct them as well as possible. PR does not simply fulfill some philanthropic desires in those who participate in combat; rather, it is a key component of a larger view of warfare that ensures the realization of national objectives. While PR advocates make every effort to ensure larger numbers of soldiers do not fall prey to the same fate as the IP they are sent to recover, it has become or is seen by military and civilian leaders as an acceptable risk.

One might argue that the culturally varied urban areas of the world may affect the conditions under which SOF exercises the principles of PR, but the principles will remain necessary for success, and may be applicable to urban areas not considered in this thesis. Analysis of the three case studies from Somalia showed how the application of McRaven's principles contributed to the RS Recovery Forces. The Tiger Company recovery forces were able to maintain RS Recovery Forces throughout the engagement because they applied the model's principles in addition to their ability to bring considerable firepower to bear. While there were varying levels of success, recognizing the limitations available with regard to some of the principles allowed the teams to compensate and still maintain a high level of RS Recovery Forces. Task Force Ranger was a good example of how it is nearly impossible for a force to regain RS Recovery Forces once it is lost. Unfortunately, when the PR event occurred, the organically tasked recovery force quickly lost RS Recovery Forces. Their ability to affect a recovery of the IP was impossible until outside forces were able to arrive and provide RS Recovery Forces over the enemy.

The introduction of the concept of RS Isolated Personnel shows the necessity to develop a comprehensive model that takes both the recovery force and IP into consideration when developing a PR plan. It also shows how difficult it is for an IP to attain and sustain RS Isolated Personnel in the urban environment. One lesson derived from these case studies is that RS Isolated Personnel requires all four principles, but that the IP's ability to adapt to the environment is the strongest influence. This trait of becoming invisible to the enemy seems to be a consistent trait in determining where an IP can achieve RS Isolated Personnel. Just as a recovery force will have difficulty regaining RS once it is lost, so will an IP.

As illustrated in the case studies, movement and exposure, at the wrong time and under poor conditions, can result in losing RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>. While there are historical instances of bold acts of overt movement that allow a person to blend, they are rare compared to the number of those that the enemy have captured or killed because of such acts. The decision, therefore, remains with the IP as to when movement will facilitate a rescue or lead to failure. The correctness of this decision lies in the IP's ability to communicate with the recovery force and exploit the opportunities provided by the environment. Finally, the IP's must found his or her decisions and actions in a composed warrior mindset that is developed, enhanced, and matured through intensive and realistic training, in accordance with the Gonzales principle.

The case studies also illustrate what is arguably the most important lesson for PR operations in urban terrain: gaining RS <sub>Recovery Force</sub> using overt methods for recovery is extremely difficult and costly. One reason for this is the United States' well-published and historically proven intent to retrieve IP despite the tremendous resources required to do so. In many cases, once an IP event has occurred, the enemy is aware of this fact and expects some type of recovery operation to follow. This greatly diminishes the recovery forces' ability to employ the principle of surprise. This is why it is so important for an IP to achieve and maintain RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> during the event. Since RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> is heavily dependant on adapting to the environment, the recovery force can then maintain some level of surprise on exactly where the recovery efforts will focus. The ability of the IP to maintain RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> will also allow recovery forces to achieve a similar amount of surprise as to the actual timing and means of recovery. The enemy will typically assume that the recovery force will attempt a rescue as soon as possible, but if the IP achieves RS <sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>, the modus operandi of the RF can be more flexible.

Another important lesson to garner from these case studies involves the use of helicopters in the urban environment. The events in Mogadishu, and most recently in Iraq highlight that the use of large, slow moving platforms at low altitudes provides easy targets for the enemy to engage and exploit. Typical recovery platforms such as the HH/MH-60 and MH-53 seem to provide easy targets for the enemy, and hence raise the potential for more IP events, in the urban environment. The large size and inability to land of these helicopters creates situations where extended hovering is necessary, and that

is where the helicopter is most vulnerable to low-tech weaponry. While retaining a vertical-lift platform, as a means of transport from this environment, may be beneficial in terms of redundancy for ground vehicles, or simply as an expedient, the use of other airframes may be in order. The MH-6 offered a more difficult target and could land in the narrow streets of Mogadishu due to its agility and size. Perhaps further research into its use, or the development of similar helicopters dedicated to PR in an urban environment is in order.

McRaven also proposes several additional means for special operations forces to reduce their area of vulnerability and maintain RS until mission completion. One of these methods is to move the point of mission completion closer to the point of vulnerability by limiting the objectives. Figure 23 shows a basic illustration of this concept. This is very difficult to translate to PR operations because it implies leaving personnel behind, which is contrary to the very essence of the U.S. military culture. Part of the Ranger creed is to not let a fallen comrade fall into the hands of the enemy. The discussion of this point does not intend to advocate selective recovery of U.S. personnel, but to provide an avenue of thinking for mission planners approaching PR operations. An example of this could occur when RF are directed to recover only living personnel until a follow-on mission can be assembled that can bring *absolute superiority* to the battlefield to recover the deceased (through massed firepower or other means). Another way to reduce the time and vulnerability is to introduce multiple small forces, distributed within the battlespace, each with limited objectives. The difficulty with these options is balancing the size of the operation with the inherent complexity and difficulties with security.

Comparing this concept with the events of TF Ranger on 3 October (illustrated in Figure 9), one could see that by restricting the objectives to living IP, the recovery forces could have reduced their area of vulnerability significantly by leaving crash site number one up to three and a half hours earlier. This does imply that the decision to remain was an incorrect one. Rather, the point is to merely illustrate another method of increasing the probability of mission success. The elements that define tactical mission success still reside with the commanders and soldiers who are on the ground conducting operations. It will be up to these people to determine what actions to take in order to reduce the area

of vulnerability under the environmental constraints they face, and whether the consequences of those actions are acceptable.




Figure 23. Example of Limiting Objectives & What Constitutes Mission Completion. (From McRaven, 1996, p. 386).

McRaven also states that moving the point of vulnerability can reduce the overall area of vulnerability during an operation. Figure 24 illustrates this concept. This method presents PR planners with less of a dilemma than attempting to alter the conditions for mission completion. With this method, planners can use innovative methods and careful analysis to determine weak points in the enemy's defense and exploit them. In the urban environment, this could be as simple as using routes through sympathetic neighborhoods to get as close to the objective as possible before engagement, using indigenous vehicles to forestall identification as recovery forces, or using diversionary attacks to allow lift platforms to enter further before detection occurs.




Figure 24. Example of Moving the Point of Vulnerability. (From McRaven, 1996, p. 385).

## B. NONCONVENTIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

This thesis postulates that a recovery mechanism (RM) can only hope to achieve and maintain RS Recovery Mechanism in the conduct of NAR operations by adhering to six basic, yet specific, principles. These principles include the dedication of visionary leaders and operators and the development of a simplified and effective command, control, communications, and computer infrastructure. These principles comprise the strategic and operational base, respectively, upon which the other principles rest and directly affect how much RS Recovery Mechanism will exist at the point of vulnerability. The other four principles are critical for maintaining RS Recovery Mechanism and achieving mission success at the tactical level. These principles include: security measures that protect the network without impeding its effectiveness, properly allocated trust to agencies and members of the recovery mechanism, access to resources and opportunities to effect a recovery, and flexibility of the members of the RM to adapt to a fluid environment. The boundaries (strategic/operational/tactical) between these principles is a permeable one, because security is also crucial prior to the point of vulnerability, and the importance of trust extends to interagency relationships that initially form the RM prior to combat

operations. They model merely depicts where the majority of each principle's impact generates the most significant effect.

The IP, just as in the overt recoveries, must also be able to maintain RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> throughout his isolation until he or she is absorbed into the network. At this point, the IP is under the control of the mechanism designed to bring him or her out and has negligible impact on his or her own recovery. The four principles that lend to the RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> are no different than for overt recoveries, and will have the same impact on his or her recovery. Planners must design NAR infrastructure and operations to ensure that a lapse in RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub>, particularly when close to the contact phase, will not have a negative affect on the RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>. The continued ability to perform clandestine activities that allow it to effectively recover IP's in their area relies heavily on RS<sub>Recovery Mechanism</sub>. RS<sub>Isolated Personnel</sub> involves remaining out of enemy control. Sustaining both levels of RS until contact between the RM and IP is achieved will increase the likelihood of successful recovery.

The authors did not design the four tactical principles of access, flexibility, trust, and security to be “cookie-cutter” planning templates for successful NAR operations. Rather, they provide basic guidelines for tactical consideration when planning the development and execution of recovery methods. Security and trust have balancing qualities; security provides for the continued existence of the network, while trust ensures its effectiveness. Extending too much trust can reduce the level of security; conversely, imposing too much security will limit critically required reciprocal trust. Similarly, flexibility allows the network to exist clandestinely within the enemy territory, while access to resources and information allows the network to fulfill its functions. Access and trust create some form of exposure of the network, and the countervailing principles of flexibility and security prevent this exposure from compromising the network to exploitation or destruction by the enemy. This balance keeps the pyramid in its proper form, and rests on the operational and strategic strengths of the model’s base, simplicity of C4I and vision.

In discussing the operational principle of simplicity of C4I, it is important to remember that NAR planners and executors should not pursue simplicity at the expense

of effectiveness. There is no overarching diagram illustrating a standard practice applicable in all theaters of operations at all times. Rather, each theater NAR manager must take into account the available resources, ability of his or her recovery mechanism directors, the ability of the personnel operating the recovery mechanism, and the overall threat level. While portable communications devices may be appropriate in one theater, perhaps only courier communications are appropriate in another. In another example, one mechanism may warrant having complete autonomy for resource allocation and recruitment, while another may require more oversight and control until it matures. Although centralized coordination and decentralized execution are arguably the most effective means of operations, it will be incumbent upon the leaders of each mechanism to determine if such an approach is appropriate for the time and place they find themselves. The goal is to create a C4I structure that is as simple as possible given the operational environment, and maximizes effectiveness while supporting the tactical principles that lead to successful execution.

While the U.S. has come a long way since the complete destruction of MIS-X and its resources, there is still room for improvement. It is probably infeasible to expend the resources required to establish dedicated NAR infrastructures throughout every global area of strategic concern. However, leaders in the PR community can create infrastructures in the areas of highest priority. In addition, utilizing these networks to provide support for other national and military interests during periods where PR events are not likely to occur can provide several benefits. One of these benefits is to continually assess the loyalty and reliability of the network's members, resulting in a more trusted source over time. Another benefit is the conservation of resources. Using these networks to provide information while not involved in NAR activities can free up other assets typically required for such tasks. Finally, the conditions for a person to become isolated are not restricted to periods of conflict. Americans worldwide are susceptible to isolation or capture by elements belligerent to their government's policies at any time. The existence of NAR networks in these areas can greatly facilitate the U.S.'s national interests by providing a capability to return these people to friendly control without costly conventional military intervention.

### C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Vision without resources is similar to having a place to go but no way to get there. Unfortunately, the U.S. military is highly dependent on technical resources for intelligence gathering and ground-truth analysis. Exorbitant expenditures go into highly technical weapons platforms and surveillance equipment, as compared to those that the U.S. spends on the human capital that are arguably better exploited against its adversaries implementing asymmetric means.<sup>59</sup> Until key leaders and policy-makers embrace the benefits provided by NAR networks, and provide the funding necessary to exploit them to their fullest capacity, the U.S. will not realize the vision of the PR “industry leaders.” This also applies to overt funding programs. The development of the OV-22 osprey as a special operations platform will not provide more, and possibly, less, PR capabilities in the urban environment than existing vertical lift platforms. The contending replacements for the HH/MH-60, AgustaWestland’s US101 and Sikorsky’s S-92, also do not appear to be viable platforms in such an environment. As continued conflicts arise in such areas, the U.S. should explore and balance suitable technical and human capital resources, to maximize effectiveness on the urban battlefield.

Additionally, the U.S. should reconsider current doctrinal paradigms in accordance with historical and contemporary lessons learned with regard to PR. The use of overt forces has gained large favor with military planners since Vietnam, when large force packages could escort the rescue forces and “soften up” the target area of hostile forces. The urban environment removes the ability for large strike packages to create a corridor for recovery forces to safely enter the area. This is because of the issue of collateral damage as well as the restrictive nature of urban areas. Even in the age of precision strike capability, the natural camouflage of such an environment would still reduce the ability to protect an overt recovery force. If overt forces are required to conduct a recovery, military leadership should consider other innovative means of

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<sup>59</sup> An emphasis on asymmetric means to offset U.S. military capability has emerged as a significant trend among potential threats, and has become an integral part of adversaries’ principles and tactics. Asymmetry results when one opponent has dissimilar capabilities—values, organization, training, or equipment—that the other cannot counter. It is not a new concept. It naturally evolves from a sound mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) analysis by an intelligent, freethinking, and adaptive threat. These asymmetric approaches will include the most advanced, commercially available technology innovatively applied and mixed with crude, simple, and unsophisticated weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures (FM 3-06, 2003, p. 3-2).

securing their safety. Some areas to explore should include deception operations, unmanned lift platforms, and versatile ground vehicles capable of urban navigation under fire. Of course, clandestine forces enjoy the ability to use the environment to the same advantage as the enemy. While this does not negate the extreme risk such personnel operate under, it does offer greater chances for successful IP recovery in the urban environment.

This thesis does not recommend the dismantling of the U.S.'s overt means of PR. While many urbanized areas exist across the world, there are also many rural or unpopulated areas. In these less populated areas, overt methods will continue to be highly effective, particularly during the opening phases of a conflict. Downed airmen who can coast their aircraft to less populated areas, or convoy members who break down in hostile rural areas, will still create a demand for this type of operation, which is a wholly appropriate means of recovery in such circumstances. As conflicts continue, however, an adversary will realize that the sanctuary of his own urban areas provides an effective defense to potentially stall or turn the tide of a conflict. As the battle closes on these cities, there is an increased probability of IP events occurring beyond the capabilities of overt recovery forces. Based on this analysis, then, the U.S. should concentrate NAR infrastructures in urban areas where the enemy would most likely collapse his forces to as he loses the initiative on the battlefield. The advantage to maintaining urbanized NAR infrastructures is that they will still have extended reach throughout the region. The informal networks of occupational, familial, and entrepreneurial groups are easier to facilitate between urban areas due to increased communications and movements between such areas.

In short, the U.S. PR organizations should be a proper mix of overt and clandestine forces, established in and dispersed to areas suited to their individual strengths. These forces guide themselves by overarching principles that encompass the responsibilities of the commanders and their staffs, recovery force, and the isolated personnel. The adherence to these principles will provide the best chance of each element attaining RS in their portion of the effort and hence, leading to overall situational superiority that ensures the greatest probability of successful recovery efforts.

## APPENDIX A. THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Although the U.S. has conducted many combat operations in urban environments, they have conducted relatively few personnel recovery (PR) missions of isolated personnel (IP) in urban terrain. In only one of the five known or available modern cases have personnel recoveries been effected prior to capture. The authors argue that special operations forces (SOF) are ideally suited to increase the probability of success of these operations in the high-threat arena of the urban environment. Currently, the individual services have PR capabilities that are doctrinally limited to low or medium-threat environments. However, even in the medium-threat environment, the services require large numbers of supporting forces to conduct those operations. SOF, using relatively small forces to attain relative superiority (RS <sub>Recovery Forces</sub>) for quick operations, offer the greatest probability for mission success in high-threat environments, especially in urban areas. Figure 25, derived from the SOF PR doctrinal manual, illustrates the level of risk with regard to employed methods of recovery.<sup>60</sup>

In addition to NAR capabilities, SOF forces also have other unique capabilities that facilitate a higher probability of success in recovery operations associated with the high-threat urban environments. DA missions conducted by SOF have widely been considered nothing more than *hyper-conventional* operations—where it is the unit, and not the mission, that is special because of the unique equipment and high proficiency. Even conducting “essentially ordinary conventional warfare activities” SOF offers a higher probability of success in the conduct of PR missions (Adams, 1998, p. 304). In this context, Figure 25 shows that joint conventional forces should be employed in JPR operations of increased risk, until the point where the risk reaches a level requiring enhanced capabilities and proficiency, when SOF forces would be better suited, or offer a higher probability of mission success.

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<sup>60</sup> While the authors adopted Figure 25 from current SOF doctrine, they made the following refinements to coincide with the thesis: the term JPR (joint personnel recovery) replaces JCSAR (joint search and rescue) in accordance with joint doctrine; under JPR, the mission was divided into joint component and SOF assets in order to demonstrate the proper use of SOF’s unique capabilities in relation to increased threat; finally, under NAR, the terms “DOD and OGA” were replaced with “SOF and OGA” to illustrate that SOF is the only DOD agency that manifests that capability.




Figure 25. Personnel Recovery Spectrum. (After FM 3-05.231, 2003, p. 1-11).

In contrast to Adams' view of traditional SOF missions, Susan L. Marquis (1997) noted:

American special operators, like special operations forces throughout the world, have developed unique operational capabilities and missions that distinguish them from their conventional counterparts. Each group performs missions and meets requirements that more conventionally trained or organized forces cannot adequately address (p. 7).

In short, SOF is unique because it can provide capabilities that are distinctive, forces that are uniquely proficient, or both.<sup>61</sup> These characteristics make SOF better suited for missions in high-threat environments that exceed the capabilities of conventional forces. Recovering personnel located in urban environments represents just one example of such a mission, but it is this situation explored by this thesis. Moreover, situational superiority (SS) is arguably most difficult to achieve in this environment.

SOF, as one element of JPR, typically operates in a medium to high-threat environments, with high levels of training and proficiency, using sophisticated hardware.

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<sup>61</sup> Even by USSOCOM's own account, "SOF offers DoD an additive and unique capability to achieve objectives. SOF perform tasks that no one else in DoD does, and we perform tasks that others do, but conduct them to a unique set of conditions and standards" (USSOCOM Memorandum, 2003, p. 5).

The hostile operating environment presents adversary forces over a wide area of coverage, usually including a densely concentrated and rapidly reconstituted ground order of battle (GOB), a look-down/shoot down capable air threat, and a highly concentrated integrated air defense system (IADS) with modern ground-based radars (GBR), early warning systems, electronic counter-countermeasures, command & control (C<sup>2</sup>) networks, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, advanced or late generation surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Highly concentrated IADS virtually prohibit air operations without large-scale combat protection packages and/or high-risk capable<sup>62</sup> SOF platforms, since detection by modern GBRs and/or passive detection systems would otherwise result in a lethal engagement. SOF posses unique equipment, procedural expertise, and organic capability for JPR, but doctrinally perform combat search and rescue (CSAR) in support of SOF missions only. SOF claims to perform CSAR in support of other components on a case-by-case basis, not to interfere with the readiness or operations of core SOF missions, but recent history shows that this is not necessarily the case. As of May 2003, however, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) no longer considers PR to be a collateral special operations activity.<sup>63</sup>

After analyzing conventional recovery capabilities, overt SOF PR capabilities may be more appropriate in situations where air superiority is denied, the priority for recovery of IP is sufficiently high to warrant a special operation, or access is beyond the capability of traditional component CSAR platforms. There are also other key differences in operational mindsets not accounted for under the umbrella of JPR activities that make SOF more suited to the mission. JPR missions for the components or services, similar to CSAR, are more reactive and ad hoc operations built on the premise of quick and timely response. U.S. Air Force pilots, typically associated with PR due to historical ties to the mission, tend to focus on the third dimension of airspace, and not on the

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<sup>62</sup> Aircraft specifically designed to perform low-level, long-range, undetected deep penetration missions into denied areas with heavily defended airspace, day or night, in adverse weather, for infiltration, extraction and resupply of special operations forces.

<sup>63</sup> From USSOCOM Memorandum, DTG 202013ZMAY03, Subject: Changes to the Missions of Special Operations Forces (SOF). After changing the name of SOF's "principle missions" to "core tasks," this memorandum directed that SOF discontinue the use and discussion of SOF "collateral activities." Before this directive, PR was one of SOF's collateral activities. USSOCOM's desire was simply to focus priorities, training, and resources on the newly-termed core tasks.

ground where the actual CSAR takes place. While conventional rescue pilots tactically execute CSAR missions with a warfighter mentality, the conventional rescue community considers the role of CSAR as an altruistic defensive mission with the purpose of preserving the force structure. In contrast, the SOF community treats PR missions as offensive operations under the umbrella of direct action (DA) missions, and with fewer and more specialized assets available to commit, attacks the problem with a more deliberate and precise planning process with judicious risk analysis.<sup>64</sup> PR missions for SOF are treated as special operations DA missions characterized by detailed planning, preparation, and rehearsals, more time required and available to plan and execute, thorough intelligence analysis, and often incurring more political risks. The model and SOF principles for PR in the high-threat urban environment are grounded within the framework of a DA mission.

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<sup>64</sup> SOF combat search and rescue missions (SOF CSAR; also doctrinally referred to as SOF PR missions under the umbrella of Joint CSAR (JCSAR)) resemble a special operations direct action (DA) mission in that they are characterized by detailed planning, preparation, and rehearsals; more time required and available to plan and execute; thorough intelligence analysis; and often incur more political risks. Correctly and sufficiently applying McRaven's principles of special operations and his theory of special operations as the model, since it is tailored to DA or strike operations very similar to SOF CSAR operations, one can expect to increase the probability of mission success for SOF.

## **APPENDIX B. DETAILED TIMELINE OF THE EVENTS OF 3-4 OCTOBER 1993**

**1324 hours (Sunday, 3 October 1993)** - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent Garrett Jones received HUMINT indicating that several of General Mohamad Farah Aidid's lieutenants would be meeting near the Olympic Hotel.<sup>65</sup> Since Jones was already at a meeting with MG Garrison at the airfield, he quickly passed this initial intelligence to TF Ranger (Loeb, 2000, p. W6).

**1330 hours** – For the next two hours, the TF Ranger JOC's “intelligence fusion cell” frantically managed, redirected, and orchestrated collection and surveillance assets trying to determine the credibility of the information. In order to determine the exact location of the meeting, the JOC intelligence chief asked his CIA liaison, a case officer code-named Wart Hog, to radio a request via the HUMINT source’s case officer who was code-named Cheetah. TF Ranger requested that the HUMINT source use some means of non-technical communication to refine the target house (Loeb, 2000, p. W6; Faust, 1999, p. 50).

**1414 hours** - TF Ranger Joint Operations Center (JOC) notified the UNOSOM II LNO, Captain Donahue, and the UN QRF Brigade TOC, that certain sectors of central Mogadishu were off-limits to UNOSOM II air and ground forces. TF Ranger planned on conducting operations within the sectors designated as grid reference graphic (GRG) 24, 29, 30, 35, and 36.<sup>66</sup> Simultaneously, TF Ranger relayed another message through Cheetah, requesting that the HUMINT source identify the target again. The Somali

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<sup>65</sup> Also referred to by different spellings of his name: Mohammad and/or Farrah, and/or Aideed. I am using the spelling from an official memorandum personally signed by him in 1993. As for the actual target, it is often incorrectly identified as being the Olympic Hotel itself. Actually, the target on 3 October 1993 was a squared-off, three-story, pure-white house on *Hawlqidig* Road (Initially thought to be at GRG Sheet 24, 12.8/M.8; UTM NH36122665, but later revised before launch to GRG Sheet 24, 12.9/M.5) in the *Habr Gidr* section of town (one of the Hawiye clan’s ten main subclans), about one block north of the hotel. The HUMINT source said that Omar Salad Elmi, Aidid’s principle political advisor, Issa Mohammad Siad, and possibly COL Abdi “Qeybdid” Hassan Awale, the alleged Minister of Interior were at the meeting site. Thus, the actual target was the Salad House or the Salad Meeting House, and not the Olympic Hotel. Actually it was Salad and Mohammed Hassan Awale, who was soon to be named as Aidid’s Foreign Minister, who was at the meeting.

<sup>66</sup> “The GRG is a grid reference system superimposed on the top of either satellite or other overhead photography, giving an overhead picture of a topographic feature (in this case Mogadishu) broken down into smaller referenced sections providing greater detail” (Casper, 2001, p. 24).

wanted no part of the request, but was finally convinced to mark the target for a second time. Reconnaissance assets were on station to observe the signal, but quickly realized that the location was vastly different from the description initially provided by the source.

**1415 hours** - The HUMINT source feigned car trouble near the target building, but none of TF Ranger's reconnaissance assets had observed the signal (Loeb, 2000, p. W6; Faust, 1999, p. 50).

**1447 hours** - The TF Ranger JOC was starting to become skeptical of the credibility of the source and the information,<sup>67</sup> Cheetah relayed that the source could not safely mark the target house because of local security. Informed that the actual target was at the opposite end of the block, TF Ranger redirected assets to watch the house at the end of the block. Almost immediately, reconnaissance assets identified a vehicle reportedly associated with Salad (Loeb, 2000, p. W6; Faust, 1999, p. 51). Satisfied that he had actionable intelligence, MG Garrison approved the mission launch.

**By 1500 hours** - After quickly replanning the mission based on the updated target location, MG Garrison had finished briefing TF Ranger's "operators" and leadership on the mission.

**By 1505 hours** - MG Garrison had informed MG Montgomery of the pending mission's location and target, confirmed that no NGOs were operating in the vicinity of the target area, had given the UN QRF a "be prepared to" mission of securing the ground

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<sup>67</sup> "In late September, a wing of [Aidid]'s Habr Gidr subclan known as the Suleimans showed up at the embassy compound. They were tired of having their neighborhood shot to pieces. And they wanted one of their leaders, a former Somali National Alliance politician now opposed to [Aidid], removed from the Tier One list. [The CIA agents] ultimately agreed, convincing the Suleimans that they had just been handed a huge favor. [The CIA] seized the moment, gave them a radio and started organizing surveillance Team Three. ...On October 3... [CIA case officer, code-named Cheetah] radioed in a tip from the CIA station across town. ...[their] newest asset, the ex-SNA leader, had just arrived with word that a cadre of top [Aidid] lieutenants, including two from the Tier One list...would be meeting that afternoon inside a compound 50 yards down *Hawlbadig* Road from the Olympic Hotel near the *Bakara* market, the heart of [Aidid] country. [Aidid] might be there, too, the asset advised" (Loeb, 2000, p. W6).

extraction route, and had deconflicted all airspace.<sup>68</sup> MAJ Craig Nixon notified the QRF of their “be prepared to” mission of securing the ground extraction route, via a secure phone at JOC, since the habitual TF Ranger liaison officer to the QRF was currently located at the JOC.

After this initial notification, MG Montgomery immediately started coordinating additional support, even though he had no reason to think that TF Ranger would require it. Upon committing the QRC, MG Montgomery began thinking ahead, trying to predict what else recovery forces might need. An armor officer by trade, but with no U.S. armor or heavy forces at his disposal, MG Montgomery called the Pakistani commander, who had four operational M-48 tanks that the U.S. had given to them already on call at the airport, and told him that he might need the tanks. The Pakistani commander agreed to provide his extremely old and limited assets with no night vision capabilities; they were poised when the QRF ran into a tough fight attempting its first recovery. At that point, it was clear to MG Montgomery that if recovery forces were piecemealed into the fight, they would suffer additional casualties, so he determined that additional heavy forces would be required. The Malaysians had some older wheeled armored personnel carriers, so MG Montgomery informed the MALBATT commander that he might need to commit the Malaysian battalion.<sup>69</sup> The Malaysian commander did not hesitate in offering his

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<sup>68</sup> That morning MG Thomas Montgomery had been in western Somalia with the German contingent, representing the Force Command. MG Montgomery arrived back at his headquarters at about three in the afternoon. Upon his return, his staff informed him that TF Ranger was about to launch on an operation, and gave him the information that was available at that time. He then talked to MG Garrison, and then ensured the UNOSOM II Commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, knew what was happening. While MG Montgomery was away, TF Ranger’s alert had gone to COL Ed Ward, the UNOSOM Operations Officer (U3), and everything that needed to happen to support TF Ranger had already been done. The QRF had been alerted, and was being prepared to support TF Ranger if called upon (from *Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu* interview with LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery; personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004).

<sup>69</sup> The Malaysians were a capable force, and the UN had already designated the Malaysians as the next UN QRF force to assume the QRF mission from the U.S. at some point in the future. MG Montgomery did not call solely for APCs. The decision to ask the Malaysians for only their APCs came later when BG Gile, COL Casper, and LTC David were working out a plan at the TF Ranger JOC. While those leaders decided that they did not want to use the entire Malaysian Battalion, they did want to use their APCs. The Malaysian commander would reluctantly accept the proposal to replace the Malaysian infantry soldiers with U.S. forces, provided that the vehicle commanders, drivers and gunners were his (personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004).

support (from *Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu* interview with LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery; personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004).

Only then did MG Montgomery make a request to the Italians for the support of their regiment of approximately fifty modern tanks, but at the time, they were located several hours northeast of Mogadishu in the town of *Balcad*. After conferring with Rome, the Italian commander agreed to support, and directed his tank crews to move to an assembly area on the outskirts of Mogadishu. MG Montgomery wanted them available in the morning if forces had not been able to break through to TF Ranger's soldiers. The Italians got to Mogadishu at about 0300 hours after a long road-march. They were placed in a field location and refueled, but were never employed ("Ambush in Mogadishu;" personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004; Casper, 2001, p. 44). "I will only use your force if I have Americans in extremis," Montgomery promised (Atkinson, 1994, p. A01).

After coordinating with the Italians, MG Montgomery also called the Indian Brigade commander. The Indians were still in the process of moving their units to Mogadishu, but had several T-72 tanks. MG Montgomery asked the Indian commander for assistance if the Americans were still in trouble after employing the Pakistanis, Malaysians, and Italians. The Indian commander agreed to help, even though his unit had not even completed its deployment to Mogadishu (personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004).

**1532 hours** - After finalizing the plan, preparing for combat, and loading the aircraft, TF Ranger launched the assault force of eight AH/MH-6 and eight MH-60L helicopters. The task force had taken no time to conduct "mission specific" actions on the objective rehearsals, due to the timeliness of the actionable intelligence.

**1535 hours** - TF Ranger's vehicle convoy, or ground reaction force one (GRF-1), of 56 personnel in nine HMMWVs and three 2½-ton trucks departed the airfield.

**1537 hours** - QRF headquarters alerted the Quick Reaction Company and designated it at REDCON 1.

**1542 hours** - Helicopters begin inserting the blocking force and assault elements at the target location.

**1545 hours** - GRF-1 had positioned itself in its staging area or holding point, and awaited the signal to move forward to the target location. TF Ranger JOC notified the QRF TOC that cordon and search elements were on the objective in the *Bakara* Market area.

**1553 hours** - GRF-1 began movement from their holding position towards the link-up point at the target building.

**1555 hours** - As the mission was progressing as planned on the target itself, TF Ranger helicopters began to notice increasing hostile activity by the local inhabitants, and AH-6's fired on some antagonistic Somalis for first time during the raid.

**1558 hours** - Somalis gave TF Ranger its first casualties when they hit a 2½-ton truck with an RPG while it was en route to link-up with the assault force at the target site.

**1602 hours** - TF Ranger has secured the target building and detained twenty-four Somalis.

**1604 hours** – The link-up of the assault force and GRF-1 at the target house was complete. The TF Ranger assault force began consolidation at the point of extraction in order to begin the process of withdrawing.

**1613 hours** - One seriously wounded Ranger departed for the airfield with one cargo and two “gun” HMMWVs. All of the Somali detainees departed shortly thereafter in the two remaining 2½-ton trucks, escorted by some assault element personnel back to the airfield.

**1620 hours** - Somalis used a RPG to hit and down a MH-60L, callsign Super 61, “Thunderstruck,” at what the location referred to as the northern crash site, or crash site #1. The pilot, CW4 Clifton P. Wolcott had the presence of mind to alert the crew via radio to brace for impact while the helicopter spun out of control toward the street below. This radio report alerted friendly forces that there were now isolated personnel on the

battlefield. The other helicopters in the area visually observed the crash, so the location of the aircraft was a known point; the aircraft smashed into an alley about 500 yards northeast of the target.

Unknown to the task force, Aidid brought in fundamentalist Islamic soldiers from Sudan, experienced in downing Russian helicopters in Afghanistan, to train his men in RPG firing techniques.<sup>70</sup>

**1624 hours** - An unarmed MH-6 (callsign Star 41) piloted by CW3 Karl Maier and CW3 Keith Jones landed in the narrow street. CW3 Maier fired on approaching Somalis from the cockpit with a Heckler and Koch MP-5 light submachine gun in his right hand, while he simultaneously maintained the aircraft at a hover with his left hand. The alley was so narrow that the rotor blades barely cleared the houses on both sides.

**1626-1629 hours** - The TF Ranger JOC first notified the QRF that problems were developing on the objective, and that they might need assistance.<sup>71</sup>

**1627 hours** - COL Ed Ward, the UNOSOM II Operations Officer (U3), directed COL Casper to place two scout weapons teams (SWT) from the QRF's aviation task force at REDCON 1. Only two minutes earlier, the QRF had already determined that it had two SWTs ready to fly (two OH-58A's, and five AH-1F's) in support of TF Ranger, and had proactively placed the crews on alert.

**1628 hours** - A six-man Ranger squad from blocking position #2, led by 1LT Thomas Di Tomasso, arrived at the crash site.

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<sup>70</sup> Captain Haad, a sector commander for Aidid's militia, had 30 militiamen under his authority on 3 October 1993. With more than ten years of fighting experience, he had received military training in Libya. In an interview with Frontline, he stated that almost all of his militia had been trained in either Libya or in other Islamic countries, and admitted that Aidid had received foreign help (from Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu interview with Captain Haad). Based on evidence developed in its investigation of the 1998 bombings of two American embassies in Africa, the U.S. Justice Department indicted Osama bin Laden for conspiring to kill Americans. The 238-count indictment on 4 November 1998 included several references to *Al Qaeda*'s training of militias and support to Somali fighters who attacked American soldiers in Somalia in 1993. One of the suspects charged, Fazul Abdullah Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, admittedly trained in *Al Qaeda* camps in Afghanistan in 1992, and helped train Somali Islamic militants who opposed the UN peacekeeping mission there. The Jordanian-born Palestinian "boasted of providing the rifles and rocket launchers" and "told Pakistani intelligence officials upon his capture that Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, in an effort to expand his worldwide anti-American terror network, had helped bankroll [Aidid] and provided weapons [specifically lots of RPGs] in 1993" (Vick, 1998, p. A01; Casper, 2001, p. 49).

<sup>71</sup> During a secure phone call from BG Gile, who was collocated with MG Garrison at the TF Ranger JOC, BG Gile told COL Casper that Garrison, "wanted the QRC now!" BG Gile had only arrived in Somalia five days earlier to participate in COL Casper's Change of Command (Casper, 2001, p. 28).

**1629 hours** - COL Casper directed LTC Bill David and his QRC, garrisoned at what was left of the University Compound, to move to the airfield where TF Ranger's JOC was located. COL Casper directed LTC David to use the Main Supply Route (MSR) bypass (see Figure 26), instead of the shorter, more direct route to the airfield (MSR-2), fearing that another ambush might await the QRC<sup>72</sup> (Casper, 2001, pp. 28-29). At this point, the QRF was staging the QRC at the airfield as a precaution. TF Ranger still believed that they could handle the situation on their own; it was not until the second helicopter went down that the QRF mission took on a greater sense of urgency. At that point, the QRC was already committed to the MSR bypass.

**1631 hours** - CW3 Jones confirmed that both CW4 Wolcott and CW2 Donovan L. Briley died upon impact while he assisted two WIA snipers onto the MH-6 for extraction (Rysewyk, 1994, p. 10). Unfortunately, only SFC Jimmy Smith made it back alive as the other sniper, SSG Daniel Busch, died en route to the airfield from injuries sustained defending the crew of Super 61.

Shortly after Star 41 departed, CW3 Dan Jollota and MAJ Herb Rodriguez, in CSAR MH-60L (callsign Super 68), inserted fifteen CSAR personnel via fastrope. Commanded by CPT Bill Coultrup, the CSAR personnel would assist in securing the crash site and treat the wounded. Somalis struck Super 68 with an RPG while the CSAR team was still on the ropes, but the pilots held the aircraft steady as the last of the soldiers made it to the ground. The pilots managed to make it back to the airport, where they made a "hard landing" on the runway, and then transloaded onto a spare MH-60L.

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<sup>72</sup> The MSR bypass was also referred to as MSR-3, or MSR "Tiger." Unlike UNITAF, UNOSOM II never used MSR 1, since it went through a highly congested market area. The use of UNOSOM II's primary MSR (MSR-2) greatly diminished when, on 8 August 1993, Somali guerrillas used a command-detonated mine to destroy and kill four U.S. military policemen and their HMMWV along that route on Jaalle-Siaad Street. As a result of the 8 August ambush, the more secure MSR 3 (or bypass) was created to reduce the possibility of similar ambushes in the future. Thinking that COL Casper had better situational awareness on the big picture that he did at that point, LTC David asked COL Casper what he believed to be the best route given the tradeoffs involved. Both leaders agreed that using the original MSR 2 was a more direct route through the heart of the SNA-occupied city near the K-4 circle, but had a higher possibility for making contact or being ambushed, and then being bogged down. Additionally, COL Casper's intelligence officer, CPT John McPherson, adamantly warned of going near the K4 circle since it was "the gateway to Aideed [sic] territory, and [Aidid's] followers surrounded the traffic circle. MSR-3, while a longer route, had a much lower probability of contact. UN forces rarely drove MSR-1 or MSR-2 when there wasn't any shooting in the city, so it didn't make any sense to do so when there was. In the end, both leaders agreed "the additional time to traverse the bypass road far outweighed the possibility of the QRC being ambushed before it got to the airport" (Casper, 2001, pp. 28-29, 44; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Dill David, April 6, 2004; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004).




Figure 26. MSR routes and average times to the TF Ranger JOC. (After personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 16, 2004).

**1641 hours** - Somalis struck and downed a MH-60L, callsign Super 64, “Venom,” with a RPG at a location referred to as the southern crash site, or crash site #2, approximately 800 meters south of Super 61. As command and control aircraft loitered overhead, they witnessed Super 61 going down—just as pilots CW3 Michael J. Durant and CW4 Raymond A. Frank reported their dilemma over their radio. While two of the AH-6’s orbited the position to provide cover fire, LTCs Harrel and Matthews finally authorized MH-60L (callsign Super 62) pilots CW3 Mike Goffena and CPT Jim Yacone, to insert two snipers (MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randy Shughart) after their third plea to provide protection for the crew as they watched Somali crowds close in on the position. Super 62 inserted the 2-man recovery force within minutes of the crash, but they ran out of ammunition before additional recovery forces could arrive, and there was nothing more they could do. Though unknown to the task force, with the exception of CW3 Durant, all of the wounded crew (including crew chiefs SSG William D. Cleveland, Jr., and SGT Thomas J. Field), and both of the snipers were overrun and killed by the Somalia mob within twenty minutes of the crash (Durant, 2003, pp. 35-37). Immediately

after Somalis shot down the second MH-60L, MG Garrison gave MAJ Nixon the Warning Order (WARNORD) to be prepared to assemble and deploy a second ground reaction force (GRF-2) to conduct a recovery mission.

**1645 hours** - LTC David departed for the airfield with the QRC and his TAC CP. Before departing, he placed Company A “Terminator Company” of TF 2-14 at REDCON 1. Company A had been on the support mission cycle, but LTC David felt that it was prudent to have a company on standby.<sup>73</sup> As a part of normal support requirements, 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon had tasked one squad to augment the airfield’s internal quick reaction forces. The squad chosen to perform the mission was 2<sup>nd</sup> Squad, led by SSG Psonis. Because 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon was missing one rifle squad, CPT Meyerowich assigned the company’s attached engineer squad to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon leader, 2LT Mark A. B. Hollis in order to make up the difference, at least numerically.

**1647 hours** - Just after LTC David departed University Compound, the TF Ranger JOC informed the QRF TOC that Somalis had shot down one TF Ranger aircraft at 1620 hours.

**1649 hours** - TF Ranger JOC informed the QRF TOC that Somalis had shot down a second TF Ranger. The JOC provided no locations for either aircraft.

**By 1700 hours** - Company A lined up and ready to move to the airfield.

**1703 hours** - GRF-2 departed the airfield with 27 soldiers from TF Ranger, three 2½-ton trucks, and five HMMWVs—bound for crash site #2.

**1711 hours** - COL Casper, physically located at the QRF TOC, informed LTC David via radio that he and his battalion would be OPCON to MG Garrison.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> In order not to burn-out his soldiers, LTC David established a nine-day rotation for the companies of TF 2-14. Each company would spend three days on support (fulfilling miscellaneous requirements, patrols, or cordon and searches), three days as the QRC, and three days on MSR guard (personal interview, BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19-20, 2003).

<sup>74</sup> BG (Ret.) Larry Casper later wrote, “The control of David and his QRC was transferred, or ‘chopped,’ to TF Ranger. This had been directed previously by UNOSOM II Headquarters at the urging of TF Ranger and the approval of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters. The brigade staff was aware of this command and control lash-up, but I had been in country a couple of weeks and somewhere during the in-briefs I missed it. I didn’t like it, and I immediately called Colonel Ward. ...He shared my concern, but stated that this was agreed to weeks before and now was not the time to change. I was angry, but he was right, so I acquiesced” (Casper, 2001, p. 29).

**Between 1710 and 1724 hours** – The QRC and TAC CP arrived at the TF Ranger JOC. MG Garrison and his staff quickly briefed LTC David on the situation, and gave him his mission of moving to the southern crash site (site #2, where MH-60L, callsign Super 64 crashed) to secure the crew and any TF Ranger personnel. Garrison's staff informed LTC David that approximately 100 Rangers had inserted by air and ground into an area near the *Bakara* market, and that TF Ranger had successfully detained 24 Somali individuals. However, the staff also informed David that after Somalis downed the first aircraft, the Rangers converged on that site to secure the crew and aircraft. In doing this, the task force continued to experience heavy enemy fire and resistance, and became pinned down near the northern crash site. The staff also informed David that TF Ranger had approximately 20 WIA, and 3 to 4 KIA at the northern crash site alone. Shortly after arriving at the JOC, CPT Whetstone watched a live video feed in the JOC, provided by one of TF Ranger's aerial reconnaissance platforms focused on the southern crash site. Together, he and MG Garrison watched the Somali crowd of hundreds overwhelm, and literally overrun, the MH-60. As CPT Whetstone departed the JOC, MG Garrison turned away from the monitor while shaking his head in disgust; with his ground forces immobilized, he was virtually powerless to affect the battle (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004).

**1723 hours** - The GRF-1 Commander, LTC Danny McKnight, reported to the JOC that he had numerous casualties, had lost a second 2½-ton truck to enemy fire, and that he had no choice but to return to base with GRF-1.

**1727 hours** - MH-60L, callsign Super 62, landed in the New Port area after Somalis hit it broadside with an RPG after missing on at least ten prior attempts.

**1730 hours** - TF Ranger's medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) MH-60L launched from the airfield to the New Port area. At the University Compound the QRF's scout platoon, combat trains, and PSYOPs elements were lined up behind Company A, and ready to move (Ferry, 1994, p. 25). LTC David recalled Company B from a location north of the city where they had been conducting training, and directed them to proceed

directly to the New Port (personal interview, BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19-20, 2003). Evening twilight quickly approached as the remainder of TF 2-14 awaited instructions.

**Between 1735 and 1747 hours** - After assembling and briefing the QRC, LTC David's QRC departed the airfield with their TF Ranger liaison, MAJ Craig Nixon, en route to crash site #2 (see Figure 27). TF Ranger aircraft were to provide air cover for the QRC, but TF Ranger air cover was not yet in a position to provide support since there were initial communication problems between TF 2-14 and the TF Ranger aircraft. COL Casper directed a SWT from TF 2-25 to support TF 2-14, but at about that time, the TF Ranger aircraft arrived on station, and the TF 2-25 aircraft remained at the airfield at flight idle for an immediate response.

**1740 hours** - Both GRF-1 and GRF-2 returned to the airfield after failing to reach any of the trapped soldiers.

**Between 1745 and 1754 hours** - LTC David reported via radio that the QRC was in an ambush by cross-fire from both sides of the street, approximately 300 meters north of the K4 traffic circle on Via Lenin,<sup>75</sup> and that air cover was not yet on station. The QRC lead elements had passed through the ambush site, and the convoy continued to suppress the Somali positions as it kept moving. The TAC CP's two HMMWVs and the five 2½-ton trucks carrying the QRC were easy and vulnerable targets for Somali gunmen with RPGs, even though the bed and sides of the trucks were protected with an additional three layers of sandbags.

**1757 hours** - LTC David reported that Somalis had hit and disabled a TF Ranger HMMWV north of the K4 traffic circle.

**1800 hours** - Darkness had fallen on Mogadishu.

**1802 hours** - LTC David reported that Somalis hit and disabled a second TF Ranger HMMWV north of the K4 traffic circle as the convoy reached National Street. The convoy again came under heavy Somali fire from the east, but could not turn onto National Street because Somalis had blocked it with stacked crushed cars, and burning

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<sup>75</sup> K4 traffic circle is “a traffic circle forming the nucleus of five main boulevards, which spanned the city like the spokes of a wheel” (Casper, 2001, pp. 28-29).

tires set three tires deep. Instead of turning east, the convoy continued north while receiving fire, until it reached the intersection at grid coordinates NH34502650.




Figure 27. QRC route: Failed attempt to reach crash site #2 from the airfield (dashed line)

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**1821 hours** - While collocated with MG Garrison purely by happenstance, BG Greg L. Gile (10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Assistant Division Commander for Operations (ADC-O), callsign Mountain 05) directed COL Casper to have LTC David break contact with the enemy at the direction of MG Montgomery. MG Montgomery was located in the old U.S. embassy building using a secure telephone to communicate with MG Garrison and BG Gile. LTC David immediately directed CPT Whetstone to break contact, and to return to the airfield as soon as possible.

**By 1830 hours** - MG Montgomery, in his capacity as the Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II, directed the Pakistani contingent to relocate their four M-48 tanks from a position near the airport to the New Port.

**1838 hours** - MG Montgomery again contacted BG Gile, and directed him to serve as both his personal representative at the JOC and the lead tactical planner for the QRF.<sup>76</sup> He also directed BG Gile to “chop” LTC David and his unit back to the QRF headquarters. BG Gile immediately radioed COL Casper to relay the messages (Casper, 2001, p. 46; personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004).

**1840 hours** - After surviving the better part of five ambushes, LTC David reported that CPT Whetstone’s element had consolidated vehicles and personnel in two covered areas southwest of the K4 traffic circle, and was retreating with heavy casualties to the airfield to regroup.

**1845 hours** - LTC David requested air cover for CPT Whetstone while two of his dismounted platoons checked the disabled HMMWVs. COL Casper directed LTC Gore to launch a SWT to support TF 2-14.

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<sup>76</sup> MG Montgomery decided that since BG Gile was already located at the JOC, and would be representing MG Montgomery at the TF Ranger headquarters, it only made sense to use BG Gile’s Infantry background to spearhead such a ground assault. BG Gile was already co-located with MG Garrison, he did have a direct land-line with MG Montgomery, and he was the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division’s ADC(O)—who the Aviation Brigade habitually reported to (personal communication, LTG (Ret.) Thomas Montgomery, April 10, 2004; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004). Also factoring into MG Montgomery’s decision was the fact COL Casper had assumed command only three days before the battle. By all accounts, BG Gile kept his cool during the entire operation, and did not exert his presence or position any more than was necessary.

**1849 hours** - The SWT arrived to cover TF 2-14's egress to the airfield.<sup>77</sup>

**1858 hours** - COL Casper directed LTC David to recall CPT Whetstone's dismounted platoons, and return to the airfield. COL Casper stated that David did not need to search the vehicles because TF Ranger had accounted for all personnel at that location.

**Approximately 1900 hours** - While awaiting LTC David's return, BG Gile and COL Casper discussed the task organization for the follow-on operation, at about the same time that the Pakistanis and Malaysians began to close in on the New Port.

**1905 hours** - As he approached the airfield, LTC David directed MAJ Randy Munch, the TF 2-14 executive officer, to move the remainder of the battalion and combat trains to the airfield, and to be prepared to conduct further combat operations. The battalion did not have sufficient assets readily available to move the remainder of TF 2-14 at the same time, so Munch directed that the movement be conducted in convoy serials, with ten minutes between serials, and using the same MSR bypass that the QRC had used earlier. The one-way trip at night, driving with night vision goggles (NVGs) under blacked-out conditions took about forty-five minutes (Ferry, 1994, p. 26).

**1907 hours** - LTC David and his TAC CP returned to the TF Ranger JOC.

**1912 hours** - TF Ranger placed their second Ground Reaction Force element (GRF-2), still under the control of JOC operations officer LTC Lee VanArsdale, OPCON to the QRF.<sup>78</sup> Its stated mission was to secure National Street with the Pakistani tank platoon.

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<sup>77</sup> CPT Bill Metheny (callsign Coyote 06) led this SWT in an OH-58 scout aircraft. Pilot CW4 Dave Coates (callsign Raven 33), and his copilot and gunner CW2 Eric Jacobsen flew the lead AH-1F Cobra. CWO Scott MacDonald (callsign Coyote 25), flew the wingman position in the other AH-1F Cobra. The three aircraft took up a racetrack pattern over the southwest portion of the city (Casper, 2001, pp. 29-30).

<sup>78</sup> The exact composition of the GRF-2, and time that it was actually OPCON to the QRF is difficult to determine with any precision due to conflicting records. One official record stated that the GRF-2 was OPCON to the QRF at 1800 hours, and was comprised of sixty personnel divided into three elements, with three 2½-ton trucks and six HMMWVs. Another personal experience monograph written by the Ranger Company's executive officer, stated that the reconstituted force consisted of 56 personnel and seven HMMWVs (Rysewyk, 1994, p. 11). QRF records state that the GRF-2 was a platoon-sized element of approximately forty Rangers with four HMMWVs (Appendix F). Given the timing of other events, 1912 hours seems more accurate and plausible.

**By 1914 hours** – The QRC returned to the airfield, and had immediately began to rearm at TF Ranger’s ammunition supply point (ASP).

**1922 hours** - TF Ranger JOC informed the QRF headquarters that the Rangers had consolidated and become pinned-down near grid coordinate NH36242679.

**1935 hours** - COL Casper, his battle staff, and his LNOs boarded helicopters to move to the TF Ranger JOC (airfield) in order to plan the rescue.

**2000 hours** - MH-60L, callsign Super 66, conducted an aerial resupply to the stranded elements of TF Ranger; Somali ground fires damaged it in the process.

**2025 hours** - COL Casper and his staff arrived at the JOC to begin parallel planning with TF 2-14

**Between 2020-2030 hours** - Company A, TF 2-14 arrived at the airfield.

**2030 hours** - MG Garrison, BG Gile, COL Casper, LTC David, and LTC Gore all met in the JOC to discuss the concept of operations and link-up procedures with the Rangers on the objective. Then, QRF leadership conducted initial mission analysis on the hood of LTC David’s HMMWV, and planned the route for the movement to the New Port.

**2052 hours** - LTC David directed elements of TF 2-14 and GRF-2 to move to the New Port. The column began movement with CPT Whetstone’s company and elements of TF Ranger in the lead, followed by CPT Meyerowich’s company. Upon arrival at New Port, the units conducted final pre-combat inspections (PCI’s), and issued more ammunition. Shortly after the order to move to New Port, the QRF Intelligence Officer (S-2) reported the grid locations for downed aircraft as follows: Site #1, grid coordinate NH36142685; site #2, grid coordinate NH36402625.

**2056 hours** - Company B, as well as the remainder of TF 2-14, arrived at the airfield (Ferry, 1994; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 7 and April 9, 2004).

**2100 hours** - BG Giles gave COL Casper a change of mission—to effect link-up with the Rangers at the northern crash site first (site #1, where MH-60L, callsign Super 61 crashed), then, if the tactical situation permitted, to proceed to the southern crash site to rescue survivors or recover bodies.

**2100-2130 hours** - COL Casper and his battle staff traveled to the New Port to continue planning the operation, and to conduct initial coordination with the Malaysians and Pakistanis.

**By 2130 hours** - LTC David had linked-up at the New Port with all assets under his control, including the Malaysian and Pakistani forces. When David arrived, all forces had arrayed themselves administratively, and were neither task organized for combat, nor marshaled in proper order of movement. After fleshing out the plan, LTC David briefed the QRF LNO to the Pakistanis, 1LT Ben Mathews, and the QRF LNO to the Malaysians, 1LT John Breen, on what he expected.

LTC David's initial plan was simple—Pakistani tanks would lead the convoy of Malaysian German-built Condor APCs carrying TF 2-14 soldiers.<sup>79</sup> As Combat Team Alpha, TF 2-14's Company A would spearhead the attack to break through to TF Ranger at the northern crash site in APCs assigned to MALBATT's Company B. Combat Team Bravo, the TF 2-14 TAC CP and TF Ranger attachments, would remain at Release Point Yankee approximately 1200 meters past Pakistani Strongpoint 207 on National Street. As Combat Team Charlie, TF 2-14's Company C, in APCs assigned to MALBATT's Company A, would pass through the release point, and attack to break through to the southern crash site. TF 2-14's Company B, would stage at the airfield to serve as the task force reserve (see Figure 28). The attacking elements were to move as far as possible

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<sup>79</sup> LTC David was placed in charge of an ad hoc task force, and given what seemed to everyone to be a mission that could not be accomplished. At the outset of the operation, it appeared to have the makings of another Task Force Smith, an ad hoc organization that also lacked interoperability between coalition forces, detailed intelligence on the enemy disposition, and time to sufficiently plan a complex operation. LTC David's ad hoc task force, sometimes referred to as "Task Force David," consisted of two organic rifle companies, 113 personnel from two Malaysian mechanized companies in 28 "Twin GPMG" and six "20mm Oerlikon cannon" Condor APCs (with vehicle commanders, drivers and gunners only), a composite platoon (+) from TF Ranger, one Pakistani tank platoon, UN LNOs, an anti-armor platoon from 3-C/1/87<sup>th</sup> Infantry, and two aviation task forces from both TF 2-25 and TF Ranger. By operation's end, "Task Force David" had successfully achieved what many believed to be impossible. The fact that so few casualties were sustained by this ad hoc organization, in the execution of a near insurmountable task, was nothing short of miraculous.



Figure 28. Route from the New Port to the objectives, and then to Pakistani Stadium (dashed line)

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while mounted, dismounting only when reaching the assigned objectives (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003; Zakaria, 2000, p. 28).

CPT Meyerowich task organized Company A as follows (Ferry, 1994):

<u>1<sup>st</sup> Platoon</u>	<u>2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon</u>	<u>3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon</u>	<u>Company HQ</u>
Mortar Squad	Engineer Squad	Medic	FMTT (Surgical Tm)
Fire Support Squad	Medic	3 x Malaysian APCs	FLA
Medic	3 x Malaysian APCs		Surgeon
3 x Malaysian APCs			1 x HMMW
			4 x M-48 Paki Tanks

2LT Hollis task organized his platoon in the following manner:

<u>1<sup>st</sup> Squad</u>	<u>3<sup>rd</sup> Squad</u>	<u>Platoon Headquarters</u>
SGT Hollis (SL)	SSG Morrison (SL)	2LT Hollis (PL)
1 <sup>st</sup> Malaysian APC	SSG Roberts (PSG)	RTO (Radio Operator)
	M-60 Team #2	M-60 Team #1
	Platoon Medic	Interpreter (Somali)
	Engineer Team #2	Engineer Team #1
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Malaysian APC	2 <sup>nd</sup> Malaysian APC

When CPT Meyerowich returned from his mission briefing from LTC David, 2LT Hollis, the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon Leader (2LT Damon Wright), and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon Leader (2LT Curtis Crum), were all waiting at the commander's HMMWV. CPT Meyerowich briefed everyone on their unit's task and purpose, but there remained some confusion as to the actual route to the objective. The platoon leaders had enough information to begin loading the vehicles, and assumed more details would follow, especially concerning the route. After loading the vehicles, 2LT Hollis went back to CPT Meyerowich in order to get more information concerning the exact route. CPT Meyerowich told him not to worry about the route, because the Malaysian drivers knew the route to the objective. Satisfied that his commander had the situation under control, 2LT Hollis returned to and loaded his APC. He positioned himself directly behind the Malaysian driver, with his RTO seated next to the side door, which offered a small view port. From this position, 2LT Hollis had limited observation of what was to the front and one side of his APC (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**2130 hours** - COL Casper flew to the TF Raven headquarters to refuel and pick up LTC Gore.

**2200 hours** – COL Casper returned to the New Port (personal interview, BG (Ret.) Bill David, November 19-20, 2003; personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 9, 2004).

**2256 hours** - COL Casper reported problems with the Pakistanis and the order of movement. With their better knowledge of the area, the Pakistani-driven M-48 tanks were supposed to lead the column the entire way to the Rangers. The Pakistanis no longer wanted to lead without NVGs since they would have to use their white lights to navigate, which would make them easy targets for the Somalis. This forced LTC David to change his plan—the Malaysians would now lead with two APCs, with the Pakistanis immediately following. Just before departing the New Port, the plan changed again, whereby the Pakistanis agreed to lead the convoy along the secured UN route as far as their first strongpoint along the route, Strongpoint 69. Turning west on National Street, the Malaysian-driven Condors were to take the lead. CPT Meyerowich had not briefed 2LT Hollis on any of these changes to the originally briefed plan, and 2LT Hollis was still under the impression that the Pakistanis were leading the entire route (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**Between 2310-2324 hours** - TF David departed the New Port en route to the two crash sites. LTC Gore continued to coordinate the direct fire air support, and deconflict air space between TF Ranger and TF 2-25 helicopters. TF 2-25's SWT guided and covered the convoy's movement up to Strongpoint 207, and then handed-off responsibilities to TF Ranger. About one kilometer outside of New Port, the Pakistani tanks encountered a roadblock, and the Pakistani commander refused to go through fearing Somalis had mined it. Mathews fired a magazine of 5.56mm ammunition into the roadblock, and told the commander to go through. The Pakistanis reluctantly complied. The convoy continued east to Checkpoint 77, and then turned north to Checkpoint 69. At Checkpoint 69, the Pakistani brigade commander informed the battalion commander that

he could no longer lead the column because they did not have NVGs. Two of the three Malaysian APCs containing 2LT Hollis' personnel then unknowingly assumed the lead of the convoy (Casper, 2001, p. 69).

As the lead APC went 200 meters west down National Street to Strongpoint 207, the beginning of Habr Gidr territory manned by a UNOSOM M113 APC and a sandbagged position, all hell broke loose. The Somalis began firing huge quantities of small arms and RPGs at the convoy. The Somalis had once again initiated a deliberate ambush using extremely heavy rocket, mortar, and automatic weapons fire. LTC David's subordinate leaders, clearly understanding the gravity of the situation and their commander's intent, immediately returned fire and continued to slowly advance down National Street's gauntlet of destruction. For roughly three hours, TF David fought a vicious battle until they reached their respective release points, and finally broke through to their objectives. 2LT Hollis heard numerous explosions outside his APC, and felt the shrapnel hitting the vehicle.

**By 2350 hours** - The TAC CP had reached the holding area and release point about 1200 meters past Strongpoint 207 on National Street (Hollis, 1998, p. 29). The lead Malaysian drivers reacted to the increased fire by erratically jerking the vehicle forward in an almost convulsive motion. This caused all of the U.S. passengers in the back of the APC to be tossed about violently. The limited land navigation that 2LT Hollis had been able to maintain up until that point in time then became next to impossible, because every time he tried to look out the small port, he would be thrown in a different direction. Suddenly, and without warning, the APC increased its speed, and began to scale curbs and other obstacles in the road, which again threw the U.S. passengers around the back of the vehicle. The Malaysians' Platoon Commander, LT Zunaidi bin Hassan, had ordered the two APCs to move through the "kill zone" established by the Somali ambush. Unknown to 2LT Hollis at the time, both he and SGT Hollis' APCs were breaking contact with the rest of the column. LT Hassan, unable to pass the tanks that were blocking the narrow road, and unable to see the lead APCs, got on the radio and told them to turn towards the objective (Hollis, 1998, p. 29; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003; Zakaria, 2000, pp. 33-34).

Fortunately for the convoy, CPT Meyerowich's HMMWV placement as the third vehicle in the convoy was arguably the only thing that prevented the other Malaysian drivers from following the lead of the two runaway APCs. CPT Meyerowich knew the APCs had broken contact, but decided to continue on to his objective (Ferry, 1994, p. 28). This unfortunate reaction by the Malaysian drivers effectively separated the two lead APCs from the remainder of the convoy. 2LT Hollis could not accurately maintain his bearing while being bounced around in the back of the APC, and coupled with the explosions outside, communications with his commander were virtually impossible. Totally disoriented, and still unaware that they were now on their own, 2LT Hollis and his lead squad would not link up with their company until the next morning.

**2359 hours** - Plagued by confusion and a language barrier, the Lost Platoon's two APCs continued west on National Street, then took a wrong turn after receiving heavy fire from the vicinity of the Olympic hotel. They continued moving south instead of north, probably attempting to return to the New Port facility (Hollis, 1998, p. 30; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003). On National Street, and back in the lead since the two Malaysians took the wrong turn, the Somalis ambushed the Pakistani tanks with machine guns and 7-10 RPG rounds. The tanks stopped to return fire, and it took several minutes for 1LT Mathews to get the column moving again. The Pakistanis passed the road leading to the crash site, and secured the far west end of National Street.

**0005 hours (Monday, 4 October 1993)** - The Lost Platoon's two APCs proceeded south roughly one kilometer beyond the southern crash site, when they entered a Somali ambush near the Italian Compound, or Villa Italia. RPG fire first impacted the lead vehicle directly into the driver's compartment, mortally wounding the Malaysian driver.

**0007 hours** - Somalis disabled the second of the Lost Platoon's two APCs with an RPG round placed into the engine compartment, on the right-hand side of the vehicle front. The damage to the APCs also resulted in the Malaysians losing radio contact with their company headquarters.

**0011 hours** - 2LT Hollis instructed SGT Hollis to assist in establishing security upon dismounting the APCs.

**0015 hours** - 2LT Hollis led his platoon headquarters group and engineer team north. After passing only two buildings, small-arms fire originating from the direction of travel began to intensify. With the enemy fires intensifying the farther away he moved from SGT Hollis' position, and with the fear of Somalis potentially dividing his forces, 2LT Hollis decided to return to SGT Hollis's position. SPC Keller continued to have no success at reaching any friendly forces over the radio.

**0020 hours** - 2LT Hollis led his element back to its initial position, and reestablished local security. Desiring to improve his unit's level of security, 2LT Hollis then turned to the engineer squad leader, SSG Maxwell, and while pointing to a wall, asked if he could make a hole in the wall surrounding an adjacent cluster of houses. Upon Maxwell's affirmation, 2LT Hollis contacted SGT Hollis, telling him of his plan to produce a hole in the compound, in order to establish security positions within the more protected compound.

**0030 hours** – After blowing a hole in the wall of a nearby compound, the Lost Platoon entered the courtyard and established security.

**0050 hours** - CPT Whetstone reported he was 300-500 meters past Checkpoint 207.

**0056 hours** - A TF Ranger OH-58D, callsign King 57, reported that there was no friendly activity observed near the southern crash site.<sup>80</sup>

**0103 hours** - LTC David gave CPT Whetstone the order to depart the release point and move towards the southern objective after linking up with his guide OH-58D and after passing the vehicles parked to his front (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 11, 2004).

**0130 hours** - 2LT Hollis transmitted unsecure to establish communications with LTC David.

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<sup>80</sup> Shortly after TF Ranger's arrival, TF Raven chopped the Fort Hood-based OH-58Ds to TF Ranger. The OH-58D's unique mast-mounted optics and FLIR could be "down-linked" directly to TF Ranger's JOC (personal communication, BG (Ret.) Larry Casper, April 6, 2004).

**0134 hours** - CPT Meyerowich reported that he was working his company onto the northern objective with assistance from OH-58D, callsign King 57, and their infrared (IR) laser's "sparkle."

**0138 hours** - CPT Meyerowich reported that he was within 100 meters of the northern objective.

**0142 hours** - CPT Whetstone reported that Somalis had disabled two of his APCs near crash site #2, which had caused him to dismount under fire. He reported that one APC was burning, while he reported the other as inoperable.

**0145 hours** - CPT Whetstone then reported completing his mounted movement to his dismount point.

**0145 hours** – After LTC David directed 2LT Hollis to contact CPT Whetstone on Company C's assigned radio frequency, 2LT Hollis and Whetstone first made contact on the radio, but suppressing the Somalis who had just disabled two of his APCs had Whetstone occupied.

**0155 hours** - CPT Meyerowich reported linking-up with the Rangers at the northern crash site.

**0158 hours** - CPT Whetstone reported that he was 100 meters away from the southern objective [Super 64].

**0226 hours** - COL Casper directed coordination with medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) personnel as well as the Pakistanis, so that aviation assets could fly to and from the Pakistani stadium. COL Casper directed LTC David to have his units egress to the Pakistani camp in the soccer stadium upon their withdrawal.

**0228 hours** - CPT Whetstone reported being on the southern objective, at the crash site. At this time, all elements had reached their objectives. CPT Whetstone then had to fight his way to the actual crash site while dismounted. Company C with TF Ranger attachments went on to search the wreckage and the areas surrounding the southern crash site, and found nothing but multiple blood trails headed in several different directions as they called out the names of the isolated TF Ranger personnel.

**0244 hours** - CPT Meyerowich had requested more APCs to transport the additional 90+ TF Ranger personnel, and advised that if not provided, the overflow personnel would walk to Pakistani Stadium.

**0245 hours** - Company C had recovered all remaining sensitive items from the aircraft, and placed "thermite" grenades to destroy what remained of the helicopter. While returning back to the APCs in order to begin the process of consolidation, reorganization, and establishing a better defensive position, CPT Whetstone had the idea of using star clusters to locate the "Lost Platoon." In order to determine a general distance from his current location, CPT Whetstone directed the platoon leader to fire a red star cluster signaling device (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004).

**0250 hours** - 2LT Hollis fired the star cluster, unintentionally illuminating some of CPT Whetstone's 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon near the southern objective. This illumination inadvertently silhouetted the soldiers, and resulted in the Somalis increasing their fires on the newly identified defensive positions (Scott Hilliard, personal telephone interview, 5 April 2004). CPT Whetstone then fired a green star cluster at approximately 0255 hours, and the two agreed that no more than 1,000 meters separated them. CPT Whetstone then informed 2LT Hollis that he should remain in place, and that he would work on moving his company toward Hollis' platoon (Hollis, 1998, p. 31; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**0307 hours** - COL Casper reported to BG Gile at the JOC, that the Terminator element, minus one platoon, was still on the northern objective and had recovered all killed (KIA) and wounded (WIA) except the trapped pilot. COL Casper also informed BG Gile that LTC David instructed the Terminator element not to leave the site until the body was recovered, and that the Tiger element at the southern objective had no contact with any TF Ranger elements.

**0300 hours** - CPT Whetstone directed 2LT Hollis to move north and attempt to link-up with Whetstone's lead platoon, which would attempt to move south. 2LT Hollis immediately summoned SGT Hollis and SSG Maxwell.

**0300-0315 hours** – The Lost Platoon formulated a plan to move north. The final plan was for SSG Maxwell’s engineers to lead, followed by 2LT Hollis as his M-60 machinegun team, the Malaysians, and finally SGT Hollis’ squad. Concurrently, CPT Whetstone directed that one squad from LT James K. Haynes’ 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon, the closest unit to 2LT Hollis, be sent out as a recon element to determine if there was an alternate route to reach the isolated platoon. Upon his return, SSG Tewes’ reported that there was only one route to 2LT Hollis, and that if the company attempted to move along that route dismounted, that there would be a high number of casualties given the intense concentration of Somalis between their two locations.

**0315 hours** - CPT Whetstone asked the Malaysian Company A Commander, Major Ab Aziz bin Ab Latiff, to “borrow” a couple of his APCs to affect the recovery of Hollis’s platoon. After Aziz had asked for permission, which his battalion commander denied, he informed Whetstone that he was sorry, but that he was not authorized to offer any assistance (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**0325 hours** - 2LT Hollis contacted CPT Meyerowich to inform him that he was beginning his movement north. CPT Whetstone had explained to 2LT Hollis that he was having trouble moving south, and that the enemy resistance between the two units was too great for his dismounted company to move through without sustaining significant casualties.<sup>81</sup>

**0337 hours** - LTC David reported to the QRF TOC that Somalis had hit three or possibly four APCs, and that one or more was still burning.

**0340 hours** - Soon after the Lost Platoon began its movement north, the engineers moved past the garage where 2LT Hollis had moved to immediately following the ambush. 2LT Hollis positioned himself on the corner of the garage facing north. The

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<sup>81</sup> Given the heavy volume of fires along the road 2LT Hollis’ APCs had initially traveled, CPT Whetstone assumed that 2LT Hollis would understand that he was to move north using an alternate route. Not understanding what CPT Whetstone intended, 2LT Hollis opted to use the known and most expedient route to CPT Whetstone’s position (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; personal communication, MAJ Mark Hollis, April 19, 2004). Arguably, this was also the most dangerous route given the consistent levels of Somali activity throughout the night.

Malaysians moved past 2LT Hollis' position, moving closer to the engineers, when all of a sudden a Somali stepped out from an alley, and unloaded his weapon into the lead element. SGT Hollis eventually killed the Somali, but not before the Somali shot SGT Cornell Houston in the chest, PFC Xiong Ly in the back, and SSG Maxwell in the knee. Now 2LT Hollis had two casualties who were "litter priority," two casualties who were "litter urgent," and eight casualties who were "walking wounded" (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**0344 hours** – The TF Ranger JOC reported that bandits were starting to move out of Villa Somalia. The JOC directed that all aircraft stand off so that the Pakistanis located at Strongpoint 1 could fire mortars.

**0348 hours** - Another Somali started engaging the Lost Platoon from across an open lot to the north.

**0355 hours** - SPC Keller contacted CPT Whetstone and informed him of the Lost Platoon's status, and requested immediate transportation out.

**0400 hours** – The Lost Platoon was informed that the Malaysians were in route, and that TF Ranger "Little Birds" were on station to support the link-up. MAJ Aziz had finally grown tired of listening to his battalion commander telling them to stay put, while his fellow Malaysians were seriously wounded at 2LT Hollis' location. Just as CPT Whetstone had his entire company ready to move dismounted towards Hollis' platoon, fully recognizing that he would certainly sustain numerous casualties along the 1,000-meter gauntlet of Somali fires to his south, MAJ Aziz pointed to CPT Whetstone, signaling to him that he wanted CPT Whetstone to keep his unit in place. MAJ Aziz then disobeyed a direct order from his battalion commander as he ordered his Number 3 Platoon leader, 2LT Muhammad Juraimy bin Aripin, to prepare to move his APCs to 2LT Hollis' position.<sup>82</sup> MAJ Aziz pointed at CPT Whetstone, and then into the night sky, indicating that he wanted CPT Whetstone to have aircraft provide covering fires during his movement. While synchronizing the recovery of Hollis' platoon, CPT Whetstone had

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<sup>82</sup> There is some discrepancy as to the number of APCs that 2LT Juraimy led to 2LT Hollis' position. From personal interviews, both MAJ Hollis and LTC Whetstone recall that it was two APCs. Casper (2001) and the MALBATT accounts both recall that it was three APCs. LTC Whetstone conceded "In the heat of the mess at the time, getting the company back in defensive mode, I [guess I could have] missed a vehicle" (personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, May 4, 2004).

already requested and coordinated AH-6 support from King 56 and King 57 (two of the orbiting OH-58Ds attached to TF Ranger), to supplement the AH-1F “mini-gun” fires that he had been requesting since arriving at the southern objective (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

CPT Whetstone directed 2LT Hollis to use the M-203’s parachute flares to mark the buildings of known enemy locations surrounding the extraction point. Shouting over to SGT Hollis, 2LT Hollis asked him if he could mark the building with a flare. Getting an affirmative reply from SGT Hollis, 2LT Hollis directed his RTO to inform the pilots that he was marking the building with an M-203 flare.

**0405 hours** - SGT Hollis shot a flare, but hit the wrong building. The AH-6 made one pass, and destroyed the marked building with its mini-guns and rockets. 2LT Hollis then had his RTO inform the pilots that he would now mark the building with 5.56mm tracer rounds.

**0410 hours** - Standing up from behind the stoop, 2LT Hollis emptied an entire magazine of tracers into the building he wanted destroyed. The AH-6 approached perpendicular to the platoon’s location, fired the 7.62mm “gatling gun,” then the 2.75-inch rockets, and the building disappeared (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**0409 hours** – The TF Ranger JOC reported that the Pakistanis had cleared and secured the egress route from the stadium to Strongpoint 207. LTC David also reported multiple mortar rounds impacting within forty meters of his location at the release point.

**0410 hours** - As 2LT Juraimy’s Condors began moving south towards 2LT Hollis’ platoon, CPT Whetstone called in eight to ten more AH-6 and AH-1F mini-gun and rocket runs to keep the route cleared for the APCs. Without the 20-30 minutes of aerial fire-support, the recovery APCs would likely have met the same fate as the two APCs already destroyed at Hollis’ location; the sheer volume of Somali fires between the

two units was highly lethal for most of the night. Before they departed, CPT Whetstone had told the MAJ Aziz to go to the chemical lights, or “chemlights,” which 2LT Hollis would emplace to mark the pick-up location.

**0420 hours** - SGT Hollis had marked the road with green chemlights, and both 2LT Hollis and SGT Hollis had prepared the highly concentrated (HC) smoke grenades. The plan was to ignite the HC smoke grenades once the APCs had moved to their position and turned around, allowing the cloud of thick smoke to sufficiently build so as to cover their movement before advancing toward the vehicles (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 7, 2004; Hollis, 1998, pp. 32-33; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**0418 hours** - The TF Ranger JOC reported that the Pakistanis would fire forty mortar rounds into Villa Somalia in two minutes.

**0420 hours** - The Pakistanis reported that the egress route was no longer clear.

**0427-0429 hours** - Aircraft reported that they were continuing to work with a Terminator element, likely Terminator 26, to identify and engage targets.

**By 0430 hours** - 2LT Juraimy's Condors arrived at the chemlight extraction point. The language became a problem once more, because 2LT Hollis had planned on the drivers turning their APCs around before he was to enter the vehicles. 2LT Hollis was concerned that the vehicles would attempt to continue moving south, back into the ambush site, thinking that that route was the quickest way back to the New Port.

**0435 hours** - After having little luck at getting the vehicles to turn around, one of the Malaysians who had been with the platoon all night finally understood what 2LT Hollis wanted and started yelling in Malaysian to the drivers, who finally faced the vehicles north (Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**0438 hours** - CPT Meyerowich again requested more APCs to transport the additional 90+ TF Ranger personnel, and advised that if not provided, the overflow personnel would walk to Pakistani Stadium.

**0445-0450 hours** - After the Lost Platoon mounted the vehicles during the daring recovery with APCs, CPT Whetstone finally physically linked-up with the 2LT Hollis at the southern crash site. CPT Whetstone immediately began the process of ensuring 100 percent accountability while loading the remaining vehicles in order to withdraw. 2LT Hollis' platoon did not exit their APCs at the southern crash site.

**0505 hours** – The TF Ranger JOC received a report that the northern objective still had Wolcott's body trapped in the aircraft.

**0515 hours** - CPT Whetstone began his planned withdrawal to Strongpoint 207, but the Malaysians had other ideas, as they began receiving conflicting instructions from their chain of command en route to Strongpoint 207.

**0524 hours** - MAJ Craig Nixon, the TF Ranger LNO collocated with LTC David, reported that the Malaysian APCs returning from the southern objective were out of CPT Whetstone's control as they passed Strongpoint 207 heading for the Pakistani Stadium. LTC David's planned withdrawal had all elements linking up at Strongpoint 207 in order to perform an orderly and covered withdrawal. In the back of the APC, CPT Whetstone knew what the plan was, but was not able to control the drivers. When he strongly suggested to his driver to stop, the Malaysian pointed to his earpiece, as if to suggest that he was only following the orders he was receiving over his radio net. At that point, it was already too late—there was no turning the APCs around before they reached the stadium (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004; personal communication, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 9, 2004; Hollis, 1998, p. 32; personal interview, MAJ Mark Hollis, November 17, 2003).

**0528 hours** - CPT Meyerowich reported that he and the forces at his location had extracted the last body from the MH-60L, had set explosive charges to destroy the aircraft, and had consolidated all personnel for movement back to the release point on National Street.

**0530 hours** - CPT Whetstone and 2LT Hollis' Lost Platoon arrived at the Pakistani Stadium.

**0537 hours** - CPT Meyerowich finally departed the northern crash site area headed for Strongpoint 207.

**0550 hours** - CPT Meyerowich's company, and all TF Ranger personnel from the northern crash site, conducted a link-up with LTC David.

**0554 hours** - CPT Meyerowich requested that CPT Whetstone's Malaysian APCs return down National Street to pick up approximately fifty additional passengers. LTC David then directed that overflow personnel ride on the top of the APCs (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004). Approximately fifteen TF Ranger personnel began would become known as the "Mogadishu Mile," at the release point on National Street, since all of the APCs were fully loaded. Fearing friendly forces would leave them behind, these personnel literally ran beside the vehicles.

**0604 hours** - At the request of CPT Whetstone, the SWTs destroyed the APCs damaged on the southern objective (personal telephone interview, LTC Michael Whetstone, April 6, 2004).

**0608 hours** - The TF Ranger JOC received a report that there was still TF Ranger personnel dismounted. LTC David ordered all movement stopped until the vehicles picked up the personnel. Falcon 16, probably 1LT Breen, radioed that he had two APCs at Strongpoint 207, and would move to assist.

**0620 hours** - LTC David reported that all personnel were now with vehicles, and ordered the movement to resume.

**0632 hours** - LTC David reported that all QRF and TF Ranger forces had closed on the Pakistani stadium.

**0717 hours** - LTC David reported initial unit casualties to the TF 2-14 TOC as one KIA and fourteen WIA. The final casualty report for TF 2-14: two KIA, 24 WIA.

**0810 hours** - TF Ranger aircraft began shuttling personnel from Pakistani stadium to the airfield.

**0916 hours** - TF Ranger had accounted for all personnel; TF Ranger personnel listed six personnel from crash site #2 as MIA.

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